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ABSTRACT AND KEY TERMS 
Abstract  
 
This Master of Laws dissertation is a treatise of “The efficacy of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) in labour disputes: a critical comparative analysis of Botswana, 
South Africa (RSA) and Zimbabwe.” Alternative Dispute Resolution hereinafter 
referred to as (“ADR”) has attracted so much research ado worldwide with policy 
makers alive to its possibilities in so far as it ought to shed off the burden of the courts 
in handling disputes. Courts are considered inundated with unresolved cases taking 
many years to finalise. ADR is therefore touted, not only the panacea, but the cheaper, 
efficient and effective alternative to normal court process. This study was saddled with 
the common challenges of definition, scope and methodology as does most scientific 
studies, especially to locate the concept ADR in the plethora of views from prominent 
exponent-s of the discipline. This study labored on the considered view that ADR is 
essentially an ‘out of court settlement approach to dispensing with disputes involving 
an attempt by disputants to rope in an impartial third party to aid finality to the 
respective wrangle. The lack of a methodological approach to treat this subject matter, 
made this study more challenging. The study had to therefore rely on a hypothetical 
model developed after gleaning through various scholarly views1 that sought to treat 
the subject of ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution.  The study contented with the 
strongly held view2 that ADR is an efficacious approach in resolving disputes outside 
the court system. As to whether this was the case in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe 
in so far as labour dispute resolution is concerned was the major challenge this study 
was seized with? A model was formulated which envisaged that efficaciousness of 
ADR may be  achieved if three conditions or criteria are present within a jurisdiction, 
namely (1) ADR Background Conditions that comprise (a) adequate legislative and 
political support; (b) Supportive institutional and cultural norms, (c) adequate and 
competent manpower, (d) sufficient funding support, and (e) power-parity of 
disputants; (2) ADR Program Design comprising of  (a) Planning  and preparation and 
(b) Operations and implementation and finally (3) ADR Measures (a) Client 
 
1 Brown, Cervenak and Fairman Alternative Dispute Resolution: Practitioners’ Guide (1998) 10 (See 
also Kerbeshian (1994) 383 and Love Settling out of court: How effective is Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (2011) 5 
2 Folberg and Rosenberg Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis (1994) 1448 
xiv 
 
satisfaction; (b) Time efficient; (c) Cost saving and (d) Settlement & enforcement. This 
study measured the situations obtaining in the three countries using these three-
pronged criteria. In all three measures3 this study found that although all the three 
countries still have a long way before their ADR became as efficacious as would be 
reasonably possible, RSA has made many strides such as legislative enactments 
immediately upon attaining independence that sought to address the injustices of the 
past and thereby installing structures for enforcing industrial democracy4, while 
Botswana and Zimbabwe took 5 years5 and over 10 years6 respectively after attaining 
independence. RSA established an independent body for dispensing with labour 
dispute settlement7 while Botswana8 and Zimbabwe9 are still reluctant to do so, relying 
rather on their labour ministries often marinated in bureaucratic bottlenecks hence 
stalling efficacy of ADR. While RSA makes effort to provide adequate and competent 
manpower because of sufficient funding, Botswana and Zimbabwe still struggle to 
dispense with disputes under their labour departments who are either inadequately 
skilled or also accused of favouritism in the case of Zimbabwe.10 All the three countries 
are regarded as unequal societies which tends to sway the power-parity of disputants 
with capitalists still wielding unbridled powers in dispute outcomes. South Africa 
enacted section 143 to the Labour Relations Act11 which empowers the Director of 
CCMA to certify an arbitral award, giving it the same force as an order of the Magistrate 
Court. This has cut off the time and administrative burden of having to register an 
arbitral award with the court so as to obtain writs of executions and enforce it, a 
practice which is still prevalent in Zimbabwe. The Department of Labour in South Africa 
has made funding available to the CCMA to assist employees who are not in a financial 
position to enforce awards in their favour.12 The funding is aimed at employees who 
 
3 The three measures comprise (1) ADR Background Conditions; (2) ADR Program Design and (3) ADR 
Measures as outlined above and in the rest of the report. 
4 Section 115, Act 66 of 1995 
5 Bill of 1985 (See also Sachikonye Labour Legislation in Zimbabwe: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives (1985) 7) 
6 Trade Disputes Act 29 of 1982 
7 Section 115 Act 66 of 1995 
8 Section 3 Act 15 of 2003 
9 Sections 93 and 98, Labour Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
10 Madhuku The alternative labour dispute resolution system in Zimbabwe (2012) 31, (See Maitireyi and 
Duve Labour arbitration effectiveness in Zimbabwe: Fact or fiction? (2011) 138) 
11 Act 66 of 1995 (As amended)  
12 Strydom https://ceosa.org.za/amendments-to-section-143-of-the-labour-relations-act-66-of-1995-
and-the-implications-thereof/ Date of use: 13th February 2019 
xv 
 
are too indigent to afford the costs of enforcement.13 These employees are deemed to 
be: (a) Employees who earn below the earnings threshold (currently at R205 433.30 
per annum) – proof of income will be required by the CCMA. There is no record 
regarding enforcement or ease of enforcement of ADR outcomes in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe or at least this study is aware of. The governments of Botswana and 
Zimbabwe have been accused of using a heavy hand in determining wages, the right 
to strike and often curtailing union power through declaring certain sectors essential 
services. RSA’s Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration hereinafter 
after referred to as (the “CCMA”)14 runs an electronic system of case management by 
which cases are screened and assigned commissioners whereas Zimbabwe and 
Botswana still rely on manual systems often inefficiently managed especially when it 
comes to allocating matters to ADR interventionists.15 In Zimbabwe the challenge of 
resources is acute often the Labour Officers lacking a simple photocopier and postage 
stamps to dispense with administration of disputes. This dissertation found that 
Botswana and Zimbabwe lack publicly available information from which to infer the 
efficaciousness of ADR practices therein. Measuring client satisfaction, efficiency and 
cost effectiveness, enforcement and settlement has not been tackled with ease, which 
was different when it came to RSA. This study argues that RSA’s ADR is efficacious 
rated at 75% attainment of settlement of disputes, despite accusations of failing to 
offer disputants options and job retention at the end of ADR intervention. Botswana 
and Zimbabwe on the measures raised above are not yet close to achieving 
efficaciousness based on the above criteria. The challenges need to be addressed to 
ensure that in all three measures ADR affords Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe 
disputants a cheaper, efficient and effective alternative to dispensing with labour 
disputes. This study concluded with recommendations arising from the three 
measures ADR Background Conditions; ADR Program Design and (3) ADR Measures 
could be implemented towards achieving an efficacious ADR regime for the three 
countries and beyond. 
 
  
 
13 Strydom https://ceosa.org.za/amendments-to-section-143-of-the-labour-relations-act-66-of-1995-
and-the-implications-thereof/ Date of use: 13th February 2019 
14 Section 115, Act 66 of 1995 
15 Madhuku (2013) 35 and Ss 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2003 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Broadly construed, the term Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereinafter referred to as 
ADR), refers to “all forms of dispute resolution other than court litigation or adjudication 
through the courts,”17 often touted an “out of court settlement”18 approach to dispute 
resolution. Disputes are an intricate, inherent and a natural part of human existence.19 
Various reasons, be it personal or institutional relationships, account for why people 
find themselves engrossed in disputes. Disputes are also resolved in a variety of ways. 
Western societies have tended to traditionally resolve their disputes through the courts 
of law.20 However, it has been recognised that resolution of disputes through the courts 
is a complex affair awash with shortcomings and inadequacies that range from costly, 
time consuming processes, among other things, hence the emergence of alternative 
ways of doing so, to the satisfaction of the parties.21 In fact ADR is regarded as an 
alternative system whose chief aim is ‘to ensure accessible and fast dispute 
resolution’22 affording the parties more control, confidentiality, and a consensual 
approach to dispute resolution focusing more on preserving the relationship between 
disputants at the end of the process.23 Arguably, court litigation has, for instance, the 
effect of breaking down relationships that are personal to the parties at the end of the 
process.24 Some of the key ADR approaches that enjoy treatise in literature and use 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe are briefly outlined as follows: 
  
 
17 Wiese Alternative Dispute Resolution in South Africa (2016) 1 
18 Love (2012) 32 
19 Bosch, Molahlehi & Everett The Conciliation and Arbitration Handbook (2004) 2 
20 Wiese (2016) 1 
21 Ramsden The Law of Arbitration (2009) 1 
22 McGregor, Dekker, Budeli, Germishuys, Manamela, Manamela & Tshoose, Labour Law Rules (2013) 
13 
23 Wiese (2016) 2, See also Lynch ADR & Beyond: A Systems Approach to Conflict Management (2001) 
213. 
24 Wiese (2016) 2 
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• Negotiation: this is the process by which disputing parties attempt to resolve 
their differences by reaching settlement or comprise personally25 and privately 
by way of consensus and agreement, thus redefining the manner of their future 
relationship.26 
• Conciliation: this is a process in terms of which a third party termed a conciliator 
serves as a referee between the parties in dispute, for the sole purpose of 
encouraging movement towards a resolution without necessarily offering any 
suggestions, personal ideas or judgmental opinion.27  
• Mediation: This is a process in terms of which parties to a dispute make use of 
an independent third party to help them reach agreement.28 Mediation differs 
from conciliation in that the mediator is an expert in the field or subject at issue 
enabling him to facilitate dialogue and offer alternative suggestions that enable 
the disputants to open up, engage in a discussion and move towards a mutually 
agreeable resolution.29 
• Fact-finding: this is a non-binding process whereby the neutral third party 
determines the facts applicable to the dispute30 after hearing the parties’ 
presentations and in the result submits findings of fact and non-binding 
recommendations to the disputants in the hope that their adoption of same will 
resolve the dispute.31  
• Arbitration: this is a system of dispute resolution in terms of which an 
independent neutral third party is appointed by mutual agreement of the parties 
in dispute,32 who then employs quasi-judicial processes and acts as the 
decision maker in a dispute,33 after the parties make their presentations, s/he 
reaches an arbitration award, which, in general, is final and binding.34 The 
parties commit themselves to abide by that person’s decision, recognizing it as 
final and binding.35  The downside to arbitration is that the parties lose control 
 
25 Ramsden (2009) 1 
26 Cassim, Hurter & Faris Civil Procedure Study Guide CIP2601 (2013) (2013) 40 
27 Okharedia The Emergence of Alternative Dispute Resolution in South Africa: A Lesson for Other 
African Countries (2011) 2 
28 Wiese (2016) 5 
29 Okharedia (2011) 2 
30 Wiese (2016) 5 
31 Okharedia (2011) 2 
32 Wiese (2016) 7 
33 Coetzee & Schreuder Personal Psychology (2010) 470 
34 Lotter & Mosime, Arbitration at work (1993) 2 
35 Okharedia (2011) 2 
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of the outcome of the dispute resolution process while the advantage is that the 
dispute is resolved and the determination is binding and enforceable.36 
• Con-Arb: this is a process whereby the parties to a dispute refer it to a neutral 
third party who firstly attempts to mediate it, when s/he fails to resolve it through 
conciliation, the parties immediately agree to reach resolution through an 
arbitration process37 on the same day, through the same third party who 
attempted to have them resolve the dispute through conciliation.38 Corn-arb can 
either be voluntary or compulsory, depending on the parties who must apply for 
this process before it can be employed.39 
 
The above processes, either taken as a group or singly, constitute what comprises 
ADR as a dispute resolution mechanism. It is these mechanisms that are regarded as 
alternative approaches to resolving disputes without having to rely on the inefficient 
court system. Essentially, it is important to resolve disputes because unresolved 
disputes in their nature are often a threat to industrial peace, productivity, 
organizational progress and the national economy at large.40 Unresolved disputes 
have often led to violent outbursts and in certain respects deaths in South Africa41 and 
Zimbabwe alike.42 A case in point is the Marikana43 mine disaster which led to deaths 
of miners because a dispute could not be resolved amicably. This makes dispute 
resolution, let alone ADR, a very important subject of study in the modern-day 
industrial environment.  
 
The ILO has also acknowledged a dramatic increase in labour disputes in the globe 
and the importance of a macrolevel response in legislative frameworks of different 
countries to address these. The number of individual disputes arising from day to day 
 
36 Wiese (2016) 7 
37 Ibid  
38 Okharedia (2011) 2 
39 Ibid  
40 Betts Supervisory Studies: A managerial perspective (1989) 355 
41 Bosch, Deale, Friedman, Levy, Mpedi, Savage & Venter The Dispute Resolution Digest 2013 (2013) 
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42 Sibanda State and Industrial Relations in Developing Countries: Focus on Zimbabwe (1989) 18 
43 Marikana refers to a series of strike actions starting with the platinum industry in the Rustenburg area 
following by a spread of industrial action into the West Rand gold fields’ area beginning September 
2012. See also Bosch et al. (2013) 5 
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workers grievances or complaints have been rising across the world.44 The causes are 
complex and vary across countries and regions. Common features include an 
increased range of individual rights protection, a decrease in trade union density and 
/or collective bargaining coverage; higher risks of termination of employment and 
unemployment; reduced job quality security due to greater use of various contractual 
arrangements for employment and other forms of work and increase in inequality as a 
result of segmented labour markets.”45 
 
The three countries under review in this study, on paper, have committed to the 
establishment of industrial democracy through their constitutions. Section B (1) of the 
constitution of Botswana provides for certain limited rights pertaining to freedom of 
association.46 This gives expression to rights to belong to a union of one’s choice. The 
South African Constitution47 provides for everyone’s right to fair labour practice 
including both the employer and employee. The Zimbabwean constitution provides as 
follows: “everyone has a right to fair and safe labour practices and standards and to 
be paid a fair and reasonable wage.”48 The right to ‘freedom of association’; fair labour 
practice and fair and safe labour practices and standards and to be paid a fair and 
reasonable wage’ did not specifically speak to ADR but provided a framework to 
recognise and enforce industrial democracy in the three countries respectively. These 
standards found expression in legislative enactments of the Trade Dispute Act,49 the 
Labour Relations Act50 and the Labour Act51 which directly introduced and entrenched 
ADR in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. This study is interested 
in establishing if such legislative enactments speaking to ADR has led to efficacious 
implementation thereof. 
 
 
44 Ebisui; Cooney and Fenwick Resolving Individual Labour Disputes A comparative overview (2016) v, 
see also ILO, 2013a; http://www.ilo.ch/global/topics/employment-security/labour-market-
segmentation/lang--en/index.htm Date of use: 25 June 2019 
45 Ebisui et al. Resolving Individual Labour Disputes A comparative overview (2016) v, see also ILO, 
2016; http://www.ilo.ch/global/topics/employment-security/labour-market-segmentation/lang--
en/index.htm Date of use: 25 June 2019 
46 Section B (1) The Constitution of Botswana, 1966 
47 Section 23 of the Constitution of 1996 
48 Section 65 (1), The Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 
49 Act 15 of 2003 (Amended) 
50 Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
51 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
5 
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution has generally not enjoyed a smooth passage in the 
terrain of academic scrutiny especially in so far as its efficaciousness in resolving 
labour disputes is concerned giving regard to cases such as Bernstein52 and Bhorat53 
who cast aspersions on its potential for achieving desired outcomes. The concept of 
ADR is saddled with several challenges ranging from the politics of definition, as there 
is no universal agreement among scholars as to its meaning, history and origin, to 
issues of scope of what constitutes ADR, as well as whether the claims to 
effectiveness vis a vis court litigation can be substantiated with empirical certainty are 
reviewed later and in chapter 2 of this study specifically. 
 
The three countries under consideration in this study, Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe, 
are members of the International Labour Organisation, herein (the “ILO”), a United 
Nations body that deals with labour issues whose main function is to set international 
standards and monitoring implementation.54 The ILO was formed in 1919 after the end 
of World War 1 and specifically, with the hope of fostering universal peace.55 The 
general Assembly of the ILO, the International Labour Conference, meets annually in 
Geneva. It is attended by representatives or agents of countries which have ratified its 
conventions, who generally must comply with the Convention.56 ILO runs a system of 
international supervision that ensures that member countries that ratified conventions 
adhere to the provisions of such conventions. Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe became 
members of the ILO in 1978,57 1919 and 199458 and 198059 respectively. Within the 
ILO, labour dispute prevention and resolution are regulated by various Conventions 
and Recommendations: 
• Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention No. 151 (1978); 
• Collective Bargaining Convention No. 154 (1981); 
 
52 McIver and Keilitz (1991) 123 
53 Bhorat, Pauw, and Mncube Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Dispute Resolution 
System in South Africa (2007) 25  
54 Steadman, Handbook on Alternative Labour Dispute Resolution (2011) 13 
55 Benjamin, International Labour Standards: Labour Notes (1991) 83 
56 Ibid  
57   ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103303 Date of 
use: 25 June 2019 
58  ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:102888 Date of 
use: 25 June 2019. South Africa was a member of the ILO since its inception in 1919. Due to its 
apartheid policies, it withdrew and joined again in 1994. 
59 ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11110:0::NO:11110:P11110_COUNTRY_ID:103183 Date of 
use: 25 June 2019 
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• Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation No. 92 (1951); 
• Examination of Grievances Recommendation No. 130 (1967); 
• Labour Administration Recommendation No. 158 (1978). 
 
These conventions and recommendations are designed to provide guidelines for 
member states to establish labour standards in their countries. The International 
Labour Standards are therefore either conventions which are legally binding 
international treaties that may be ratified by member states or recommendations that 
are non-binding.60 It is apparent from the above that standards are a creation of the 
ILO61 hence the referral to standards under municipal law should derive its definition 
from ILO definitions.62  
 
Before critical resort is had to the analysis of the effectiveness of ADR, it is fitting for 
this study to consider a brief discussion of the origins of this concept. In fact, Deborah 
Hensler63 holds the view that ‘no one has yet written a comprehensive history of the 
dispute resolution movement.’ The history of ADR is as controversial as the concept 
itself for want of agreement among scholars, with some attributing it to the USA and 
yet others to Europe.64 There is also no agreement as to whether enquiries about the 
origins of ADR must focus on the concept itself or its interdependent constituencies 
vis a vis mediation, arbitration or negotiation among others.65 Karl Marx provides a 
more reasoned explanation for the source of conflict between employers (capital) and 
employees (the proletariat) that possibly points to the inevitable emergence of dispute 
resolution interventions such as ADR.66 Karl Marx67 proffered the foundation for the 
reasoned source of conflict through his conflict perspective also known as the conflict 
theory, although he limited it to class conflict.68 The conflict intensified in the industrial 
revolution when, what may be termed as class conflict, descended into the arena 
 
60 ILO, Rules of the Game: A Brief Introduction to International Labour Standards (2009) 14 
61 ILO, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation, Geneva: ILO 
62 Matsikidze Fair Labour Standards Elevated to Constitutional Rights: A New Approach in Zimbabwe 
Lavour Matters (2017) 26 
63 Shin (2011) 4 
64 Barrett & Barrett (2004) xxvii; (See also Boulle (2005) 1) 
65 Ibid  
66 Marx and Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party (1969) 14 
67 Ibid  
68 Ibid  
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camouflaged in social class struggle in which the owners (bourgeoisie) of the means 
of production or rather the businesses, factories, and textile mills in which the workers 
toiled and the providers of labour, rather the workers or proletariat battled for control 
over their fate or fortune.69 The power of the owners of capital often found its drastic 
expression through the common manipulation of the popularised ‘carrot and stick’ 
technique and use of the court system, which arguably protected the interests of those 
that were able to grease the hands of its propagators and those that administered 
justice.70 In essence, the court system protected the voice of capitalists undermining 
that of the providers of labour - the neutrality of law masks the biases and inequalities 
that underlie and perpetuate laws and social structures in capitalist societies.71 Modern 
day versions of Marx’s conflict theory to this end posit that domination, coercion and 
the exercise of power occur to some degree in all groups and societies72 because they 
are in the basic social mechanism for regulating behavior and allocating resources.73 
Unionism to some sizeable degree took forms of armed struggle in Botswana (to a 
lesser degree), South Africa and Zimbabwe by joining forces with political parties as 
they sought to dispel imperial control that disenfranchised the people74 and working 
class included.  
 
In essence, during the apartheid and colonial era respectively, the trade union 
federations such as the Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU) in South 
Africa75 and Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in Zimbabwe76 fought 
alongside revolutionary parties with the intent of democratising the workplace. At the 
end of the struggle oppressive labour legislation had to be purged.77 It is not in doubt 
however, that much ado in labour disputes gather around the interpretation of the 
contract of employment and the attendant conditions of employment. This 
necessitates a framework for resolving resultant differences, disputes, deadlocks or 
 
69 Marx and Engels Manifesto of the Communist Party (1969) 14 
70 Sachikonye (1985) 2  
71 Ibid  
72 Ibid 
73 Marx and Engels (1969) 16, See also Salamon (2000) 9 
74 Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa attained independence from colonialism, oppression and 
apartheid rule in 1966, 1980 and 1994 respectively. 
75 Budeli Freedom of Association and Trade Unionism in South Africa: From Apartheid to the 
Democratic Constitutional Order (2007) 127 
76 Sibanda (1989) 11 
77 Makamure Constitutional Reform in Zimbabwe: Labour, Gender and Socio-Economic Rights (2009) 
35 
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conflicts that may arise in such negotiations. Alternative Dispute Resolution has been 
proffered as such a framework or system. Whether or not it is an efficacious system 
begs answers in this study. 
 
There is nonetheless a long history of use of ADR particularly in collective bargaining 
and labour-management relations though this study limits the tenuous endeavor to a 
few instances that could provide pointers to the origins of the concept.78 Accordingly, 
in recorded history, ADR is said79 to have surfaced in a labour dispute in 1866 in the 
USA, when arbitration, one of its important constituent elements,80 was factored into 
employment agreements between former slaves and former [slave] owners, as 
directed by General Howard.81 Mediation, an important ADR element was factored into 
the institutional framework of labour relations as national unions pulled their weight in 
the late nineteenth century.82 Mediation was recognised by the U.S. federal 
government as a method of handling labour disputes with the enactment of the 
Erdman Act of 1898 into law.83 ADR has however spread to other fields of human 
endeavor including contract negotiations, contractual disputes,84 non-union 
employment contexts,85 public policy in environmental disputes,86 international 
conflicts, criminal justice cases,87 divorce, child custody battles, educational fraternity, 
sexual harassment and small claims courts88 to name but a few. The above situations 
have not had reviews conducted to ascertain the efficacy of ADR in resolving the 
attendant disputes or at least in countries beyond USA such as Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe which are of interest to this study.  
 
 
78 Barrett & Barrett (2004) xxvii 
79 Ibid  
80 Arbitration is an important constitute elements of ADR 
81 Barrett & Barrett (2004) xxvii 
82 Mareschal New Frontiers of Alternative Dispute Resolution (2002) 1256 
83 Mareschal (2002) 1256 
84 Eaton and Keefe Industrial Relations (1999) 56 
85 Bingham and Chachere Dispute Resolution in Employment: The need for Research in Employment 
Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace (1999) 25 
86 Baker ADR Assists Energy Industry Restructuring (1999) 8 
87 Bercovitch and Houston Why do they do it like this? An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Mediation 
Behaviour in International Conflicts (2000) 170  
88 Wall and Dewhurst Mediators Gender: Communication Differences in Resolved and Unresolved 
Mediations (1991) 63 
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In the USA it is interesting to note that in the case of Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane89  
a USA court endorsed a practice by non-union employers who required their 
employees to waive their right to have resort at court in their disputes but to resolve 
their disputes through arbitration.90 Between 1920 and 1935 alone a myriad of activities 
that were instrumental to the ADR concept took place.91 For example, in 1920 the New 
York state passed its first modern Arbitration Law, which was followed by five other 
States within a space of five years, and in the same year employers used various 
tactics to lobby government to reduce ‘collective bargaining’ and union membership’92. 
 
In the UK the use of ADR is entrenched in the construction industry and other sectors. 
A research study93 of 229 respondents interviewed, revealed that 70% preferred the 
use of ADR in resolving their disputes as opposed to pursuing same through a court 
litigation process.94  
 
In Cambodia for instance, a country that experienced years of war, civil unrest adopted 
ADR through the guidance of the International Labour Organisation herein (“the ILO”) 
through its Labour Dispute Resolution (LDR) project in 2002.95 This was a few years 
after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime and following three decades of civil 
conflict. The country had been characterized by an absence of effective institutions, 
basic laws, impartial judiciary or dispute resolution systems.96 The Arbitration Council 
was established to administer ADR in labour disputes and it has resolved over 70 per 
cent of the cases referred to it between its inception and December 2010. It has had 
a positive impact on overall industrial relations in Cambodia, thereby improving the 
climate for investment and economic growth.97  
 
It is unfortunate that the African continent has not so much as explored the 
development and use of ADR through existing frameworks especially in war torn crisis 
 
89 Gilmer V Interstate/Johnson Lane (500 US 20, 1991) 
90 Ibid  
91 Barrett & Barrett (2004) xxvii  
92 Ibid  
93 Brooker and Lavers (1997) 519 
94 ibid    
95 Vargha Reflections on ILO Experience:  How Can the Effectiveness of Dispute Resolution Systems 
Be Assessed? (2015) 7  
96 Vargha (2015) 8  
97 Ibid 
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contexts such as Sudan, Somalia, the Rwanda’s Tutsi and Hutu tribal wars, the sharia 
law and constitutional crisis and the Ogoni oil crises in Nigeria which could be well 
resolved through ADR as opposed to court litigation.98 Regarding the second 
challenge, there is for instance no agreement as to the specific history of the concept 
of ADR except that it is an alternative to court litigation as long as it embraces ‘informal, 
voluntary, accessible, and speedy resolution of labour disputes.’99 Apart from 
challenges to locate ADR’s origins in history the second challenge is that of definition, 
which is equally critical to this study as it attempts to find answers to its 
efficaciousness. The framework for determining ADR efficacy presents itself as the 
third challenge this study must grapple with, as discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Conceptually, though ADR is touted a panacea to the inadequacies of the court 
litigation approach to resolution of disputes,100 as to whether ADR is efficacious in so 
doing remains unknown if not a controversial notion. This is so because studies that 
have been conducted to substantiate the claims to ADR effectiveness in resolving 
disputes, let alone, labour disputes are negligible, and those101 that do attempt to do 
so are widely disagreed as to its efficacy. This makes the efficacy or otherwise of ADR 
difficult to ascertain. 
 
There is a dearth of literature that seek to investigate and analyse the efficacy of ADR 
in labour disputes which is the objective of the present study. Available studies have 
for the most part focused on either a historical treatise of the use of ADR with negligible 
success at reaching universal agreement among scholars,102 a descriptive analysis of 
the preferred use or otherwise of ADR,103 or review of other ADR attributes save the 
efficacy thereof. The only studies that provide impetus for the present study were 
conducted by Folberg and Rosenberg104 and Bernstein105 who reviewed the 
 
98 Okharedia (2011) 4 
99 Khabo (2008) 40 
100 Wiese (2016) 2  
101 Brooker and Lavers Perceptions of Alternative Dispute Resolution as Constraints upon its use in the 
UK Construction Industry (1997) 519 and Folberg and Rosenberg (1994) 1488  
102 Barrett and Barrett A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Story of a Political, Cultural, and 
Social Movement (2004) xxvii 
103 Brooker and Lavers (1997) 519 
104 Folberg and Rosenberg (1994) 1488 
105 McIver and Keilitz (1991) 123, ‘Court Annexed Arbitration (CAA) is defined as another type of ADR 
mechanism designed which involves a diversion of a portion of civil cases from the dockets of 
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effectiveness of Neutral Evaluation (ENE)106 and Court Annexed Arbitration herein (the 
“CAA”) which are ADR mechanisms, respectively.  
 
Measured against the following factors:107 overall cost, fees, savings, satisfaction, 
pendency time, and neutral adjustment, ENE108  an ADR system would be regarded 
as either effective or ineffective. While this study may have produced positive results 
that go to endorse ADR,109 it has not escaped the eye of scrutiny, especially that; (1) it 
seldom preserves the relationship of the parties beyond the dispute; (2) the 
neutralizing element was too simplistic to assume that all disputants preferred a private 
process and finally (3) it was confined to one context, North California District and had 
not been tested elsewhere to be regarded as a universally sound system.110 On the 
other hand, Bernstein111 sought to review the benefits of ADR mechanism terminal 
Court Annexed Arbitration herein (the “CAA”) in which a judge acts as arbitrator. The 
result was that it did not confer any benefits112 and further that it did not reduce the 
private or social cost of disputing.113 It can be gleaned from the above that while ADR 
may have worked in other contexts it remains to be tested against different contexts 
such as Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe especially in so far as its ability to 
achieve efficacious results through applying its use in labour disputes. While these 
studies have been conducted in the USA it would be important to verify their relevance 
outside the USA especially in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s ADR practices 
in labour disputes. Further, there is no synthesis of universally agreed measures 
 
overloaded state and federal courts into arbitration. CAA as such was coined to variously incorporate, 
“mandatory”, “compulsory”, “court ordered” form of dispute resolution approach/  
106 Department of Justice (2016) online, ‘Neutral Evaluation (a.k.a ENE) is defined as a dispute 
resolution technique that stands at midpoint between mediation and binding adjudication – which can 
be independent or integrated with other ADR techniques. This technique applies with the net result that 
the parties or their counsel present their cases to a neutral third party (usually an experienced and 
respected lawyer with expertise in the substantive area of the dispute) who renders a non-binding 
reasoned evaluation on the merit of the case. This technique integrates features of both a decision-
making and a non-decision-making process. During the process, the neutral may be invited to serve as 
mediator or facilitator’. 
107 Shin, Discussion on the Models of ADR (2011) 4 
108 Ibid   
109 Shin (2011) 4  
110  Ibid 
111 McIver and Keilitz (1991) 123, ‘Court Annexed Arbitration (CAA) is defined as another type of ADR 
mechanism designed which involves a diversion of a portion of civil cases from the dockets of 
overloaded state and federal courts into arbitration. CAA as such coined to variously incorporate, 
“mandatory”, “compulsory”, “court ordered.”  
112 US Legal (2016) online 
113 Bernstein Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR (1993) 2169 
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against which the assessment of ADR efficacy can be ascertained. This study 
attempts to provide such a framework, discussed later in this chapter and the rest of 
the dissertation. 
 
In RSA, the only study that attempted to provide inroads into the present study was by 
Bhorat.114 The study reviewed the effectiveness of Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation, and Arbitration (CCMA), a body which was formed at independence in 1994 
with the chief purpose of administering ADR as the first line of dispute resolution of 
labour disputes in the country.115 The study found both positive and negative 
outcomes. While the processes were received well however the study decried it for its 
lack of absolute success in reaching efficiency targets.116 Some of the main challenges 
that surfaced in the administration of ADR through CCMA included resource 
constraints and poor resolution of disputes.117 Other studies118 also confirmed Bhorat’s 
119’ misgivings with CCMA as an ADR system asserting that it is under strain due to its 
rather very legalistic approach, length delays, and declining settlement and 
enforcements of cases.120 Generally, the CCMA has not been able to resolve disputes 
as expeditiously as was hoped for in certain areas of the country.121 These are among 
the issues that casts doubt on the efficacy of ADR in South Africa that preoccupy the 
questions this study is concerned with.122 
 
In Zimbabwe, there is also a general lack of studies that review the efficacy of ADR. 
An important study that is closest to the aims of the present study was conducted by 
Madhuku123 who sought to review ADR in Zimbabwe. The use of ADR is pronounced 
in Zimbabwe through the enactment of the Labour Act124 which officially endorsed the 
use of conciliation and arbitration in resolving labour disputes.125 The study126 revealed 
 
114 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25  
115 Ibid  
116 Ibid  
117 Ibid    
118 Mahomed et al. (1997) 17 See also (Bendeman (2007) 142) 
119 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25  
120 Mahomed et al. (1997) 17. See also (Bendeman (2007) 142) 
121 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25  
122 Mahomed et al. (1997) 17. See also (Bendeman (2007) 142)  
123 Madhuku (2013) 35 
124 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
125 Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
126 Madhuku (2013) 35 
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chronic challenges the Zimbabwean ADR is saddled with emanating from lack of 
resources including lack of skilled staff, bureaucratic inefficiencies of being 
administered by government operatives, and biases perpetuated by some officers who 
are not motivated to administer the system127 among other things. While this study128 
sheds light on the development of ADR as a system and the manner in which it is 
administered, it is purely theoretical in nature and does not comprehensively factor in 
an in-depth analysis of the efficacy of ADR. Other studies129 while providing some light 
into the ADR practices in Zimbabwe were nonetheless limited to only certain aspects 
such as arbitration, or conciliation separately and descriptive profiling of ADR and least 
on its efficacy per se.130  
 
In Botswana, a study by Kupe-Kalonda131 in 2001 touched upon the use of ADR in 
labour dispute resolution, though the study was primarily conducted to review the 
contribution of the Industrial Court in labour disputes in Botswana.132 There is an 
evident use of ADR through the passing of the Trade Dispute Acts in Botswana.133 The 
study134 pointed out that ADR was constrained by the heavy-handedness with which 
the government administered ADR.135 The same sentiment also surfaced in Khabo136’s 
study who pointed out that conciliation, mediation and arbitration were undertaken by 
the Department of Labour in [Namibia] and Botswana undermining the independence 
and fairness of their outcomes and inability to foster the tripartite relationship that 
should [ordinarily] emanate from ADR.137 The principle of a tripartite relationship 
between the employer, employee and the State within the dispute resolution regime, 
should be promoted to foster the independence of ADR system138 as is the case with 
 
127 Madhuku (2013) 35 
128 Ibid  
129 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138. See also (Mawire Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, with Special 
Emphasis on Arbitration & Appeal Mechanisms (2009) and Watadza, Mahapa, and Muchadenyika 
Effectiveness of Conciliation and Arbitration in the FerroChrome Industry in Zimbabwe (2016) 341) 
130 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
131 Kupe-Kalonda The Industrial Court in Botswana: An Assessment of Its Contribution to Labour 
Relations (2001) 1 
132 Ibid  
133 Trade Disputes Act, 2003 (Act No. 15 of 2004) (Cap. 48:02). 
134 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
135 Section 3 (1) Act 15 of 2004  
136 Khabo (2008) 40 
137 Ibid A tripartite relation is a relationship between three parties, that is, the employer, the employee 
and the state. Given that the government also administers ADR, it implies if there is a dispute between 
the government and an employee the government acts both assailant and referee which tends to 
undermine the principle of the rule against bias. 
138 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 30 
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CCMA in South Africa.139 The challenges with the two studies, one by Kupe-Kalonda140 
and Khabo141 is that the first has been overtaken by events as it was conducted in 2001 
and that it was not conducted to investigate the efficacy of ADR in Botswana per se 
while the second was more of a general analysis of ADR in selected countries of 
Southern Africa. Studies that look closely at ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution 
in Botswana are scant. The present study is intended to fill that gap. 
 
It is discernible from the above analysis that CCMA in South Africa is constrained by 
failure to meet efficiency targets,142 the lack of resources, legalistic approach, lengthy 
processes, and poor settlement and enforcement of cases143 while in Botswana and 
Zimbabwe ADR is confined to the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the government as the 
primary administrators of the systems.144 The efficiency of ADR in labour disputes in 
South Africa is also undermined by the CCMA commissioners’ lack of jurisdiction to 
determine status disputes such as whether an employment relationship existed 
between employer and employee before the main issues in dispute are dispensed with 
as in the Linda145 case for instance. In this case the applicant, Erasmus Properties 
Enterprise contended against the referral by first and third respondents of their matter 
to CCMA, for resolution, a body that did not have jurisdiction over such a matter 
because there was no employment relationship involved but only that of independent 
contracting. The efficacy of ADR in all the three countries, Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe under review, is constrained by one demerit or the other though studies 
that investigate the phenomenon in a compresence fashion are negligible. However, 
the studies referred above in a way point to the issues that are of paramount 
importance to this study. The identification of factors146 such as overall cost, fees, 
savings, satisfaction, pendency time, and neutral adjustment that are required to 
measure ADR effectiveness; reduction of the private or social cost of disputing147 as 
 
139 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25 
140 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
141 Khabo (2008) 9 
142 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25  
143 Mahomed et al. (1997) 17 See also (Bendeman (2007) 142) 
144 Kalula, Ordor and Fenwick Labour Law Reforms that Support Decent Work: The Case of Southern 
Africa (2008) 13 See also Khabo (2008) 40 and Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
145 Linda Erasmus Properties v Lucky Mhlongo, the CCMA and Janine Beytell, J 1604/04, See also 
Building Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape) vs Melmons Cabinets CC & Another (2001) 
22 ILJ 120 (LC) 
146 Shin, Discussion on the Models of ADR (2011) 4 
147 Bernstein (1993) 2169 
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critical issues in ADR effectiveness; the critical importance of reaching efficiency 
targets148 in administering ADR processes; overcoming resource constraints and poor 
resolution of disputes149 as some of the issues that affect efficacy of ADR. The 
importance of independence and fairness of ADR processes was highlighted as critical 
to Botswana ADR. This could be achieved when the heavy-handedness of the 
government is curtailed and an independent ADR body is established to foster a 
tripartite relationship between the employee, employer and the state, rather than the 
present situation where the government tends to be the complainant, referee and 
decision maker in all disputes. This inadequacy is also obtainable in Zimbabwe where 
the government is seized with the role of administering ADR and subjecting the 
discipline into the usual bureaucratic bottlenecks, resource constraints and abuse of 
the system for personal and financial gain by officers in charge of ADR rendering it 
inefficient. 
 
This view contends that ADR has not provided the effective resolution of labour 
disputes in these countries, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, for many reasons 
that this study is designed to unearth, one being their bias towards traditional 
adjudication. The efficacious nature that ADR is touted to be in developed countries150 
does not enjoy the same accolades in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, there 
is still limited research on why this is so. Mahomed151  is of the considered view that 
‘...ADR-techniques supplementing formal justice systems at different levels work to 
provide South Africans with an opportunity to establish an acceptable justice system 
that will be swift and effective [are] required.’ (Emphasis mine).  This is in tandem with 
Kupe-Kalonda152 and Madhuku153 in Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively. The 
views154 sees ADR as only a supplementary dispute resolution system to the traditional 
court litigation system. This however does not address whether it is an efficacious 
‘supplementary system’ given the challenges such as inefficiency and costly court 
litigation is already saddled with. If for example disputes requiring determination of 
 
148 Bernstein (1993) 2169 
149 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25 
150 Shin (2011) 4, See also McGuinness, Rickard-Clarke, McAuley, Shanley & O ‘Donnell Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Consultation Paper (2008) 119 
151Mahomed et al. (1997) 
152 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 1 
153 Madhuku (2012) 32 
154 Mahomed et al. (1997) 17, Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 1 and Madhuku (2012) 32 
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whether an employment relationship does exist between disputants as the Linda 
matter155 in South Africa discussed above and Pako case in Botswana156 come before 
the so called ‘needed supplementary ADR system’ takes its course, will efficacious 
outcomes be guaranteed? It would appear to this study that ADR is saddled with 
jurisdictional challenges rendering its efficacy challenged. It is for this purpose that this 
study is designed to fill the knowledge gap within the context of Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe by assessing the status or efficacy (effectiveness and efficiency) of 
ADR and the major factors that are responsible for it.  
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution has generally not enjoyed a smooth passage in the 
terrain of academic scrutiny especially in so far as its efficaciousness in resolving 
labour disputes is concerned giving regard to arguments such as those by Bernstein157 
and Bhorat et al158 who cast aspersions on its potential for achieving desired outcomes.  
 
This study attempted to escape the first challenge of definition by providing a working 
definition to the subject ADR as ‘‘a buffet of processes of settling disputes outside the 
courts, consisting of an array of methods such as negotiation, conciliation, mediation, 
arbitration or a combination thereof, affording disputants an ‘accessible, informal, 
private, voluntary, independent, less combative, relationship building, cheaper and 
speedy, and more satisfactory resolution of disputes enhancing optimal enforcement 
of awards and outcomes.’’159 This definition is all encompassing capturing the 
important benefits, as well advantages to be achieved from the use of ADR apart from 
its inclusiveness of elements that may aid in finding criteria for measuring its efficacy 
such as accessibility and enforcement. These are also important for selecting a 
suitable ADR mechanism.160 It also helps in creating an atmosphere of addressing 
ADR efficacy around aspects such as ‘accessibility, informality, privacy, voluntariness, 
independence, less combative, relationship building, cheaper and speedy nature ADR 
is or should be and more satisfactory resolution of disputes in envisages, factored into 
the definition.  
 
155 Linda Erasmus Properties v Lucky Mhlongo, the CCMA and Janine Beytell, J 1604/04 
156 Pako Joseph v General Projects (Pty) Ltd and Xia Fanning UR 52/12 
157 McIver and Keilitz (1991) 123 
158 Bhorat et al. (2007) 25  
159 Cassim et al. (2013) 39. See also Love (2011) 1 
160 Khabo (2008) 40 
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It is however clearly evident in the preliminary review of literature161 that the general 
agreement among scholarly opinion that ADR is a departure from the tendency of 
seeking resolution of labour disputes through courts or adjudication processes is not 
in dispute. This is in tandem with the chief advocates of the practice162 who believe it 
is a great relief to the traditional court system of resolving labour disputes. What is not 
clear is whether ADR is efficacious in achieving what it is claimed to be able to secure 
for disputants in regard to fast resolution of disputes and the cost saving nature it is 
touted to provide. 
 
This study discusses, in a comprehensive fashion, the efficacy (effectiveness and 
efficiency) ADR in labour matters, with special focus on SADC countries, let alone, 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The general thrust which prefaces discussions 
of ADR saddles the concept which accolades it as being a panacea for the 
overburdened justice system. It is perceived as the cure for time consuming and costly 
traditional court litigation in finding resolution for disputes, let alone, labour disputes. 
Ordinarily, courts are overwhelmed by the unending inflow of civil cases to dispense 
with hence the need for a mechanism to supplement their efforts. Specifically, court 
litigation challenges drawn include the fact that: 
 
“the high cost of court litigation, means that access to justice is denied for the vast majority of 
the population; the long delays inherent in the court procedures often means that relief comes 
too late-justice delayed is justice denied; the parties to the dispute suffer a lack of control over 
the dispute resolution process due to the usual representation by attorneys who may not 
necessarily share or appreciate their real concerns; the rules of civil procedure (used to address 
labour disputes) are rigid and cumbersome; the adversarial nature of court proceedings often 
leads to a breakdown of personal relationships that are [often] valuable to the parties; and the 
court process is limited to that the legal remedies it provides can often produce a ‘win-lose’ [or 
lose win] resolution of a dispute (emphasis mine)”163  
 
 
161 Khabo (2008) 40 
162 Folberg and Rosenberg (1994) 1488 
163 Wiese (2016) 2 
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Several studies164 have confirmed that the use of ADR in selected countries is saddled 
with challenges mainly to do with inefficient or ineffective manner in which labour 
disputes have been handled.  
 
This chapter particularly introduces the discussion through a background to the study 
which has already be treated in the foregoing, the problem statement, aims and 
objectives of the study, justification and the methodology of the study leading to a 
conclusion. The problem statement outlines the nature of the problem which this study 
is grappling with especially that ADR is not proving to be as efficacious (effective or 
efficient) in Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa as previously thought. An 
interrogation of the causes and remedies may ensue in this study. Considered in this 
section is the point of departure which outlines the reasons why such a study would 
be necessary. This chapter provides a detailed description of the research methods 
used to conduct this study in particular the framework for measuring the efficacy of 
ADR in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as a critical 
comparative study. The methodological framework for measuring the efficacy of ADR 
as used in this study were adapted from the following prominent scholars: Love,165 
Kerbeshian,166 Brown167 and Shin168 to the extent discussed in this chapter. This is 
followed by a description of the structure through which the dissertation is conducted 
leading to a summary of the chapter. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Despite ADR processes having received so much attention as a panacea to the 
inadequacies or inefficiencies of court litigation in labour dispute resolution, ADR is 
still embroiled in controversy169 especially relating to the question whether ADR is 
 
164 Love (2012) 32; Khabo Collective Bargaining and Dispute Resolution – Is SADC meeting the 
challenge? (2008) 40; Kupe-Kalonda The Industrial Court in Botswana: An Assessment of Its 
Contribution to Labour Relations, Masters of Law in Labour Law Thesis, (2001); Mahomed, Olivier, 
Mokgoro, Nhlapo, Gauntlett, Mojapelo and Seedat Alternative Dispute Resolution: Commission Report 
(1997) 1) 
165 Love (2011) 5 
166 Kerbeshian “ADR: To be or …?” (1994) in Woodard (1997) 383 
167 Brown, Cervenak and Fairman Alternative Dispute Resolution: Practitioners’ Guide (1998) 15 
168 Shin (2011) 13 
169 Woodard Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, Are They Working? The Case of Travis County 
Settlement Week Program: An Applied Research Project (1997) 9. See Yamamoto ADR: Where have 
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efficacious (effective and efficient) in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as 
compared to the traditional court process in labour dispute resolution. The controversy 
is three pronged.170 As already shown above, first, ADR faces the problem of meaning 
and history of its origin. The next question is whether it should be called ‘alternative’ 
or ‘appropriate dispute resolution.171 The second challenge is around scope of what 
indeed constitutes ADR.172 There are inconclusive debates around whether arbitration 
should be factored into the scope of ADR given its resemblance with the court system 
(quasi-judicial nature) especially its notion of forcing decisions on disputants.173 The 
debate asserts that arbitration is a quasi-judiciary process that takes on the character 
of court litigation and should not be seen as ADR, which is purely reconciliatory and 
affords parties the latitude to decide their own outcome.174 This element is discussed 
fully in chapter 2 of this study. Third, there is confusion around the efficaciousness of 
ADR as a dispute resolution mechanism in general, and in particular whether it should 
be relied upon as an alternative to court litigation.175 Labour disputes, just like many 
other disputes whether personal or commercial, have always been resolved through 
the courts, which approach has been touted, time consuming, adversarial, combative 
and costly; hence resort to an alternative, ADR.176 There is a world of difference 
between those who support ADR as time saving, effective, cost effective and more 
satisfying than court litigation177 and those who disparage it as ineffective and 
delusional.178 Should ADR be relied upon as a labour dispute resolution mechanism? 
If ADR is said to be efficacious, would this suggest the need for a departure from the 
norm, court litigation, in so far as dispute resolution is concerned?  Court litigation has 
always been the traditional way of resolving disputes, let alone, labour disputes.179 
However, court litigation is considered lengthy, costly and tenuous (time inefficient) 
 
the Critics Gone Essay, Santa Clara Law Review 1055 (1996) 1056 and Shin Discussion on the Models 
of ADR (2011) 2) 
170 Ibid  
171 Mahomed et al. (1997) 13. See Brown, Cervenak and Fairman Alternative Dispute Resolution: 
Practitioners’ Guide (1998) 10. See also Mnookin “Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1998) in Shin (2011) 
7)  
172 ICC Guide to ICC ADR, Paris (2001) 3 
173 Ibid  
174 Ibid  
175 Wiese (2016) 2 
176 Bendeman Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the Workplace – The South African Experience 
(2007) 142. See also Shin (2011) 6) 
177 Love (2011) 1 See also Shin (2011) 4;  
178 Shin (2011) 13 
179 Ibid (See Mahomed et al. (1997) 17; Bhorat et al. (2007) 25) 
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because of the detailed processes180 required therein such as the pleading stage,181 
where disputants exchange summons, pleas, notices, discovery of documents,182 and 
conduct pre-trial procedures183 to determine the issues that must be before the court 
and then final trial.184 Court litigation may take years before a matter is set down for 
trial. ADR, on the hand presents a shortened process, often lasting days such as 30 
days in the case of South Africa185 Fourth, and finally, but closely related to the third 
issue is the general dearth in measurement criteria or framework by which the 
efficaciousness or otherwise of ADR can be ascertained with finality. The incessant 
claims that court litigation in labour disputes proffers a more satisfying result than ADR 
would, is contentious and triggers unending debate.186 This study discusses both views 
and seeks to find common ground for the contending parties. Whether ADR can be 
said, with certainty to be producing efficacious outcomes in labour dispute resolution 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe remains uncertain. In light of the foregoing 
discussion, it is clear that the present study has to inevitably contend with many 
challenges’ vis a vis definitional, scoping and measurement of efficacy framework 
issues - before proceeding to provide answers to its main aim which is to ascertain the 
efficacy of ADR in labour disputes in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
 
1.2  Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate in a comprehensive manner, the efficacy of 
ADR mechanism to ensure the effective and efficient resolution of future labour 
disputes. Pursuant to that, this study seeks to conduct a comparative assessment of 
the efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. In doing so the study investigates not only the level of effectiveness and 
efficiency with which ADR resolves labour disputes in the selected countries but also 
critically assesses its impact on the need to minimise reliance on courts litigation or 
adjudication. 
 
 
180 Cassim et al. (2013) 39  
181 Faris, Hurter, Cassim and Sibanda Civil Procedure, Module 2 Study Guide for CIP301K, (2011) 47 
182 Faris et al. (2011) 81  
183 Ibid 72 
184 Ibid 81 
185 Section 191 (1) (b) Act 66 of 1995 
186 Bhorat et al. (2007) 51 
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To achieve this purpose this study must provide answers to the questions below: 
 
1.3 Research Questions of the Study 
 
By focusing on the objectives set out herein, the study hopes to answer the following 
questions:  
 
• Is ADR efficacious in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe? 
• What initiatives have been undertaken to make ADR mechanism efficacious in 
labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
• Are there any challenges faced with the use of ADR in labour dispute resolution 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
• How effective are the ADR processes in resolving labour disputes in Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
• What are the similarities and differences between ADR processes in Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
• What can be done to improve ADR processes in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe? 
 
1.4 The objectives of the study  
 
To provide answers to the above questions, the specific objectives of the study are to: 
• Examine the efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe 
• Assess the initiatives undertaken to make ADR mechanism efficacious in labour 
dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe  
• Examine the challenges faced with ADR use in labour dispute resolution in 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
• Examine the effectiveness of the ADR processes in resolving labour disputes 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe? 
• Establish the factors pertinent to the effectiveness of ADR in labour dispute 
resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
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• Compare and contrast ADR processes obtaining in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. 
• Make recommendations for future research in ADR in labour dispute matters. 
 
1.5 Point of Departure 
 
Conducting this study is important for three reasons. First, the study will contribute to 
the stock of available theoretical knowledge in the subject area of ADR.  Although ADR 
has been the subject of many studies in the developed world, the subject remains 
under researched in the African and SADC context generally and in Botswana, RSA 
and Zimbabwe in particular. There exist no studies that the researcher is aware of 
focusing on a comparative analysis of the status of ADR in the three countries testing 
its efficacy or otherwise in particular. The only study that comes closest to the subject 
under review was conducted by Madhuku187 focusing of the status on ADR in 
Zimbabwe while theoretically comparing its status to other SADC countries, Botswana 
and South Africa but did not place much emphasis on developments and efficacy of 
ADR in the comparator countries. Another important study was conducted by 
Mahomed and others.188 Though Mahomed et al189 study touches on ADR it does not 
single out labour disputes as its primary focus of enquiry but generalises its application 
to other areas such as family and commercial disputes. It sheds light on the subject 
under review in that it pointed out the need to continually review dispute resolution 
mechanisms and provide efficient methods to resolve disputes aside adjudication.190  
 
Another important study by Bhorat et al191 is touted a breakthrough study as it provided 
a rather clinical and non-legalistic interpretation of the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the CCMA since its inception.192 It relied on “...advanced statistical techniques and 
models to analyse labour dispute referral trends and investigated variations in 
efficiency across regions, sectors and types of disputes.”193 The researcher however 
acknowledged its limitations, one being that it was purely positivist and further it left 
 
187 Madhuku (2012) 3 
188 Mahomed. et al. (1997) 17 
189 Ibid  
190 Mahomed. et al. (1997) 17 
191 Bhorat et al. (2007) 50  
192 Ibid   
193 Ibid 
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out legalistic interpretation of ADR processes, a matter that is important to the present 
study. Many important questions such as what are the major determinants of 
effectiveness and efficiency of ADR and what these countries are doing to create an 
efficacious labour dispute mechanism, thus remain unanswered. First, by assessing 
the status of ADR including the factors that affect it as well as testing the major factors 
that are responsible effective labour dispute resolution, this study will contribute to the 
bridging of this knowledge gap.  
 
Second, the study will generate information (knowledge) that could form the basis for 
policy formulation in the management of ADR processes in Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe to expedite effective resolution of labour disputes. Although initiated 
primarily for explanation rather than policy purposes, the study will contribute 
significant knowledge that could become quite useful in the formulation and, above all, 
the effective implementation of future labour dispute resolution policies in the selected 
countries being studied. The attitudes and behaviours of policy makers are central to 
the effectiveness and successful operation of any ADR mechanism as they are 
primarily responsible for whether ADR policies, financial and other resource support 
are committed to its development and see to its basic implementation.194 By 
understanding the best practices that bolster as well as the particular factors that are 
considered to be important effectively, utilising ADR will be better equipped to tackle 
the problem of costly and time consuming resolution of labour disputes. According to 
Bhorat,195 because CCMA often relied on part-time commissioners who were paid on 
an hourly basis it was suspected that they deliberately delayed cases to clock more 
hours. This however was not supported by empirical evidence. The need to determine 
whether ADR is effective or otherwise and the factors responsible for its 
efficaciousness requires answers. It is believed that the findings of this study will form 
the basis for the formulation of better ADR policies and processes in the selected 
countries by identifying the important factors that have a bearing on its cost and time 
effectiveness. This is achieved through an analysis, unearthing pertinent issues and 
reporting on specific literature, studies, reports, court cases and other documents that 
 
194 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
195 Bhorat et al. (2007) 51 
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have handled the subject of ADR in labour disputes in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe.  
 
Third and finally, understanding what makes an effective ADR or rather effective 
labour dispute resolution is important in itself because the concept has been said to 
be a key factor in explaining a departure from court-administered resolution of labour 
disputes. ADR for example has been touted a major development in labour dispute 
resolution in developed countries, since 1886 in the USA for instance.196 Research has 
also shown that mediation and arbitration as ADR constituent elements often produced 
better satisfying results than combative, cumbersome and competitive adjudication 
systems.197  
 
1.6 Assumptions of the study  
 
This study makes a number of assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that ADR is an 
important development in labour dispute resolution in the three countries under 
investigation. As such ADR will continue to be important and used in resolving labour 
disputes in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Secondly, it is further assumed 
that everyone involved in a dispute desires the most effective and efficient approach 
to resolve it with regards to both cost and time. This is why this study would like to find 
out if it is indeed efficacious to find resort at ADR in resolving labour disputes in 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Thirdly, to achieve the objectives of this study 
it is also assumed that the information targeted by the study will provide relevant 
information on ADR efficacy in labour disputes in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe especially given that it incorporates a selection from myriads of documents 
on the subject. However, this will be overcome in this study through ensuring that 
documents such as court cases, reports and public discourse discussion papers that 
place ADR in its proper perspective and addresses issues of efficacy are critically 
selected and analysed.  
 
 
196 Love (2011) 5 
197 Bernstein (1993) 2259  
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1.7 Research Methodology  
 
This section discusses the research methodology followed in this study to both collect, 
analyse and report its findings. This is against the background that ADR appears 
entrenched in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.198 This study predominately 
relies on document analysis as its main research methodology. This includes case 
analysis, review of annual reports on performance of administrators of ADR in the 
respective countries. Information analysed in this study was obtainable from reports 
from commissions, and databases as well as reported cases on ADR. According to 
Eugene Bardach199 ‘when conducting policy research, almost all likely sources of 
information, data, and ideas fall into two general types: documents and people.’  
 
1.8 Document analysis approach  
 
Document analysis is also going to predominantly encompass this study. In this case 
documents such as cases from court proceedings, ADR proceedings where available, 
reports and other material that may aid this study will be analyses.200 Accordingly, 
Dvora Yanow201 holds the view that document analysis can be used in observational 
studies or an interview-based project, in which background information is obtainable 
prior to the study. Such document analysis may therefore corroborate or review 
observational and interview data. The net result is that it all provides the researcher 
with tools to clarify, or challenge what is being told. In the case of ADR, it is important 
to review the documents, themes and trends that emanate from the same for further 
clarity to match with standards derived from literate and evidence elsewhere. Lee202 
suggests that “a document is a durable repository for textual, visual and audio 
representations.” According to Saunders et al.203 the forgoing suggestion by Lee204 
illustrates the availability of a wide range of sources of documents and data that this 
study immensely relies upon to ascertain the efficacy of ADR in labour dispute 
 
198 Bendeman (2007) 142 (See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 1; and Madhuku (2012) 3) 
199 Bardach (2009) 69 
200 Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill Research Methods for Business Students (2016) 183 
201 Yanow (2007) 411 
202 Lee Using documents in organizational research (2012) 391 
203 Saunders et al. (2016) 183 
204 Lee (2012) 391 
26 
 
resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.205 Essentially, this study will 
review court cases in which ADR cases are dealt with. This assists this study to draw 
out the main issues around such issues as ADR settlements and awards as well as 
their enforcements, time and cost saving nature of ADR processes. Court cases by 
the nature tend to interpret the laws as they are applied in practice.  
 
1.9 Methodological framework for measuring the efficacy of ADR 
 
The lack of a methodological framework for measuring the efficacy of ADR frameworks 
is however acknowledged by several scholars including Love,206 Kerbeshian,207 
Brown208 and Shin.209 Studies that deal with the effectiveness of ADR, especially 
outside the United States are negligible. For example, according to Bingham,210 “most 
scholars and commentators agree that there is insufficient empirical research about 
the efficacy and success of ADR as compared to traditional court litigation.” One study 
that laid out a sort of framework which can be used to assess if ADR is effectively 
structured and in operation was conducted by Brown et al211 which factors what are 
termed as ADR background conditions and ADR program design.  This study will be 
largely reliant on these three points of analysis, namely ADR Background Conditions; 
ADR program design212 then finally ADR Measures.213 These elements, as illustrated 
in figure 1, were relied upon as the main measures of efficacy and comparison of the 
status of ADR in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe in this study. They are briefly 
discussed below in turn. 
 
205 Lee (2012) 391 (Categories of textual documents include: 
• Communication between individuals or within groups such as email, letters, social media and 
blog postings; 
• Individual records such as diaries, electronic calendars and notes; 
• Organizational sources such as administrative records, agendas and minutes of meetings, 
agreements, contracts, memos, personnel records, plans, policy statements, press releases, 
reports and strategy documents; 
• Government sources such as publications, reports and national statistics; 
• Media sources including printed and online articles and other data. 
206 Love (2011) 5 
207 Kerbeshian “ADR: To be or …?” (1994) in Woodard (1997) 383 
208 Brown, Cervenak and Fairman Alternative Dispute Resolution: Practitioners’ Guide (1998) 15 
209 Shin (2011) 13 
210 Bingham, Nabatchi, Senger and Jackman “Dispute Resolution and the Vanishing Trial: Comparing 
Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes.” (2009) 3 
211 Brown et al. (1998) 15 
212 Ibid 40 
213 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
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Figure 1 ADR Efficacy Framework 
 
Adapted from Brown et al214 and Kerbeshian215 and Love216 
 
ADR Background Conditions constitute adequate legislative and political support, 
institutional support, human resource support, financial resource support and parity in 
the power of disputants217 on the one hand. The general idea is whether these 
elements are factored in when ADR is instituted as a dispute resolution mechanism.218  
Some of the main reasons advanced for needing political support for an ADR system 
are: securing legislative support to establish jurisdiction and authority; obtaining 
bureaucratic protection from resource cuts; obtaining financial support; building 
popular acceptance and use and overcoming opposition of vested interests, among 
others.219 Aspects such as adequate human resource and financial support will deal 
with whether or not ADR mechanism is adequately supported by skilled staff and 
sufficient numbers to handle disputes.220 Often lack of sufficient staff creates backlogs 
and delays in resolution of disputes which defeats the very essence of its existence.221 
This factor also addresses issues of power parity in terms of fairness of procedure 
within ADR system.222 Typically, informal processes are less able to produce fair 
outcomes than formal justice systems in cases where there are wide power 
disparities.223 Powerful parties such as elites and capitalists retain the ability to 
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intimidate weaker parties in conciliation or mediation in the result coercing them into 
accepting unfavourable settlements.224 
 
ADR program design225 considerations on the other hand, deals with Planning and 
preparation and Operations and implementation.226 It is critical to design the ADR 
program with consideration to specific steps that ought to be taken to ensure the 
quality of the procedural components of ADR,227 the justice to be served in the ADR 
program,228 the ADR facilitator, and the screening process of the cases suitable for 
ADR.229 An effective program ought to remove traditional obstacles to settlement 
without substituting new ones.230 Careful design guarantees that programs and their 
procedures are not over-formalised or perceived as unfair.231 Fairness and a degree of 
informality are necessary to foster settlement.232 According to Brown et al.233 planning 
and preparation deals with seeking answers to the following key questions in this 
regard: What are the needs for dispute resolution in any given country such as 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe? What kinds of disputes are going unresolved? 
Are parts of the population excluded from or underserved by the existing formal 
structures? Are the costs of the existing system so high that many citizens cannot 
participate in the use of available ADR processes on the offing? What disputes are 
considered appropriate for informal resolution?234 The questions of selection of cases 
to go through ADR is important. If there is no screening process it may lead to the 
clogging of the system through frivolity where flimsy cases are brought before the 
tribunal even those outside its jurisdiction.235 Some of the major barriers inhibiting 
disputants may include cost, illiteracy, discriminatory procedures, and perceptions of 
unfairness, physical inaccessibility, and lack of proximity, or lack of awareness.236 An 
 
224 Brown et al. (1998) 33, see also Coetzee and Schreuder (2010) 470  
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226 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
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appropriate program design should address these conditions and lead to development 
of goals to address them.237  
 
Operations and implementation deal with how the ADR programs are executed within 
the three countries under consideration in this study.238 This aspect deals with 
establishment of effective procedures for selection, training239 and reputation of 
mediators and arbitrators – who have unquestionable credibility and accepted by the 
people to administer the processes.  Giovannucci and Largent240 suggest that, at a 
minimum, … training (for mediators) ought to cover: basic mediation skills; the 
distinction between various types of alternative dispute resolution; the detection and 
management of mental illness, drug and alcohol issues and intellectual disabilities; an 
overview of the specific system; an overview of the roles of each possible mediation 
participant; and effective mediation techniques to deal with impasse or emotionality 
(emphasis mine).241 Second, according to Brown et al.242 finding or creating a 
sustainable source of financial support is crucial for ADR success because many 
potentially successful ADR initiatives have been crippled by lack of sustainable 
financial support.243 All dispute resolution procedures carry transaction costs the time, 
money and emotional energy expended in disputing the resources consumed and 
destroyed and the opportunities lost.244 The cost of operating an ADR system can vary 
widely. For example, one of the ADR systems considered to be effectively 
administered is the Mediation Board in Sri Lanka owing to the fact that it operates 
inexpensively with volunteer mediators.245 However, the increasing burden on these 
mediators call into question the long term viability and sustainability of the volunteer 
system.246 It is readable from the above that without sufficient funds to administer ADR 
will negatively affect its effectiveness and render it even more expensive for the 
common man. This provides insight into ways of enhancing efficacy as far as cost 
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element is considered in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s ADR processes. 
This study seeks to consider if sufficient funding is a consideration, if at all, in 
determining the efficiency of ADR in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, and if it 
is so to analyse how that is the case and how the authorities therein are handling this 
aspect. Third, creating an effective outreach and education program to reach users.247 
Outreach and education efforts require innovative techniques, particularly to reach 
populations with low levels of literacy.248 Fourth, this calls for the need to create centres 
near the disadvantaged communities to ensure that they can access ADR services.249 
This study seeks to understand the role of creating such outreach programmes in 
ensuring ADR is effective and if so how this is obtaining in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe’s labour dispute resolution systems. 
 
ADR Measures which constitute client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, cost 
and efficiency.250 The main goals identified are: minimise costs, resolve quickly, 
maintain privacy, maintain relationships, involve constituencies, link issues, get neutral 
opinion, and set precedent.251 When considering these goals of ADR one would see 
that Sander and Goldberg’s first two measures (minimise costs and resolve quickly)252 
are in synch with Kerbeshian’s two measures efficiency and cost253 making them 
important measures in considerations of the efficacy of ADR and widely accepted 
among scholars.254 The elements of such as client satisfaction, settlement and 
enforcement, efficiency and cost255 require attention as measures to the degree that 
they are valued by ADR users’ particular disputants.256 
 
These measures of ADR Background Conditions; ADR program design257 then finally 
ADR Measures258 will be used as the basis of comparison of the status of ADR in 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe in this study leading to a conclusion. 
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1.10 Ethical considerations  
 
This study is guided by fundamental ethical considerations that relate to responsible 
research in human and social sciences. Ethical considerations in research comprise 
the concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts over the proper way to conduct research.259 
According to Neuman and others, ethical considerations help to define what is or is 
not legitimate to do, or what “moral” research procedure involves.260 These views are 
consistent with those expressed in the Collins Concise dictionary which defines ethical 
practices as being in accordance with principles of conduct that are considered correct 
especially those of a given profession or group.261 The main ethical considerations that 
will be critical to this study is that it will observe referencing requirements and avoid 
plagiarism.262 Plagiarism is described as stealing information from another source and 
passing it off as your own.263 In order to successfully conduct this study an ethical 
clearance was requested and granted from the College of Law’s ethical clearance 
committee. 
 
1.11 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the background to the problem under consideration in this 
study. In this chapter, the study found that the concept of ADR, like any other concept, 
is faced with several challenges including challenges of definition, scope as well as its 
history. Chapter one introduces the concept around which the study is conducted. This 
is the chapter that discussed the concept of ADR and the problem statement which 
prompted this study to be conducted. It also handled the research questions, research 
methodology, chapters outline, aims and objectives of this study. This study is guided 
by scientific research principles and conventions in order to produce a sound, objective 
and valid result. As such, the research philosophy and strategy employed in this study 
are discussed in this chapter. This chapter also considered how the validity and 
reliability of findings will be realised as well as the ethical considerations of this study, 
the assumptions, limitations and delimitations to be observed. 
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Many studies have been conducted to ascertain the cost effectiveness of ADR 
especially that it reduces the cost of dispute resolution relative to court litigation.264 
Estimates of cost savings vary across different studies depending on the ADR type 
under review. Very few studies of this nature have been conducted to ascertain the 
efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution, specifically focusing on a critical 
comparative analysis of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. This study was 
conducted to fill that gap. This study also noted that the three countries under 
consideration are members of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and have 
ratified its conventions to implement effective labour dispute resolution regime in 
respective countries. Remaining to be ascertained is whether such ratification of ILO 
conventions has contributed to ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution in the 
countries. 
 
1.12 Chapters outline of the Dissertation 
  
In its entirety, this study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1, as already 
observed, provides for a general introduction, outlines and research problem, the 
problem statement, the aims, rationale and scope of the study. It also deals with the 
methodology, highlighting the main research questions, research objectives and 
methodological framework adapted from the viewpoints of prominent scholars like 
Love,265 Kerbeshian,266 Brown267 and Shin.268 used to tackle the study, before delving 
into the outline.  
 
Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical background. It defines key concepts used in the 
study and their relation to the subject matter. These concepts include ADR, disputes, 
disputing process, negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration. The chapter 
also considers the theoretical underpin ADR in labour disputes and the measures that 
are important for analysing the efficacy of ADR. 
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Chapter 3 deals with ADR in Botswana. It traces the history of dispute resolution in 
Botswana under the colonial legal order to the present, after a brief outline of the 
Botswana context. The chapter then conducts an analysis of case law to determine 
ADR efficacy in labour disputes in Botswana.   
 
Chapter 4 deals with ADR in South Africa. It traces the history of dispute resolution in 
South Africa under the colonial and apartheid legal order to the present, after a brief 
outline of the South Africa context. The chapter then conducts an analysis of case law 
to determine ADR efficacy in labour disputes in South Africa.   
 
Chapter 5 deals with ADR in Zimbabwe. It traces the history of dispute resolution in 
Zimbabwe under the colonial legal order to the present, after a brief outline of the 
Zimbabwe context. The chapter then conducts an analysis of case law to determine 
ADR efficacy in labour disputes in Zimbabwe.   
 
Chapter 6 provide for a critical comparative analysis of ADR in Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. It highlights the points of difference and similarity in the manner ADR 
processes are administered, leading to the review of ADR efficacy in labour dispute 
resolution.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study. It discusses the challenges ADR processes are faced 
with in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as well as the conclusions and 
recommendations and recommendations for further research on ADR. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2 INTRODUCTION  
 
While the previous chapter provided the context, background and problem of this 
study, the present chapter deals with the theoretical background to this study. It 
defines key concepts used in the study and their relation to the subject matter. The 
concepts include ADR, meaning and nature of disputes, disputing process, 
negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration, challenges and measures of ADR 
efficacy. These concepts are interrelated as will be seen throughout the chapter. The 
chapter also considers the theoretical bedrock underpinning ADR in labour disputes 
and the measures that are important for analysing the efficacy of ADR. 
 
2.1 The challenge of ADR in labour dispute resolution 
 
It is difficult to define ADR given the lack of a universally accepted definition thereof. 
The challenge of definition cannot be ignored as measuring efficacy of ADR depends 
on it. It is important to this study to consider the definition of ADR as a precursor to 
evaluations of effectiveness and efficiency thereof. This study considered the definition 
by Zack269 in which ADR is defined as “… a broader spectrum of processes, other than 
litigation, used to resolve disputes.” The use of the axiom ‘out of court settlement’270 
often resonates with the idea of ADR as well.  
 
Failure to reach a universal definition of ADR led this study to adopt a working 
definition, thus, for the purpose of this study, ADR is ‘‘a buffet of processes of settling 
disputes outside the courts, consisting of an array of methods such as negotiation, 
conciliation, mediation, arbitration or a combination thereof, affording disputants an 
‘accessible, informal, private, voluntary, independent, less combative, relationship 
building, cheaper and speedy, and more satisfactory resolution of disputes enhancing 
 
269 Zack Can Alternative Dispute Resolution help resolve employment disputes? International Labour 
Review (1997) 1 
270 Love (2011) 2 
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optimal enforcement of awards and outcomes.’271 This definition was adopted because 
of its all-encompassing nature in which it captures the fact that there is no single ADR 
approach and then the main attributes which make ADR unique for example 
accessibility and privacy, among other things. The definition also captures the 
elements of ADR efficacy such as enforcement. Attempting to define ADR is 
constrained by other factors such as what ADR really stands for and what constitutes 
ADR. Alternative Dispute Resolution has been variously accorded myriads of 
nomenclature including ‘ADR’272 Assisted Dispute Resolution’;  and ‘Amicable Dispute 
Resolution.’273 Recent developments have proffered ‘Online Dispute Resolution’;274 
‘External Dispute Resolution’ and ‘Internal Dispute Resolution’ as our dispute 
resolution approaches adding to the ADR confusion.275 In an attempt276 to arrest the 
confusion between ‘Appropriate’ as opposed to ‘Alternative’ the Oklahoma Bar 
Association in the USA, without necessarily using ‘Appropriate Dispute Resolution’ but 
rather ‘Appropriate alone proffered277 the most plausible explanation that "alternative" 
dispute resolution would pertain to any approach that excludes the court process while 
"Appropriate" dispute resolution factors any responsive option for conflict resolution 
relevant to each given issue inclusive of the courts. According to Steadman 
“Alternative dispute resolution’ (ADR) is a term that first coined to describe an initiative 
by litigants, and their representatives, to use innovative ways of resolving disputes 
other than the typical adversarial process of litigation.”278 The general philosophy 
towards dispute resolution that ILO shares is in tandem with the UK formulations of it, 
especially couched around the term ‘proportionate dispute resolution herein 
(“PDR”).’279 PDR is generally a government strategy developed to enhance access to 
information and a diversity of services needed by people to apprehend their rights and 
responsibilities, avoid legal problems where possible, and, where inevitable, to resolve 
their disputes effectively and proportionately. This can be done through:  
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• increasing advice and assistance to help people resolve their disputes earlier 
and more effectively;  
• increasing the opportunities for people involved in court cases to settle their 
disputes out of court; and  
• reducing delays in resolving those disputes that need to be decided by the 
courts.280 
 
Generally, the above framework to a larger extent is already being applied in South 
Africa through the CCMA body which was powered by ILO at its inception through 
training and capacitating its first cohort of workers and commissioners.281 This would 
have been ideal for Botswana and Zimbabwe had the government therein set up a 
structure like CCMA in their respective countries. It would enhance efficaciously 
dispute resolution.  
 
This study however, rather elects the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution as it gives 
expression to the above working definition. However, the challenges are still far from 
over as there is no agreement as to what constitutes ADR given that negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation are considered consensual approaches reminiscent with its 
ethos to the exclusion of arbitration.282 Arbitration is considered to be quasi-judicial 
especially that the third party decides on the final outcome of a dispute. This 
disempowers the parties who cannot come to their own decision which is the case with 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation in which a third party only facilitates dialogue and 
parties reach their own settlement.283 The next section considers three important 
terms, grievances, conflicts and disputes contending that they are intricately related to 
each other.  
 
2.2 Grievances, conflicts, disputes and dispute resolution 
 
Understanding the meaning, nature of grievance, conflict and dispute is critical in an 
enquiry into the issues of dispute resolution. These terms are usually used 
 
280 DCA www.dca.gov.uk/civil/adr/index.htm Date of use: 25 June 2019 See also Steadman (2011) 13 
281 Steadman (2011) 43 
282 ICC Guide to ICC ADR, Paris (2001) 3 
283 Ibid  
37 
 
interchangeably.284 This study seeks to address the various challenges around these 
terms as they are important for the aim of this study, especially dispute resolution 
under the auspices of ADR. 
 
2.2.1 Grievances  
 
Generally, the thesaurus dictionary defines a grievance through the use of a number 
of words such as a complaint, protest, grumble, injunctive, wrong or ill-treatment 
among others. It is seen as a precursor to a conflict or rather a pre-conflict stage.285 
This is a stage where an individual or party believes that, s/he or its right(s) have been 
infringed or the aggrieved party has been allegedly wronged or injury has been caused 
it. Such perception may be legitimate and real or just merely imagined. The perception 
of injury or prejudice is what is termed a grievance which is a precursor to a conflict. 
Disputes and conflict emerge from grievance.286 Miller and Sarat287 argues that ‘it is 
consequent upon us to look at the incidence of grievance to establish the baseline 
potential for disputes.’288 Resultantly, such a line of reasoning presents a conceptual 
problem in that there is a thin line between concepts grievance, conflict and dispute. 
This is so because grievance presupposes a composition of concrete events or 
circumstances which are relatively objective, but they are also composed of subjective 
perceptions, definitions and beliefs that an event or circumstance is unwarranted or 
inappropriate.289 By the same rendering, this study looks at labour disputes per se. 
What may aggrieve one worker and the other may shrug it off as insignificant. Miller 
and Sarat290 warns that ‘care ought to be taken to ward off the confusion that often 
arises between the expressed rate of grievances flowing from their survey and the 
degree of injury which may be said to have been suffered.’ It is at the instance of such 
realisation that the individual or party elects to either escalate the grievance into a 
confrontation or otherwise (e.g. walk away (avoidance)).291  
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The evolutionary steps in the formation of disputes are in the following order starting 
with (1) conflict, moving to (2) power, then (3) transformation, (4) grievances and then 
(5) disputes.292 This study tends to favour the former rather than the latter. The 
understanding of the progression of conflict from grievance and then to a dispute stage 
is also corroborated by Bosch293 who holds the view that ‘the root cause of a dispute 
is the underlying conflict between the parties.294 The conflict and conflict stage is 
discussed next. 
 
2.2.2 Conflicts 
 
There is no general agreement as to a universal definition of conflict as there are many 
definitions as those295 seeking to define it. According to Bosch296 “conflict exists ‘where 
two or more parties with perceived or real differences over values or goals (often as 
an inherent consequence of structural differences in society) engage each other either 
over scarce resources, or control over resources. Such engagement in the workplace 
is sometimes referred to as a power struggle.” This definition of conflict touches upon 
important issues both that conflict is not always a concrete hegemon. It can be 
subjective given the element of perception that a conflict actually exists and 
underneath it may then emerge that it does not while in certain respects it may actually 
be real and existing over concrete issues.297 This definition however tends to be 
skewed towards resources and control over resources as the only engagement from 
which conflicts derive. The aspect of power struggle however borrows from Marx’s298 
conception of class struggle over control of human behavior by masters over the 
servants whereat resources get to be used as tools to control the latter. In that light 
one group (capitalists) seemed to gain an advantage, especially capital or the 
employer, it would of necessity use it to dominate and oppress the other group 
(workers) thereby enhancing its own position. Wiese provides a short definition, which 
states the following: “conflict is an inherent part of human relationships. A conflict 
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arises when parties perceive a divergence in their needs and interests.”299 This 
definition is favourable to this study in that besides being concise it acknowledges that 
human society has divergent needs and interests and when those needs and interests 
are deprived or frustrated, conflicting responses may arise. Another plausible way to 
look at conflict was put forward by Puttman and Poole300 who defined conflict as “the 
interaction of interdependent people who perceive opposition of goals, aims, and 
values and who see the other party as potentially interfering with the realisation of 
these goals.” The definition highlights three general characteristics of conflict, namely: 
incompatible goals, interdependence and interaction between the parties as 
prerequisites of a conflict situation between the parties. These are an intricate part of 
a conflict situation in that it is never isolated from interaction and an interdependent 
relationship of some sort especially in labour disputes and somehow involves goals, 
whether they are met or otherwise. This study adopts a working definition of conflict 
after review of the above highlighted definitions. Accordingly, a “conflict exists when 
one party has a need dependent on another with whom they interact and share an 
interdependent relationship and that need is unmet for some reason or the other giving 
rise to a claim or battle over incompatibility of goals.” This definition is favourable to 
this study in that it makes use of unmet needs and goals, acknowledging that they are 
as diverse as conflict situations. Further, this definition brings in the aspect of the 
existence of an interdependent relationship between the parties in conflict, occasioned 
by a contract of employment between employer and employee in the case of labour 
disputes.  
 
Conflicts can exist in a labour relationship where subordinates feel superiors have not 
distributed resources fairly. From another angle, value conflicts pertain to differing 
ideologies; religious beliefs; cultural norms and ethnicity such as those between 
Muslims and Hindus in Pakistan and India; Muslims and Jews in the middle east, Zulus 
and Xosas in South Africa, the Shonas and Ndebeles in Zimbabwe and the Ngwato 
and Kalangas in Botswana, Tamis and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and competing 
nationalist groups in Eastern Europe to mention a few.301  
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The conflict stage is regarded as the second stage after a grievance has been 
experienced.302 The party which feels aggrieved or wronged (from the grievance stage) 
may elect to confront the party that offended it at which stage it does communicate its 
feelings of injustice or perceptions thereof.303 This study however favours the view304 
that argues that disputes start as grievances that escalate to conflicts and then 
become disputes (unresolved conflicts). The view has gained more support than the 
one which suggests that grievances result from conflict. However, once conflict is 
realised what is left is to have it resolved within the organisation. When it failes to be 
resolved, it degenerates into a dispute, roping in an independent third party to aid in 
resolving it. This is the subject of the next sub-section. 
 
It is discernible from the foregoing discussion and views that once an aggrieved party 
lays a claim, a conflict is declared and requires resolution or relief. This is that stage 
when an attempt is made by both parties to settle conflicts by reaching compromise 
through negotiation within the confines of the firm before seeking outside influence or 
before conflicts become disputes.305 This is the approach termed internal conflict 
management where grievance procedures and conflict management systems 
developed within the organisations are used to resolve grievances and conflicts 
between the employer (management) and employees (unions). This is the approach 
that advocates for a systems approach to conflict management which fosters more of 
what Czech Republic306 and Romania307 call ‘amicable dispute resolution’ aimed at 
relationship preservation between disputants. Internal dispute resolution as such 
presupposes that organisations should depart from ad hoc approach by which matters 
are resolved on a case by case basis towards one by which focus is rather placed on 
a systematic integration of conflict management approaches into its day to day 
business practices.308 The view was motivated by Rowe309 who conceived and 
tendered what became known as an “integrated conflict management system” as 
being part of the leading-edge-developments in dispute settlement and taking center 
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stage as organisational development strategies.310 The idea that seems to permeate 
the thrust of integrated conflict management is preventative management of conflict 
so that it does not result in dysfunctional disputes within organisations.311 As such the 
former traces the sources of disputes and envisage a proactive but strategic approach 
to anticipate them and formulate approaches to prevent them.312 Such a view is always 
going to be at loggerheads with what is termed as the "choice theory" requiring the 
making of important decisions to be solely guided by the good of their firms based on 
an objective and definable "big picture." This supposes that organisations would install 
grievance and conflict management policies and procedures to enable parties to a 
grievance to attempt resolve them through internal structures and mechanisms within 
the establishment. As such, management, on behalf of the employer, ought to make 
decisions that promote the best interest of the firm (big picture and choice theory), 
even if it means trampling the rights of a worker who is considered unruly or disturbing 
such bests interests. In that light, the focus proposes a somewhat less likely attitude 
to negotiate with a party or conduct perceived to be acting without interest on the good 
of the organisation.313 Such an approach would tend to be lopsided focusing on the 
needs of the employers while restricting or constricting those of employees, as Karl 
Marx’s314 put it, rendering any attempt at reaching a negotiated settlement by the two 
opposing groups near futile. Understandably, from the foregoing, when conflicts are 
not resolved internally or at least to the satisfaction of either party they may be 
escalated to the courts or ADR as the case may be, for resolution, settlement and 
enforcement.  
 
Courts or ADR as dispute resolution mechanisms, are considered later in this study. 
By its nature, this study is not focused on conflict management per se but on dispute 
resolution, the efficacy or otherwise thereof in resolving labour disputes in Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. The fact of the interrelated nature that conflict is with 
grievances and disputes necessitated the treatise of conflict in this study, though 
briefly so, but will not be considered further in this study. The next section deals with 
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disputes, paying special attention to the meaning, causes, nature and resolution of 
disputes. 
 
2.2.3 Disputes 
 
There is no straightforward and universally endorsed definition of the concept dispute 
just as the challenge already been seen with ADR above. This is so because there are 
as many definitions as those that seek to define it.315 This makes dispute a complex 
concept to define. Generally, according to Thesaurus dictionary of English language 
the term dispute refers to ‘any argument, disagreement, quarrel, difference of opinion, 
heated discussion, clash, or raw between two or more persons about matters of 
interest between them’. The etymology316 of the term dispute is traceable to 1300 
century from the Old French term disputer which is also traceable to the 12th century 
meaning to ‘dispute, fight over, contend for, discuss.’ It is also attributable to the Latin 
term disputare which means to "weigh, examine, discuss, argue, and explain."317 The 
term disputare is derived from to words “dis” and ‘putare’ whereat dis means 
"separately"; putare means "to count, consider," which originally meant "to prune" or 
"to cut, strike, stamp"). When used in Vulgate the sense "to argue or contend with 
words or to stand out.318 Other related terms used alongside dispute 
are ‘disputable; disputed and disputing.’ The most concise definition319 of a dispute, 
defines it as ‘a disagreement between two or more individuals or groups.’320 These 
definitions while shedding light on the subject but do so generally without 
contextualising a dispute at the workplace.  
 
A more precise definition categorised as legal disputes involves “conflicting interests 
in which case one person usually has something the other person wants and both 
parties make claims of entitlement. Both claims as a rule cannot be satisfied and as a 
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result there is a ‘true conflict.’ 321 According to Wiese322 a conflict arises when parties 
perceive a divergence in their needs and interests.  
 
However, the forgoing does not seem to resolve the quagmire that usually collects 
around the lack of clarity of the difference between a dispute and a grievance on one 
hand and conflict on the other.323 Two studies that attempted at resolving this challenge 
were conducted in 1978324 and 1981,325 respectively. Miller and Sarat326 tendered the 
view that ‘a dispute begins as a grievance’. In this case ‘a grievance proceeds from an 
aggrieved party’s belief that s/he (or a group or organisation) is entitled to recourse 
which may have someone grant or deny.’ It can be gleaned in this rendering of a 
dispute that it escalates to float as a dispute but on its bottom, it is founded on a 
grievance. However, Nader and Todd327 had earlier perceived ‘conflict’ as the missing 
piece between a grievance and dispute, as discussed below. This study tends to see 
a dispute as the tipping point of a conflict and grievance in which a third party is roped 
in because the two parties failed to resolve their differences amicably while they were 
still grievances and conflicts. This is the rendering of a dispute in tandem with Miller 
and Sarat’s328 conceptions of it. It underscores the fact that grievances and conflicts 
happen within an organisation and could be resolved through existing policies and 
procedures, if any, and in the process avoiding the hanging of an organisation’s dirty 
linen329 in public which is essentially what disputes and dispute resolution does through 
roping in an outside third party. The approach sees grievance and conflict as those 
ADR levels that are controlled by the parties within the organisation while at the dispute 
level a third party is roped in because the internal systems within the organisation have 
supposedly failed to achieve settlement. It can thus be concluded that a dispute is a 
manifestation of an unresolved grievance and conflict which requires the involvement 
of a third party to reach resolution. Before discussing the resolution of disputes, it is 
important for this study to consider the types and nature of industrial disputes, 
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considering disputes of rights, disputes of interests, individual and collective disputes, 
and genuine disputes. 
 
2.2.3.1 Types and Causes of industrial disputes  
 
Essentially five types of disputes have been identified, namely, (1) dispute of right330 
and (2) dispute of interest,331 (3) individual, (4) collective disputes332 and genuine 
disputes. Lotter and Mosime333 warn that the distinction drawn between what is termed 
‘dispute of right’ and ‘dispute of interest’ is ‘somewhat controversial’ particularly in so 
far as a differentiating line is inscribed between them.334 Dispute of right335 entails a 
dispute that arises when a party to an employment contract is attempting to enforce 
rights enunciated by a contract of employment or conditions of employment.336 A 
dispute of right will therefore arise from (1) a contract of employment, (2) legitimate 
expectation, (3) recognised agreement, (4) negotiated settlement, (5) statutory 
provision and (6) any other reasonable ground that may be relied upon.337 On the other 
hand, a dispute of interest is an attempt by a party to create and enforce new rights 
that do not yet exist. Individual disputes arise when individual employees attempt to 
negotiate for better conditions of employment either in the form of dispute of right or 
dispute of interest.338 Collective disputes on the other hand are disputes that arise 
when a collective such as a union fights for the rights of its members to have better 
conditions of employment either in the form of dispute of interest or dispute of right.339  
 
In Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority v CCMA & others340 matter, the court provided for 
a clear distinction between disputes of right and dispute of interest. The learned Judge 
specifically proffered that ‘disputes of interest’ claims are limited to situations where 
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employees are intent at establishing a new right or benefit not presently enjoyed.341 In 
the result, the attempted use of unfair labour practice provisions to pursue such ends 
as occasion to assert an entitlement to new benefits, new forms of remuneration or 
new policies not previously provided by the employer will not be tenable. The court 
further ordered that where a claim about the unfair conduct by an employer is made in 
relation to the existing employment structure or conditions of employment, existing 
policies or past practice, it could be referred to the tribunal CCMA as an unfair labour 
practice relating to existing benefits hence qualifying as a dispute of right.342 Another 
view of disputes is proffered by Benjamin and Gruen343 who conceived the concept by 
the use of the phrase genuine disputes. Benjamin and Gruen344 identified four main 
disputes which they term “genuine disputes”, namely: unfair dismissal disputes, unfair 
labour practice disputes: mutual interest and severance pay. This study seeks to 
ascertain if the ADR disputing process produces efficacious outcomes – time saving, 
cost saving, client satisfaction, fast settlement and enforcement. This is the subject of 
the next section. 
 
2.3 Alternative Depute Resolution 
 
This study has already noted the challenges around ADR, especially challenges of 
definition, scope, framework for measuring the efficacy thereof. The study for instance 
holds the view that arbitration ought not to be incorporated into the scope of ADR given 
that it is a quasi-judiciary process that does not afford the parties control over the 
outcome. However, for purposes of this study arbitration will be analysed alongside 
other approaches given their usage as such in the countries under review. This study 
analyses dispute resolution around two main perspectives, namely, consensual driven 
approaches and command approaches if arbitration is to be considered as an ADR 
process with respect to the latter. As noted in chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, 
ADR is any attempt to resolve disputes without resort at court litigation. In Wiese’s345 
words ADR are “all forms of dispute resolution other than the litigation or adjudication 
through the courts.” The goals of ADR are essentially “relieving court congestion and 
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reducing undue cost and delay; enhancing community involvement in the dispute 
resolution process; facilitating access to justice and providing more effective dispute 
resolution.346 Several ILO Conventions and Recommendations deal with dispute 
prevention and dispute resolution. The main principles set out in these instruments are 
as follows: 
 
• As directed by Convention No. 154 concerning the Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining (1981)347 bodies and procedures for the prevention and settlement of 
labour disputes should be designed to also promote collective bargaining; 
• In terms of Recommendation No. 163 concerning the Promotion of Collective 
Bargaining (1981),348 procedures for the settlement of labour disputes should assist 
the parties to find a solution to the dispute themselves.  
• As directed by Convention No. 151 concerning Protection of the Right to Organise 
and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service 
(1978),349 disputes in the public sector should be settled through negotiation 
between the parties or through independent and impartial machinery, such as 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. 
 
It is perceptible from the foregoing that the ILO is interested in dispute resolution 
should place more focus on dispute prevention and if disputes arises the first port of 
call is to attempting resolving them through ADR processes especially the Promotion 
of Collective Bargaining (1981).350  According to the ILO it is incumbent upon member 
states to take initiative to design their own dispute resolution systems as directed by 
the following general imperatives:351 
 
• Recommendation No. 92 concerning Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
(1951),352 governments should make available voluntary conciliation machinery, 
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which is free of charge and expeditious, to assist in the prevention and settlement 
of industrial disputes. 
• Recommendation No. 92 concerning Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
(1951),353 the parties to disputes should be encouraged to abstain from strikes and 
lockouts while conciliation or arbitration is in progress;  
• Recommendation No. 92 concerning Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration (1951, 
agreements reached during or as a result of conciliation should be drawn up in 
writing and accorded the same status as agreements concluded in the usual 
manner.  
 
It is as a result of the foregoing that, in practice many countries which employ ILO 
recommended dispute settlement approaches favour conciliation/mediation (which 
may or may not be differentiated), arbitration; and adjudication.354 More or less these 
are the ADR dispute settlement mechanisms used in the three countries355 under 
investigation in this study. According to ILO All of these dispute resolution procedures 
find expression in statutory enactments and operate through the involvement of 
independent and impartial third parties who essentially assist in the resolution of 
disputes. It is important to this study for member states to design their own ADR 
processes given the differences of context - politically, socio-economically or other 
factors that make countries unique. The general guideline however is to ensure that 
such ADR processes are efficacious in terms of settlement of disputes and 
enforcement of resolutions, cost, time and client satisfaction and acceptance, among 
other things. South Africa with the guidance of ILO has successfully establish a free, 
and somewhat efficacious dispute resolution system to be emulated by Botswana and 
Zimbabwe in terms of this study. Conciliation/mediation, arbitration and hybrid 
procedures such as conciliation and arbitration (conarb) are sometimes also 
established under the terms of collective agreements.356 This study is interested in 
ascertaining whether the use of these procedures is achieving efficacious outcomes 
in labour dispute settlement in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, 
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much ado has already been given to the definitional issues of ADR in the introduction 
section to this chapter. The focus now is on the various elements of ADR and the 
efficaciousness in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 
It is observed357 that learned Anthropologists named Nader and Todd developed a 
three-stage typology of the disputing process, containing (1) the pre-conflict or 
alternatively the grievance stage; (2) the conflict stage and, finally (3) the dispute 
stage. This view suggests this as the process through which disputing goes through 
leading to dispute resolution.358 However, it also stands to reason that the grievance 
may not go strictly through this process. An aggrieved person may straight away go to 
the dispute stage after they are aggrieved. This study is however mostly concerned 
with the dispute process especially the use of ADR in resolving labour disputes, hence 
the scant treatise of grievance and conflict management processes in the foregoing 
discussions. 
 
2.3.1 Consensual ADR Processes 
 
A consensual process is an ADR approach by which the net result in a dispute 
resolution endeavour boils down to a shared agreement between the disputants often 
reduced to writing.359 The outcome in the consensual process is not imposed but it is 
achieved by an agreement mutual to all parties involved and it is not forced under the 
sanction of the State. Examples of consensual process in ADR are negotiation and 
mediation as discussed below.360 In Italy for instance consensual processes in 
resolution of consumer disputes were emphasised in a commission’s 
recommendation361 leading to a drop of arbitration from the out-of-court principles.362 
This marked a shift to a consensual approach to dispute resolution where negotiation 
is a greater part. 
 
 
 
357 Lippman (2015) 212 
358 Ibid  
359 Cassim et al. (2013) 39 
360 Ibid  
361 Commission Recommendation 2001/310/EC of 04th April 2001 
362 Ibid  
49 
 
2.3.1.1 Negotiation as an ADR Process 
 
Negotiation is regarded363 as a dispute resolution option and probably the first strategy 
that parties will resort to use to resolve disputes before they reach deadlock. 
Negotiation is thus an ADR process commonly used to resolve disputes.364 It is likely 
to even be used within all other ADR processes such as conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration included. Negotiation is one among the most common forms of resolving 
disputes.  The approach is alternatively defined as a method by which disputes get to 
be resolved which is as much private as it is voluntary and consensual. Negotiation 
works where two or more disputants seek to resolve their differences personally by 
way of consensus and agreement, thus redefining the manner of their future 
relationship.365 In negotiation, the focal point is the preservation of disputants’ 
continued relationship as opposed to the carving of scientific legal rules which is 
typified in litigation on the other hand.366 The purpose of reaching the agreement is 
essentially to regulate the future of the relationship shared by the disputants rested on 
the respect for their commonly shared interests which often supersede the ugly 
enforcement of legal rights.367 The negotiation process goes through the following 
successive stages.368 First stage is termed the orientation at which disputing parties 
get to access each other and come into formal attention with the issues under 
consideration in the negotiation. The second stage is positioning at which information 
regarding the issues in contention is gathered and fixed positions on the issues in 
dispute is tabled. The third stage is bargaining at which the issues contended about 
are narrowed while concessions made either in agreement or a failure to agree. The 
fourth stage is close-out-stage at which the process of negotiation often terminates 
either with the net result being an outright failure to agree on anything or alternatively 
an agreement is cut out, which is often reduced to writing. If an agreement is reached 
it follows that measures for the enforcement of same are cut out as well at this stage.369 
However, the challenge is whether negotiation can achieve efficacy in respect to cost, 
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time, satisfaction, settlement and enforcement. While it spells advantages that matters 
can be settled with least cost there are also downsides to negotiation especially 
because there are no prescribed rules to its use.370 A negotiator for instance may 
engage in competitive bargaining style for the sole purpose of achieving his or her own 
goal without consideration of the impact caused the other side. This is because the 
intentions of the negotiator are to force the opposing party to a settlement that is 
favourable to it and to win as much as possible.371 The competitive negotiator may 
attempt to convince the other party that his or her cause is weak and should seek a 
resolution as quickly as possible. In the end it may end up a zero-sum game with a 
win/lose situation where one party wins and the other loses.372 The ability to achieve 
efficacy in terms of time, cost, satisfaction, settlement and enforcement is curtained 
by the many disadvantages associated with negotiation. The section considers 
mediation as an ADR process. 
 
2.3.1.2 Mediation as an ADR process 
 
According to Online Etymology Dictionary373 the term mediation is traceable to the 14th 
century Medieval Latin term mediator which means “a division in the middle.” In that 
light mediation is defined to mean “the process of bringing about agreement or 
reconciliation between opponents in a dispute. Mediation implies deliberation that 
results in solutions that may or may not be accepted by the contending parties.”374 In 
mediation parties make use of an independent third party to assist them in coming to 
an agreement375 but the third party has no decision making power and the aim is to 
direct and assist the disputants to find their own mutually and voluntarily reached 
acceptable solution.376 This is quite different from a judge or arbitrator in that in the 
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case of a mediator s/he is denied the power to impose any solution on the disputants 
but instead, the mediator ought to assist them shape out a solutions that qualifies as 
the mutually acceptable resolution in the best interests of the parties.377  
 
Radford and Glaser378 argue that in the ‘psychology of mediation perspective, the crux 
of the mediation process revolves around the art of altering the ‘perceptual realities’ of 
the disputants.379 Through a carefully orchestrated process, the mediator intervenes in 
the dispute system, and redirects energy by building relationships with each of the 
parties in dispute and by assisting them to assess and restructure their perceptions of 
the dispute and how the mutual problem can be resolved.380 Fundamental to the whole 
process is the perceived credibility of the mediator and the trust that can be harnessed 
into the dispute system. Those381 that support mediation as an ADR approach seem 
to suggest that it is often quicker, easier, less expensive, and can provide a more 
complete solution than going to court382 though evidence to this is scant especially in 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s labour dispute regimes. In fact mediation 
seems to enjoy preference in literature as one of the major constituent elements of 
ADR.383 Ordinarily it seems to be the preferred approach before arbitration and 
litigation are considered.384 The Canadian labour unions have a special preference for 
mediation for the following reasons:385 it is considered to be fairly cheaper compared 
to arbitration; it affords the union and the employer control over the outcome than does 
arbitration and it is considered as a useful way of getting rid of disputes the unions are 
 
• seek sufficient movement by the parties to allow the parties to negotiate further as far as 
possible on their own; 
• broaden the search for potential solutions; 
• train parties in negotiation skills; 
• improve communication and common understanding of issues; 
• exert direct influence on the dispute; and 
• prepare the parties to accept the consequences of their own choices and actions. 
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reluctant to fight over more efficiently and cost-effectively: in cases where persistent 
or militant union members declining to accept that their case is a lost cause.386 
 
However, mediation is saddled with its own inadequacies that make it weak in 
achieving efficacy as a dispute resolution mechanism. Mediation is not an ideal 
approach to extract truth of the matter in dispute from the parties which is different 
from a courtroom setting whereat lawyers have several tools at their disposal to get 
people to testify and produce evidence not easily accessible to mediators.387 Further, 
being an informal process has no formal rules, unlike the courtroom procedure it is 
unable to keep things fair to both parties.388 For instance, if one of the parties to the 
dispute is timid and the other is loud and aggressive, the timid one runs the risk of 
losing some of what is legally owed it. Though mediators may have the skills required 
to restore balance there is a limit to what they can do in those circumstances as 
aforementioned.389 In abusive relationships experts believe mediation might provide 
just another way for the abuser to harm the victim inhibiting the latter’s ability to assert 
their position in such informal settings.390 In the event that mediation fails and parties 
are unable to reach agreement on the dispute parties have to resort back to the time 
consuming and expensive process of trial or other process after wasting time and 
money in mediation.391 Given the above demerits of mediation it is evident that it may 
not be appropriate for all circumstances especially those where an award has to be 
reached such as dismissal disputes. Mediation may be appropriate in circumstances 
where the parties in dispute are involved in an ongoing relationship and have to deal 
with each other after the dispute has been settled or even after failure. The next section 
considers conciliation as an ADR process. 
 
2.3.1.3 Conciliation as an ADR process 
 
This section discusses the use of and practices of conciliation as an ADR process in 
Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. The idea is to establish the status of the adoption and 
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use of this process as a mechanism for resolving labour disputes. Conciliation is 
defined as the use of a neutral or acceptable third party to assist parties to arrive at a 
mutually acceptable, enforceable and binding solution.392 The distinction between 
conciliation and mediation is always blurred.393 However, conciliation for instance is 
considered to be a form of mediation with the difference that the third party intervener 
(now called the conciliator) takes a rather more directive approach during the 
mediation. S/he may also recommend what the final outcome ought to be.394 A 
mediator has a direct function though his/her role is often confined to providing 
guidance as well as assisting the disputants in conducting their own negotiation. 
However, in certain instances the conciliator may go further so as to actually provide 
advice to the disputants during their negotiations, in the hope that this counsel will 
provide leads to a settlement of the dispute.395 Wiese396 argues that the conciliator does 
not have the power to make a binding decision on the outcome of the matter but may 
be required to make rulings on procedural matters such as jurisdiction. In the 
Bombardier Transportation (Pty) Ltd v Mtiya NO & Others case, herein (the 
“Bombardier matter”)397 it was ruled that where a challenge to jurisdiction is raised prior 
to or at conciliation stage, it must be determined prior to any conciliation taking place. 
This means that conciliation may not even take place if jurisdictional challenges have 
not been dispensed with first.  
 
There is however conflicting opinion398 on the issue of conciliation in research 
regarding its meaning and function. Purcell399 for instance in defining conciliation states 
that the third party is a facilitator and further that such facilitator cannot make 
suggestions while Cassim400 says a conciliator can advise, represents conflict among 
experts on the meaning of this ADR concept and its function. Cassim401 actually 
furthers the argument that unlike the mediator who does not interfere in the outcome 
of the mediation the conciliator may reach a finalisation of the conciliatory process by 
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awarding a recommendation that is non-binding, in the hope that it would persuade 
the disputants to accede to the settlement of their dispute. It is for this reason that 
conciliation is often called “advisory mediation.”402 This study prefers to see conciliation 
as a derivative of mediation and the two can be used interchangeably for the reason 
that they do not proffer binding rulings but advisory.403 The efficacy of conciliation is in 
contention in this study. Studies that ascertain this are scant or if they do may exist 
outside Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In India for instance a study was 
conducted by Rahul Suresh Sapkal404 which sought to evaluate the effectiveness of 
conciliation as a labour dispute mechanism showered praises for the practice.405 On 
the basis of the results of the study a conclusion was reached that conciliation was not 
just pivotal, but an efficient and effective a method for resolving labour disputes in 
comparison to litigation.406 The results of Sapkal’s407 study would need to be compared 
with studies elsewhere to establish their legitimacy given that different macroeconomic 
contexts may yield varying results. Unfortunately for the present study it is of interest 
to note that conciliation features in labour dispute legislative enactments in South 
African408 and Zimbabwean though used to a lesser extent than arbitration409 with the 
exception of Botswana laws.410  
 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that negotiation, mediation and conciliation 
are considered as consensual approaches to dispute resolution. Given that they are 
less formal and generally lack rules of enforcement, they are considered to be more 
appropriate or best suited for dispute situations designed to preserve a relationship 
between the parties beyond the dispute settlement. They may also be suitable for 
interest-based disputes where a party wants to enforce new rights, and not best suited 
for disputes of right.411 In certain respects, the ability to achieve efficacious outcomes 
is dependent on their correct selection and matching these ADR processes to the 
correct problem. The skills of negotiators, mediators and conciliators can also not be 
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left out, especially in this study, in attempts at determining the effectiveness of the 
approaches. These are considered in the chapters analysing the use of these ADR 
approaches in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, chapter 3, South Africa, chapter 
4 and Zimbabwe, chapter 5. Below arbitration is discussed as a command ADR 
process. 
 
2.3.2 Command ADR Processes 
 
As opposed to consensual process the command process is one by which the 
outcome of the disputing process is in a form of judgment that is imposed on the parties 
or litigants (whichever the case may be) by the judiciary officer.412 The parties are not 
involved in the outcome of the matter as they get an independent person to listen to 
their dispute and give judgment in the end.413 The net result of this process is that the 
decision (outcome) is enforced on the parties by sanctions of the state, for example, 
judgment is enforced by way of execution proceedings. Litigation through the courts 
and arbitration are examples of command processes in ADR system.414  
 
2.3.2.1 Arbitration as an ADR process 
 
Arbitration also enjoys preference in literature as an ADR constitute elements though 
it would appear that it is the less favourite approach to conciliation and mediation.415 
The concept arbitration is not without challenges pertaining to definition, philosophical 
bearing as well as process.416 There is no single definition that is agreed upon among 
its proponents. Some scholars have tended to provide what they term a general 
definition,417 followed by a legal definition.418 This does not help to resolve the lack of a 
universally agreed definition; hence the concept remains complex to define.419 
Merriem-Webster dictionary420 of the English language, for instance, provides what 
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they term the simplest definition of arbitration which states thus ‘a process by which 
arguments or disagreements between people or groups on both sides are presented 
to a third person or group who is empowered to reach a decision on their behalf.’ Put 
differently, arbitration is the “… process in terms of which parties to a dispute reach an 
agreement to have their matter referred to an independent and impartial third party 
(the arbitrator) who ought to decide on the matter and in the result make an award 
which they are to accept as final and binding upon them.”421 The legal definition 
provides that arbitration is “…the process in terms of which an unresolved conflict, 
grievance or dispute between labour and management is decided by presenting it to 
a third party or panel outside of the court system who is considered as impartial for a 
decision that may or may not be binding.’422 An industrial psychology perspective of 
arbitration states that ‘arbitration entails the appointment of an impartial third party, 
who will use quasi-judicial processes and act as the decision maker in a dispute.423  
 
What is common to the above definitions is the fact of a deadlock in the form of a 
dispute, argument or disagreement which has failed to get resolve among the 
disputants, hence resort to an independent arbitrator. The third party who the practice 
of arbitration obliges to be independent and impartial is required to make a decision 
or what is termed424 ‘make an award’. Lotter and Mosime425 appear to be ascribing an 
adjudication tag by stating, ‘arbitration is a form of adjudication and should therefore 
be distinguished from mediation. In the case of mediation, the third party does not 
make a binding award,”426 whereas arbitration is a formal process empowering the third 
party to make a decision to bring the dispute to a resolution.427 Each party presents 
evidence and is given an opportunity to challenge the evidence of the other. Both 
disputants try to persuade and convince the arbitrator of the merits of their cases in 
relation to the dispute. Arbitration is more flexible and simple, less time consuming 
with fewer legal intricacies and therefore cheaper than adjudication.428 As to its efficacy 
in resolving disputes arbitration is recommended for its ability to settle disputes and 
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enable enforcement.429 In the South African case, for instance the 2002 Labour 
Relations Act amendment made an arbitration award enforceable through certification 
by the Director of CCMA without need to go to court to make the award an order of 
court as was previously the case.430 This development tends to enhance the efficacy 
of ADR as a dispute resolution process unlike negotiation, mediation and conciliation. 
Arbitration also has the advantage of being a private and confidential process which 
is not the case with court proceedings.431 Arbitration can resolve disputes quicker than 
court proceedings. Arbitrators appointed are usually experts in the field of the dispute 
whereas a judge of court is usually not. An arbitration decision is final whereas the 
decision of court is subject to appeal and review in certain respects.432 The arbitration 
process is not without its own demerits. The main disadvantage of the use of arbitration 
as a dispute resolution process is that the parties lose control of the outcome of the 
dispute resolution process.433 Arbitration does not afford judiciary precedent to its users 
which is only afforded disputants by court litigation, as arbitration awards, in their 
nature, do not create precedent.434 In instances where parties resort to complex 
arbitration rules the arbitration process can end up being more expensive than 
litigation.435 In such cases parties will not only need to pay their legal representation, 
but also arbitration fees and their use of a neutral venue.436 Arbitration is not suitable 
for interest based disputes where parties want to create new rights. In Zimbabwe437 
arbitration awards are not automatically binding, but must be made orders of court and 
could be discouraged where time is an issue.438 This study sees that from the forgoing 
there seem to be more disadvantages than advantage of arbitration though it 
continues to be used to resolve disputes alongside other methods such as conciliation. 
It is discernible to this study that ADR will have to be developed continually to ensure 
that selection of each approach is best suited to every situation. This is because 
interest-based disputes for instance will not be suitable for resolution through 
arbitration while right based disputes may also not be best resolved through 
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negotiation and mediation. This study is concerned with ascertaining the efficacy of 
ADR in labour dispute settlement in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The use 
of processes like arbitration from the foregoing analysis can enhance efficacious 
resolution of disputes. This depends largely on taking initiative to ensure that the 
correct disputes are resolved using the correct approaches. This is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
2.3.2.2 Court litigation as a dispute resolution process  
 
Litigation is a dispute resolution process that traditionally runs through the courts. In 
South Africa for instance the Constitution of South Africa439 provides that the judiciary 
authority or arm of government is vested with the resolution of disputes.440 Litigation 
essentially takes place in the court rooms which are open to members of the public 
who may enter into any court room and watch the proceedings of any case as much 
as they wish.441 The court litigation process starts with a grievance in terms of which 
the aggrieved party asserts a legitimate cause of action in the form of a claim.442 The 
court processes443 are detailed, inevitably requiring the pleading stage,444 whereat 
litigants exchange summons and particulars of claim usually stating the nature of injury 
sustained and the relief sought, the pleas in reply to summons, notices, discovery of 
documents, which seek to substantiate and prove their claims.445 The strict rules of 
evidence are adhered to, to prove claims. The pleading stage often concludes with the 
pre-trial procedures such as pretrial conference446 convened to determine the issues 
in contention to be addressed before the court.447 Thereafter a notice of set down is 
issued, leading to trial.448 Trial is convened before a Magistrate or Judge in open court 
and usually concludes with the issuance of a judgment.449 The trial is followed by 
another lengthy process of enforcement through the writs, Deputy Sheriffs or 
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Messengers of Court executing writs of execution upon the losing party and the like 
depending on what nature of judgement was entered by the Presiding Officer.450 Court 
litigation may take years before a matter is set down for trial. In many countries, court 
litigation remains an expensive and tortuous way to enforce a legal right aside from 
the [inherent] delay, there is the question of rigid [and cumbersome] formality, publicity 
and corruption [that characterizes] many judicial systems, and in international 
commercial disputes there is the question of multiple jurisdictions from which the 
parties have to decide’451 (emphasis mine). Litigation is a more aggressive approach 
to dispute resolution, which is often regarded as the last port of call after internal and 
ADR processes have failed to resolve industrial conflicts and disputes.452 By its nature, 
court litigation as a dispute resolution process tends to be competitive (adversarial), 
costly and cumbersome often resulting in winners and losers who may not see eye to 
eye thereafter. In light of the above, ADR on the other hand seeks to offer a more 
private, less costly, relationship building focus, time saving and more satisfactory 
process and outcomes giving regard to the interests of both parties. This study is not 
focused on litigation through courts as a dispute resolution process, hence the scant 
focus. Litigation may only be referred to where necessary especially when it is 
appropriate to compare it with ADR. The rest of the discussion focuses on ADR as a 
dispute resolution approach especially in labour matters, particularly its efficacy.  
 
2.4 The Raison datre and Efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution  
 
The second question that this study addresses is what initiatives have been 
undertaken to make the use of ADR mechanism efficacious in labour dispute 
resolution in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe? Answers to this question consider the 
raison datre, merits of ADR and whether or not these have been considered in the 
three countries under consideration when formulating ADR policies and its 
implementation. To place the question in perspective a plausible departure would be 
to review a question asked in Woodard’s study referred to in chapter 1 to this study, 
which was conducted in the United States of America herein (USA) and couched in 
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these words453 ‘The ADR programs are evidently in place, [but] are they working? 
[emphasis mine]’454 Put differently one would ask, ‘are ADR programs efficacious?’ 
Seeking answers to that question is the main thrust of the present study. This question 
resonates with this study in so far as the justification for ADR as a conceivable remedy 
to resolving disputes is at play.  
 
Resolution of disputes has always involved non-combative methods in many parts of 
the world, way before even the USA, who are usually regarded as the originators of 
ADR, adopted and formalised mediation.455 Traditional societies such as the so-called 
Bushmen of the Kalahari in Namibia and Botswana have always had systems for 
resolving their disputes. These societies dispute resolution systems are uniquely 
embroiled in the communities’ own sophistry and customs using what is presently 
termed ADR the chief aim of which has been avoiding conflicts that spiralled into 
physical and combative mode.456 The idea of dialogue and peaceful settlement of 
disputes makes ADR a favourable option instead of court litigation. Below the 
advantages of ADR as a dispute resolution option are considered. 
 
2.4.1 The advantages of ADR as a dispute resolution mechanism  
 
There are several merits that influence the favourable use of ADR as a dispute 
settlement mechanism available to labour disputes.457 A review of literature revealed a 
number of distinct advantages accruing to disputants who elect to use an informal 
ADR process rather than court litigation as a formal process for dispute resolution 
which are reviewed below.458  
 
First, ADR processes have “the effect of translating a legal dispute into an expression 
of the personal needs of disputants thus converting a rights based dispute into an 
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interest based problem.”459 ADR possesses enable the disputants to exercise 
ownership over the process of dispute resolution through selecting the appropriate 
process, framing the issues in dispute and finally establishing standards for its 
resolution and take responsibility for the outcome.460 It means, once a dispute 
transform rights based to interest based, the relationship between parties becomes 
the focal point of contestation and the result is its preservation. 
 
Second, ADR processes are private processes. This allows disputants to settle their 
differences without having to divulge personal or confidential information, which would 
happen in a public trial.461 The exception is in the case of court ordered or annexed 
mediation or arbitration.462 This advantage is corroborated by Justice Mohammed463 in 
a commission of enquiry about ADR in RSA who asserted that ‘ADR practices like 
negotiation and mediation comprises private decision making by the blocs in 
contention themselves while arbitration involves adjudication by a third party and the 
proceedings in both cases remain private.464  
 
Third, ADR processes are able to address the material issues and interests of the 
parties in the dispute and achieve the avoidance of aggressive bargaining about the 
legal rights of parties.465  
 
Fourth, the purpose of ADR is to achieve settlement that is mutually beneficial based 
on consonance of the disputants. This is particularly true in regard to consensual 
processes such as negotiation, mediation, facilitation, the mini-trial and 
arbitration/mediation.466 The chief object of these processes is to reach agreements on 
integrity that the parties will uphold because the agreements serve their various 
interests. The presumption is that parties will take responsibility for their agreements 
and respect them.467 This ought to lead to a higher level of voluntary compliance than 
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is the case with compulsory court orders, which litigants may resist.468 In the case of 
arbitration approaches such as expedited arbitration, documents-only arbitration, final-
offer arbitration and med/arb, the final and binding arbitral award is founded on the 
disputants agreements to be bound thereby.469 
 
Fifth, the thrust of ADR is the future relationship between the parties involved rather 
than focus on past wrongs and the consequent attribution of blame which is the chief 
object of court litigation.470 ADR processes are therefore best suited to resolving 
disputes in situations where disputants have in mind a long term relationship with each 
other, for example, company directors or a divorced couples.471 ADR has the 
advantage of preserving relationships that are important to the parties.472 Arguably, 
ADR can increase satisfaction of disputants with the outcome.473 It is therefore strongly 
recommended that ADR is used (a) if existing judicial processes engender excessive 
costs, lengthy delays and limited access undermining user satisfaction; (b) cultural 
norms are inclined towards reconciliation and relationships over winning disputes; (c) 
considerations of equity favour  flexibility to yield outcomes that are more satisfactory 
to the parties; (d) low rates of compliance with strict rule of procedures typified in court 
judgments (or a high rate of enforcement actions necessitate systems that maximise 
chances for voluntary compliance; (e) the legal system tends to be non-responsible to 
local conditions or local conditions tends to vary.474 
 
Sixth, efficient methods for settling issues out of court is characterised by ADR 
processes which is a cost saving alternative to both parties and the State. The 
disputing parties save on the costs associated with Court litigation owing to swift and 
effectual resolution of the dispute, while the saving of court time and the reduction in 
court administration benefit the State.475 This element has been a major source of 
contention given that many cases resolved through ADR do not end with success and 
have to be committed to courts casting down perception of whether ADR is in fact time 
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and cost saving as alleged.476 There are also factors that disfavour ADR especially 
when (a) cultural norms tend to towards formal as well as deterministic solutions; and 
(b) cultural norms tend to be discriminatory or biased which would only be perpetuated 
than curtailed in the ADR system.477 
 
Seventh, ADR heightens access to justice for disadvantaged groups which is the case 
in many less developed countries like Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe under review in 
this study.478 The need to pay the registration and presentation fees necessary to enter 
the formal legal system often inhibit many groups who simply cannot afford it.479 Owing 
to excessive costs associated with formal dispute resolution for many people in 
developing countries many would favour a less costly alternative.480 Pursuant to this 
argument, it is reasonable to use ADR if (a) reliance on formal court systems 
engenders disbursements in resources often unavailable to large sections of the 
population; (b) formal court systems tend to be biased against the weak, poor, women, 
minorities and other groups; (c) illiteracy often inhibit large pockets of the population 
from resort to formal court systems; and (d) distance from the courts impairs effective 
use for persons in rural communities, for instance.481  
 
2.4.2 The shortcomings of ADR as a dispute resolution approach 
 
Although ADR has been popularised and adopted worldwide it remains susceptible to 
several limitations that militate against its outright success as a dispute settlement 
approach, let alone, labour dispute settlement mechanism. About five inherent 
weaknesses of ADR have often surfaced in literature.482 First, although ADR offers 
many benefits to users thereof in sizeable development efforts, it is impaired from 
serving rule based law initiatives, in particular ADR is not an effective means to; 
determine and promote a legal framework; redress elements of pervasive injustice, 
discrimination or human rights abuses; resolve disputes whereat parties possess 
excessive power or authority disparities; resolve that culminate into public sanction; 
 
476 Brown et al. (1998) 21 
477 Ibid 13  
478 Ibid 
479 Ibid  
480 Ibid  
481 Ibid  
482 Ibid 21 
64 
 
and resolve disputes involving defiant disputants or interested parties who decline 
participation or cannot participate in the ADR process for some reason or other.483  
 
Second, essentially, ADR does not guarantee the procedural rights of litigants, 
because it settles disputes informally or rather less formally and the disputants may 
place themselves beyond the protection afforded to court litigants.484 ADR is impaired 
by its inability to set precedent, refine legal norms for legal certainty neither is it able 
to establish a broad community nor national standards nor does it promote consistent 
application of legal rules.485 The challenge is bigger in contexts such as Zimbabwe 
labour dispute settlement where administration of ADR is left to the discretion of 
government Labour Officers who are appointed to conciliate disputes at will.486 The 
instances of bias are unavoidable when the government adjudicates in cases where 
the parties are employees of government. In Pako case487 in Botswana, the ADR 
mechanism had failed to establish whether an employment relationship between the 
disputants in fact existed, a legal question which could only be determined at court 
before which the dismissal matter in dispute could not be dispensed with. The mediator 
had no jurisdiction over such an important issue.488 There are no guarantees that due 
process will dispense with the legal rights of disputants.489 ADR ought to be seen as a 
gismo of equity rather than mere tools of law, and seeks to resolve disputes on an 
individualised case by case basis and may resolve similar cases differently should the 
attendant surrounding conditions direct that different results are fair or reasonable 
according to local norms.490 As such the proceedings are not on record. Moreover, as 
court proceedings are on record, a litigant may later turn to court for further relief 
without having to prove again the issues already on record, a characteristic or benefit 
ADR manifestly cannot afford them.491 
   
Third, another consideration is that ADR decisions do not have a binding effect. Court 
decisions are essentially enforced by the State by means of its machinery and 
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execution procedures such as writ of execution unlike ADR which has to depend on 
courts to give effect to its decisions.492 With the exception of arbitration or arbitration-
based processes ADR processes are only contractually binding and do not guarantee 
a final and binding resolution of a dispute. They are left to the maturity and goodwill of 
the parties to comply with their agreement.493 ADR settlements lack deterrent, 
educational or punitive effect on assailants. Given that ADR outcomes are never in the 
public domain, ADR may be inappropriate when handling matters that ought to result 
in some form of public sanction or punishment.494 This applies to matters bordering on 
violence, repeat offenders such as in those involving domestic violence or violence at 
work for instance. The society’s and individual interests are at better served when 
court sanctioned punishment such as imprisonment are at play which ADR is unable 
to offer.495  
 
Fourth, the use of litigation as a process, and attendant aspects such as access to 
court and court time, in principle, are free. This is not the case with ADR.496 The third-
party intervener must be paid and if settlement not reached – costs of informal process 
have to be added to eventual costs of litigation.497 Apart from arbitration or arbitration-
based processes, ADR processes do not guarantee a final and binding resolution of a 
dispute. If a settlement is not reached, the costs of an informal process will have to be 
added to the eventual costs of litigation.498 
 
Fifth, ADR seldom thrives in contexts of intense power imbalances. Such 
discrepancies are often a product of discriminatory norms typified in societal practices 
which consequently sip into ADR outcomes.499 Even in instances where such power 
disparities do not lend themselves from discriminatory norms in society, ADR often 
lacks the legal teeth to protect weaker parties.500 The wealthy or more powerful parties 
may throw their weight on weaker parties into settling for an unfair outcome resulting 
from coercion, while on the surface appearing consensual. For the same reason, ADR 
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may not work well when one party is the government acting as both referee and party 
to a dispute.501 On the strength of this argument ADR ought not to be used when (a) 
disadvantaged groups need to establish rights in order to reduce power imbalances; 
(b) local elites have the power to control program implementation, (c) a number of 
barriers to access to the justice system can be addressed effectively in an ADR 
program.502  
 
This implies that for ADR to achieve efficacious outcomes it must be used where 
balance of power will not be threatened and in circumstances where it is appropriate 
in securing the interests of weaker parties. Efficacy in that case depends on 
appropriate use of ADR in appropriate cases and circumstances.  
 
2.5 The efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution 
 
The third question pertinent to this study is - are there any challenges faced with 
measuring ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, RSA and 
Zimbabwe? Answering this question with both the precision it deserves requires a 
framework for measuring ADR efficacy, which is essentially the focus of this section. 
Measuring the efficacy of ADR is not a particularly simple but tenuous endeavour.503 
The challenge is exacerbated by the lack of established measurable criteria that can 
be universally applied.504 Several attempts at developing measurable criteria have 
yielded varying but less convincing outcomes as far as ADR efficacy in labour dispute 
settlement is concerned.505 The main question begging answers is: how can the 
efficacy of ADR be measured with certainty? Given that the demand for ADR 
processes in resolving disputes is gaining traction in many jurisdictions, establishing 
measures that enhance the efficacy thereof is imperative.506 This view is corroborated 
by Shamir507 who asserted that ADR is an ancient method by way of which people 
 
501 Brown et al. (1998) 22  
502 Ibid 
503 Woodard (1997) 29 
504 Ibid  
505 Shin (2011) 13 
506 Sapkal (2017) 289 
507 Shamir (2003) 4 “‘the ADR “movement” begun in the USA around the 1970s consequent upon the 
need to find more efficacious substitutes to conflict management save litigation. Today, ADR seems to 
flourish worldwide having proven itself, in more ways than one, better at resolving disputes in stark 
contrast to the famed route in the courts. The quest for more efficient and better ways to resolve 
disputes, and the art of managing conflicts, are as old as humanity itself, yet has only begun to be 
67 
 
resolved disputes and is not finding legitimacy in the legal system of the USA as a 
dispute resolution mechanism.   
 
It is discernible from the foregoing that ADR is to be seen as a major panacea to the 
inadequacies of the court system in resolving disputes. The emergency of ADR is to 
be seen as an efficacious system for its efficiency and better way of resolving disputes. 
Despite many accolades accorded ADR, especially in the USA and elsewhere, 
whether it is achieving the results it promises its protagonists remain unanswered and 
this study seeks to find answers to that with respect to Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. 
The efficacy of ADR has landed itself under deliberate and in many respects’ heavy 
scrutiny over the years since its 1886 adoption in the USA.508 While reviewing ADR 
efficacy this section will be instrumental to this study as it considers measures that are 
important for ascertaining ADR efficacy. Factors such as efficiency and time saving, 
cost effectiveness, settlement and enforcement are considered.509  
 
Generally, the term efficacy can be defined510 as ‘the power behind the production of 
a desired outcome (result or effect).’ By the same token one could say this study seeks 
to investigate ‘‘the probability ADR has in producing a desired, predictable and 
measurable outcome as a consequence of reliance on it when resolving labour 
disputes.’ While Khabo511 asserts that ‘ADR is being adopted as what has become a 
general trend, and embraced, specifically for its nature and character as accessible, 
informal, voluntary and capable of speedy resolution of labour disputes’ does ADR 
actually work to achieve that result in practice as it does in principle?512 This is the 
main question this study must seek to answer. 
 
The inevitability of ADR as part and parcel of dispute resolution is not contested; rather 
the question is whether its efficacy can be ascertained with absolute certainty.513 
However, what may work in one context may not work in another even using a similar 
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technique.514 “In many conflicts of a legal nature, reliance on and demand for ADR is 
gaining traction and enjoying usage as an effective approach to resolve disputes.515 
Prominent research outputs in law and economics appear to propose what Sapkal516 
termed “welfare maximising effects of ADR programs” whose intent is reduction in 
disposition time and promotion of expedited settlement.517 Further, that ADR may 
sponsor the lowering of costs involved in resolution of disputes while reducing risk 
thereof at the same time are its major selling points by those that sing its praises.518 
Arguably, models of ADR be it theoretical or hypothetical have outpaced empirical 
enquiries and outputs that support claims of efficacy thereof. There are recent 
studies519 that test the empirical claims of ADR program efficiency though yielding 
differing results520 especially that ADR has the effect of escalating the prospect of swift 
settlement while lessening disposition time521 and carry the potential for cutting on cost 
and delays by sizeable proportions for disputants.522 In the alternative, one view having 
studied optimal use of a fixed mediation, an ADR approach, thinks ADR efficacy is 
context-specific.  In that light, it is not about whether an ADR element is used but rather 
when is it appropriate to use a certain ADR approach should be a major 
consideration.523 There is also a confined assessment of the efficiency of arbitration as 
a distinct ADR practice in stark contrast to others such as conciliation as well as 
mediation in each case yielding results that are varied depending on context.524 This 
means that, in view of the above, there may not be a blanket assessment of ADR 
efficacy with certainty hence the need to contextualise such treatise.525 There is no 
research, at least this study is aware of that has conducted a comprehensive 
assessment of ADR efficacy in labour dispute settlement that compares its processes 
between Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. 
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2.5.1 ADR Efficacy measures  
 
In measuring success, what the present study terms efficacy, Kerbeshian526 bring to 
mind that the response is heavily rested on the object ADR seeks to serve, the 
construction of what success or failure means and achievement of set yardsticks and 
standards.527 It is consequent upon addressing these issues that ADR can be said to 
be a success, failing which it can also be a failure.528 Earlier attempts by prominent 
exponents of the ADR discipline proffered client satisfaction, settlement and 
enforcement, efficiency and cost as definitive criteria in ascertaining success of ADR 
or otherwise, as a dispute settlement programme.529 Whether these measures are valid 
in determining success or efficacy of the ADR programme is not without controversy.530  
 
First, the time saving nature or efficiency of ADR in resolving disputes as compared to 
litigation is central to ADR debates abroad531 and locally.532 The element of efficiency 
as far as timely resolution of disputes is a matter of vital importance.533 Arguably, the 
ADR “movement” started in the United States in the 1970s in response to the need to 
find more efficient and effective alternatives to litigation.534 Time alongside cost, is also 
used as an estimate to measure success of ADR programs though the accuracy of 
such estimates have not escaped the eye of scrutiny.535 Studies by Barkai and 
Kassenbaum536 in Hawaii, Rosenberg and Folberg537 in California, USA and Hann and 
Baar538 in Canada all reviewing the effectiveness of ADR programmes namely court-
annexed arbitration, ENE, and mandatory mediation, respectively all found that cases 
had been dispensed with more expeditiously. In Canada, for instance, within a space 
of six months a 25% settlement and enforcement had been achieved compared to 
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only 15% in respect to court cases.539 In 2004 a study conducted by Wissler540 also 
revealed that in five reviews of matters that got appealed, took between one to three 
months shorter to dispose of those designated to be resolved through mediation as 
opposed to other approaches.541 This is among arguments advanced for ADR’s 
potential to reduce delay in the resolution of disputes. Arguably, bureaucratic huddles 
embroiled in complex formal procedures and inadequate court resources inhibit 
expeditious resolution blotting case backlog.542  
 
Three justices in the Western world have endorsed ADR and drummed their support 
for it as a time and cost-efficient approach to resolving disputes better than the courts. 
Lord Woolf543 who wrote on the English Civil Justice system in mid-1990s; the 
Australian Justice Peter Underwood who hold that ADR is efficient and cost effective 
better than the judiciary544 and another Justice, USA Chief Justice Warren Burger who 
argues that the efficiency relates to the length of time it takes to resolve a dispute 
through ADR.545 
 
Given the experiences of these justices as a Justice they would ordinarily have a good 
picture of how long it takes to have a matter resolved through the courts than would 
be the case through ADR programs hence advocating for the latter.546 The US 
Justice547 asserted that “people with problems, like people with pains, want relief, and 
they want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible.”548 On the strength of that view 
‘mediation and conciliation may lead to a faster settlement of a dispute than going to 
court.’549 It is therefore reasonable to measure the success or efficacy of ADR in terms 
of efficiency, particularly the timely settlement of disputes as confirmed by an 
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Australian Justice Peter Underwood who hold the view that ADR is efficient and cost 
effective better than the judiciary.550  
 
However, the Federal Judicial Centre in USA published one report of ten mandatory 
court annexed arbitration programs, attempting to evaluate whether arbitration 
reduced the time from filing to disposition.551 Dayton contends that while such report 
[as aforesaid] “strongly corroborates” earlier studies that vouch for ADR as having 
helped reduce expense and delay, there was “little indication” that any of those beliefs 
had empirical backing.552 Such a view would suggest that Rosenberg and Folberg553 
studies were based on beliefs of participants rather than measures independent of the 
participants’ possible biases hence empirically unfounded.554 In RSA for instance the 
Conciliation Boards, Industrial Councils and Industrial Courts, which operated then as 
engineered by the apartheid government in pre-1994 had un-precedent backlogs with 
delays taking as much as five months to several years to have the Industrial Courts 
attend to matters as well as appeals.555 This study is interested in analysing ADR to 
ascertain if the situation has changed post the apartheid era in South Africa. Guided 
by the view that while such measures of efficiency may have been conducted 
elsewhere outside Africa the need to test their credibility in Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe labour dispute resolution is imperative. The matter of cost is discussed 
next. 
 
Second, cost is another factor of vital importance in discussions of ADR efficacy or 
any other dispute resolution process. There is a wide support for the cost saving nature 
of ADR process as compared to the judiciary process of settling disputes.556 Several 
scholars557 assert that ADR process are “less expensive than court proceedings” and 
essentially, the chief goal of ADR is to “relief court congestion as well as prevent undue 
cost and delay.”558 In fact, it is contended that ‘many poor are denied access to justice 
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[under the normal court process] because hefty registration and presentation fees are 
required for use of the formal legal system’ (emphasis mine).559 The matter of ‘cost 
saving’ remains a top priority measure of ADR efficacy when compared to 
adjudication.560 In England, for instance the cost of litigation has been highlighted in 
the case of Egan v Motor Services (Bath) Ltd.561 Consequently, the English Court of 
Appeal overwhelmingly endorsed the use of mediation particularly where litigation 
costs had the potential to be disparate to the disputed amount.562 In the Egan matter, 
for instance the amount at issue was only £6,000 but approximately £100,000 was 
spent in litigating the matter, the appeal included.563 Ward LJ perceived the parties as 
"completely cuckoo" to have spent so much litigating yet there was so little at stake.564  
The above case provides strong support for ADR as opposed to litigation in dispute 
settlement, especially when the stakes are so high in regards to the cost factor.565 
Shavell566 on the other hand, used behavioural economic analysis of ADR, while 
Rosenberg and Folberg conducts a true empirical model of ADR.567 Bernstein paid 
particular attention to “mandatory non-binding court annexed arbitration (CAA)”; while 
Heise tests the two of the core goals of ADR through an empirical study the findings 
of which drum the view that ADR increases chances of settlement and disposition 
time.568 It means most evaluations or reviews of effectiveness of ADR ought to look at 
issues of cost, time and process among other things.569 Frank Sander and Stephen 
Goldberg570 conducted a study that proffered eight (8) elements as determinants of 
ADR effectiveness and efficiency (efficacy) namely: minimise costs, resolve quickly, 
maintain privacy, maintain relationships, involve constituencies, link issues, get neutral 
 
559 Brown et al. (1998) 13 
560 Ibid  
561 [2007] EWCA Civ 1002. 
562 Law Reform Commission (2008) 117 
563 Ibid  
564 Ibid   
565 Law Reform Commission (2008) 117 & Ward LJ held that "The cost of... mediation would be paltry 
by comparison with the costs that would mount from the moment of the issue of the claim. In so many 
cases, and this is just another example of one, the best time to mediate is before the litigation begins. 
It is not a sign of weakness to suggest it. It is the hallmark of common sense. Mediation is a perfectly 
proper adjunct to litigation. The skills are now well developed. The results are astonishingly good. Try 
it more often."  
566 Shin (2011) 13 
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569 Shin (2011) 13 
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opinion, and set precedent.571 The model compares ADR to courts systems and labour 
dispute settlement mechanisms. It collects around the goals of disputants as the key 
measures of effectiveness of an ADR system.572 This view is corroborated by 
Pretorius573 who held the view that when deciding to use ADR to resolve disputes 
seven considerations were important: (1) the formalities, costs and delays associated 
with the process; (2) the privacy associated with the process; (3) the presence or 
otherwise of a third party; (4) the type of decision that will result; (5) the degree of 
choice and influence exercised by the parties in the outcome of the dispute; (6) the 
degree of knowledge and understanding of the parties of the procedures involved and 
finally (7) the amount of coercion that is exercised by or on the disputing parties or that 
are necessary to initiate the process.” It is discernible from the forgoing that efficacy 
of ADR also depends on decision factors that would be considered before opting for it 
instead of court litigation to resolve disputes.  
 
Opinion is intensely varied between proponents who shield ADR, according it a tag of 
an efficient and cost-saving affair, and those who cast aspersions on it as ineffective 
and burdensome.574 Silver, in 1987, contented that there was no empirical support for 
the claims of ADR efficacy.575 Such a view was further agreed upon by Esser576 who 
built upon particularised critiques of ADR, argued that there was a general dearth of 
empirical backing and theoretical probe into the political aspects of ADR.577 He decried 
the general prevailing approach to measuring ADR in quantitative terms – cost and 
time – which tendentiously negates the quality of justice as misleading.578 It is 
contended that the quantitative efficiency evaluation of ADR by Esser "blinded" and 
overshadowed the dispute processing arena from the political underpinnings of 
ADR.579 Dayton's assessment went even further to calling ADR's efficacy a "myth."580 
Dayton proffered a strongly held view that "the statistics simply fail to support" the 
 
571 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 49 
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575 Yamamoto, et al. (1996) 1060 
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assertion that ADR was a cost and time efficient provision.’581 ‘Dayton as such 
summoned for "more exacting scrutiny ... to ascertain whether ADR was the panacea 
for federal civil litigation - or thereby the emperor (litigation) just got to wear new 
clothes.’582 These debates583 cast doubt on the ability of ADR to reduce the cost of 
litigation despite views to the contrary. The challenge is that while the debates584 
attacking the ability of ADR to achieve cost effectiveness are strong they are 
outweighed in number by those585 that affirm its ability to so do. This study believes 
that court litigation involves the production of pleading documents such as summons, 
pleas, discovery which are produced by lawyers who charge at each stage including 
appearance at trial. It is essentially costly to resolve disputes through the courts. 
Therefore, ADR involves less tenuous and cost saving processes which do not require 
the technical rigour and involvement of lawyers. This study acknowledges the 
theoretical arguments586 for cost effectiveness of ADR but queries its validity in the 
countries under consideration. The settlement and enforcement as a determinant of 
ADR efficacy are considered next. 
 
Third, reaching settlement of a dispute is the chief goal of any disputing agenda and 
process.587 Parties may resolve their disputes through their own efforts or with the 
involvement of a third party who either facilitate dialogue or imposes an award.588 In 
the end, such resolution is what settlement is about. Tanya Venter and Andrew Levy589 
asserts that “we continue to hold the view that settlement of a dispute at conciliation 
is neither the responsibility nor does it lie in the hands of the dispute resolution 
institutions, it is in fact an outcome in the hands of the parties. Therefore, the efficiency 
or effectiveness of the system should not be determined by how high or low the 
settlement rate is.” It is discernible from the above argument, against CCMA’s 
approach to settlement, that conciliation outcomes (settlement) should never be 
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credited to the dispute resolution body as it lies in the hands of the parties who finally 
reach settlement through compromise. However, it can also be argued, opposed to 
Tanya Venter and Andrew Levy’s590 view, that the fact of a third party facilitating well 
can contribute to the outcomes of the matter, hence CCMA may not be out rightly 
denied the right to take credit. Settlement is concerned with a weighing up the efficacy 
of ADR testing the assumption that settlement is one of its highly priced benefits to 
punters.591 It is further argued that presumably ADR is geared towards settlement’,592 
and in essence settlement before going to trial is considered a common 
achievement.593 This is argued under the auspices that once a case is settled before 
trial then the dockets get cleared.594 
 
The downside of settlement as a focus in ADR programs is that in the rush to settle, 
leaves it open to scrutiny as to whether the rights of participants are not compromised 
and the fairness of the outcome jeopardised.595 It is also contented that settlement 
figures published on ADR success may be disingenuous.596 Figures may risk being 
bloated for innumerable reasons and self-generated-reports may be concocted and 
inaccurately doctored under the pretext to create an impression of success.597 In other 
cases parties that reached an agreement could lay claims of “little or no progress.”598 
Further, parties that fail to agree to a settlement during the intervention may reach an 
agreement immediately following the ADR event.599 Arguably, settlement and 
enforcements seldom reflects success with certainty, since the trial settlement ratios 
often record high scores.600 Reports have a tendentiousness to indicate that about 90% 
of all cases were settled without further ado at adjudication.601 The challenge of 
analysing settlement and enforcement is acute when it pertains to Botswana and 
Zimbabwe who generally lack publicly available data on the outcomes of the ADR 
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processes in labour dispute resolution. The case is different with South Africa whose 
data from the main labour dispute resolution bodies, CCMA, Bargaining Councils and 
Tokiso is made publicly available annually. 
 
Fourth, enforcement on the other hand presents a challenge in Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe labour dispute resolution systems. Enforcement pertains to the chief 
end of disputing where claims and awards are liquidated and afforded winning parties. 
According to Savage602 awards and claims must be capable of being enforced by the 
parties. ‘Without functional enforcement mechanisms in place, the constitutional 
assurance of the right to fair labour practices and the protection of the law risks being 
significantly undermined if not made meaningless.’603 Whether or not settled matters 
are enforced is a measure of whether a dispute resolution process has been effective 
or otherwise. The challenge with this attribute is that there is no data available in the 
three countries to ascertain, with certainty and exactitude, its status in labour dispute 
resolution in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It therefore remains an important 
measure of efficacy among others, cost, time, settlement and client satisfaction. Client 
satisfaction is considered next. 
 
Fifth, client satisfaction, is arguably the main yardstick, gauge or measure for 
ascertaining ADR effectiveness or efficiency and in myriads of occasions singled out 
as the only measure with no data in place.604 This view is corroborated by Yamamoto605 
who assertively believes that ADR can be useful, efficient and satisfying under 
carefully tailored circumstances.”606 In the same vein, it is argued that the use of ADR 
(as opposed to adjudication) tends to shift the focus from vindication of rights to 
satisfaction of needs (emphasis mine).607 In literature on ADR generally user 
satisfaction … received considerable treatment.608 A study by Folberg and Rosenberg 
609 which empirically tested the efficacy of an ADR found that ‘almost two-thirds of 
respondents in mandatory ADR felt pleased therewith and supposed that it was worth 
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every of mint of resource accorded it.610 They reported that discontent with it emanated 
primarily from displeasure with the neutral party assigned to dispense a particular 
matter at any given point in time.611  
 
However, dissenting opinion has it that client satisfaction may not be the best 
indication of whether ADR is successful when it is used alone.612 Arguably, client 
satisfaction does shed some light into participant’s “perceived control of the 
process,”613 and magnitude of gratification and satisfaction have also come to be 
“closely linked” with perceptions by participants that ADR engenders fairness.614 In 
asserting the elements that cause ADR satisfaction it is also argued that ‘an 
undisputable benefit afforded by mediation as well as conciliation comprise speedy 
access to a remedy that presents pleasurable and timely outcomes for those reliant 
on it.’615  
 
There is also opinion vehemently opposed to client satisfaction as a measure. The 
reasons advanced being that it fails to live up to “a desirable yardstick for guaranteeing 
social justice, one that ADR is not to be expected to achieve,” and that seldom reflects 
social costs with exactitude, expectations of participants or perceptions of fairness in 
the net result of the resolution.”616 An examination of the climate of displeasure with 
litigation that led to rising acquiescence of ADR, Professor Judith Resnik617 argued that 
ADR and court litigation alike are seldom perceived or gauged on the basis of their 
own merits.618 She argued that the muddled context ADR finds itself is seen as 
positioned to supplant the role of the courts in handling disputes.619 This study takes 
client satisfaction as a good measure of efficacy for the reason that there are more 
advantages advanced towards it than disadvantages. Aspects such as party control 
over the process, general perceptions of fairness it can achieve are among important 
advantages ADR affords parties while the challenge of perceptions of dissatisfaction 
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with a third party assigned to facilitate the resolution and inability to determine the 
social cost of disputing as the main disadvantage cited. This study however believes 
that client satisfaction is not to be taken as a single measure but alongside other 
elements such as cost effectiveness and time efficiency, settlement and enforcement 
of claims and awards. This means the whole ADR process has to be reviewed 
inclusive of all these elements, and not just single counts such as client satisfaction 
for its efficacy to be determined. This study, in view of the forgoing, also holds the view 
that the debate around ADR efficacy is still far from over for the simple reason that 
there are many contending views thereon. The fact that courts feel ADR supplanted 
them of their work, and the doubts about ADR’s ability to measure social costs of 
disputing leaves the debates still far from ending. Other challenges that may also 
warrant attention are the skills of the commissioners, conciliators and arbitrators who 
handle disputes.620 The administrative aspects of the organisations running the ADR 
process possibly hold some weight on the ability of achieving efficacious resolution of 
disputes as well.621 For the avoidance of being constrained in the politics of argument 
about whether time efficiency, cost, settlement and enforcement and client satisfaction 
this study will assess these in the ADR processes of the three countries under 
investigation.  
 
2.6 Summary  
 
This chapter considered the topic under investigation, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
providing a framework for understanding its meaning, scope and challenges. The 
failure to reach a universal definition of ADR led this study to adopt a working definition, 
thus, ‘‘a buffet of processes of settling disputes outside the courts, consisting of an 
array of methods such as negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration or a 
combination thereof, affording disputants an ‘accessible, informal, private, voluntary, 
independent, less combative, relationship building, cheaper and speedy, and more 
satisfactory resolution of disputes enhancing optimal enforcement of awards and 
outcomes.’622 This definition was adopted because of its all-encompassing nature in 
which it captures the fact that there is no single ADR approach and then the main 
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attributes which make ADR unique for example accessibility and privacy, among other 
things. The definition also captures the elements of ADR efficacy such as 
enforcement. This study also reviewed three important terms, grievances, conflicts 
and disputes contending that they are intricately related to each other. The study as 
such accepted the considered view that disputes start as grievance that are not 
resolved which escalate into conflicts. It is when grievances and conflicts are not 
resolved inside an organisation that the inevitability of a third party (ADR or the courts) 
have to be factored in. For the simple reason that this study was not primarily initiated 
for assessing grievance and conflict handling the debates were closed there, pursuing 
disputes and dispute resolution as the main focus. This study was mainly interested in 
the analysis of dispute resolution in labour disputes in Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, with focus on efficacious resolution thereof or otherwise. It was contended 
that efficacious resolution of disputes is not an easy task given the lack of agreement 
on definition issues of what ADR is, what it constitutes and even the absence of 
measures of efficacy. The choice of which ADR process to use either negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration is also contentious. These are ILO main 
recommended dispute settlement procedures to be used by member countries let 
alone the three under consideration in this study. This may be attributed to the various 
advantages and disadvantages they present. The major disadvantage, amongst 
others, being the lack of precedent in its determinations and rulings, which only courts 
can guarantee and then challenges of enforcement have also been considered in this 
chapter. The chapter finally adopted cost, time, settlement and enforcement and client 
satisfaction elements as the main measures that will be considered for determining 
efficacy or otherwise of ADR in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. While studies may have been conducted in the west or elsewhere 
+reviewing these measures similar studies in Africa or the three above countries are 
negligible if not non-existent. The three countries are discussed in the next three 
chapters in alphabetical order. The next chapter discusses the efficacy of ADR in 
Botswana. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ADR IN BOTSWANA 
 
3 INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter provided a theoretical foundation for this study, highlighting the 
challenges surrounding the subject of ADR, especially with regards to conceptual 
definitions, scope and measurement of its efficacy. The study established a framework 
on the basis of which to ascertain if ADR was efficacious or otherwise. This chapter 
conducts a critical analysis of the status of ADR processes in handling labour dispute 
resolution in Botswana. Given that ADR is considered to be efficacious when it 
achieves cost efficiency, time saving, settlement and enforcement of claims and 
awards as well as client satisfaction,623 it would be vitally important to this study to 
ascertain if Botswana has achieved this feat in labour dispute resolution. Before a 
critical analysis of ADR performance is had in Botswana it is also important to consider 
the context in which the country handles labour dispute resolution. The chapter first 
provides a contextual analysis of Botswana as a country giving regard to a pestel 
analysis,624 followed a brief historical analysis of the development of labour dispute 
settlement in Botswana from the pre-colonial period to the present. The common law 
bearings, the manner in which the legislature, judiciary and executive arms of the 
government handles ADR processes in labour disputes are considered in this chapter. 
Given that ADR is meant to work alongside courts and resolve lawsuits hence 
providing relief to courts, one would be keen to review how supportive the latter are in 
that regard. The independence of the executive government in handling the work of 
ADR is also a case in point requiring treatise in Botswana. This is followed by an 
analysis of ADR in terms of criteria established in the previous chapter which seeks to 
establish whether or not ADR in Botswana is efficacious.  
 
 
 
 
623 Kerbeshian in Woodard (1997) 383; Brown et al. (1998) 15; and Shin (2011) 13); Love (2011) 5 & 
Wiese (2016) 2 
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3.1 Context of ADR in Botswana 
 
Botswana is a Southern African country which, besides being landlocked is bordered 
by South Africa to its south, Zambia to its north, Zimbabwe to its northeast and Namibia 
to its west and covers625 an area of about 581 730 square kilometers.  
 
3.1.1 Political factors  
 
Botswana was granted independence by Britain in 1966 led by its first present Seretse 
Khama who oversaw the establishment of the Botswana Democratic Party herein (the 
“BDP”) which has been in power ever since. Botswana is considered a constitutional 
democracy, a country which respects civil liberties, holding free and fair elections and 
has changed four presidents since its independence in 1996. The country generally 
subscribes to the principle of trias politica in terms of which there is a separation of 
powers between the executive, judiciary and legislative arms of government. The 
current president of Botswana is Mokgwetsi Masisi.626 He took over from the former 
President Ian Khama who retired from power in April 2018.627 The country is regarded 
as a stable democracy which holds regular elections every five years though the 
governing party since independence, the Botswana Democratic Party is accused by 
the opposition parties to be failing to deliver the needed economic miracle especially 
in diversifying the economy and reducing unemployment which currently sits at 
18.10%.628  
 
3.1.2 Economic factors  
 
Botswana is largely touted a mono-cultural economy, because she is dependent on 
the exploitation and export of diamonds to a great extent. Diamonds account for 71% 
 
625 Dicey Botswana Focus (2003) 1 
626 Mail and Guardian https://mg.co.za/article/2018-04-03-who-is-botswanas-new-president-
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628 Trading Economics https://tradingeconomics.com/botswana/unemployment-rate Date of use: 25 
February 2019. “Unemployment Rate in Botswana increased to 18.10 percent in 2017 from 17.60 
percent in 2016. Unemployment Rate in Botswana averaged 19.23 percent from 1991 until 2017, 
reaching an all-time high of 26.20 percent in 2008 and a record low of 13.90 percent in 1991.” 
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of export earnings, on average, followed by copper nickel.629 At the time of 
independence, the country had minimal development and was regarded as being 
among the 20 poorest countries of the world. The discovery of diamonds630 in 1967 
changed Botswana into a very successful economy by all standards in troubled Africa. 
This success is attributed to the fact that over the years the country has had astute 
financial or economic management coupled with free enterprise policies that led to 
highest growth rate in terms of Gross National Product herein (“GNP”) in the entire 
globe in the initial 20 years since attaining independence.631 Unemployment rate 
remains on average above 15%.632 Diamond was discovered in Botswana in 1967 
changing Botswana’s tag from poorest into a successful country among others in 
Africa at large.633 Over the years Botswana’s economy has been regarded as needful 
of Diversification. To achieve more economic development away from the mining 
resources, it is incumbent upon Botswana to drift to other engines of growth such as 
tourism, manufacturing, finance etc.634  
 
Essentially, Botswana has an annual growth rate of 1.8% quarter on quarter-on-
quarter in Quarter One, 2016, leading to a 2.8% annual increase year-on-year.635 The 
economic growth rate reflects a healthy economic state given that an annual growth 
of 2.8% is faster than Botswana’s population growth rate is estimated at 1.21% in 
2015.636 However, Botswana still struggles to curb unemployment which stood at 20% 
according to a 2013 estimate and faces a population 19.3% living below national 
poverty line according to 2010 estimate. In terms of employment distribution 26.4% 
are employed in Agriculture; while 17.5% in Industry; and 56.1% services based on a 
2010 estimate. Labour participation rate as a percentage of total population ages of 
15+ was estimated at 76.8% in 2014.637 In terms of inflationary pressure – Botswana 
experienced a marginal increase of 0.1% in its consumer price index (CPI) on a month-
on-month (m-o-m) in July 2014, signaling as the fifth consecutive m-o-m rise. The 
 
629 KPMG, Botswana Economic Snapshot H2, 2016 (2016) 1 and Friedrich Ebert Foundation Trade 
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630 Dicey (2003) 1  
631 Ibid 
632 Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2004) 8 
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inflation rate per annum nonetheless remained unchanged at 2.7% year-on-year (y-o-
y) also recorded in June.638 
 
3.1.3 Socio-cultural factors  
 
Botswana occupies a geographical space of about 581 730 square kilometres639 
occupied by a population of 2.2 million people and a population growth of 2.0% per 
annum.640 Roughly about 78% of the Botswana population speaks Setswana as their 
first language as per the 2001 census findings.641 However the business languages of 
the country are English, Setswana and Kalanga.642 The BaTswana ethnic group 
comprises 8 sub-groups, followed by the BaKalanga, accounting for as much as 8% 
of the Botswana population. The remainder are BaKgalagadi, BaHambukushu, 
BaHerero, BaSarwa tribal groupings as well as expatriate (other African, Indian and 
European) ethic groupings commanding as much as 14% of the country’s 
population.643 The bigger chunk of the population is concentrated in Gaborone, 
Serowe, Palapye, Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe cities which are the key strongholds 
of the country.644 The Ngamiland Region (also known as the Okavango Delta area) 
(Maun) and in the South of the country (Lobatse, Mahalapye, Kanye and Molepolole) 
are also important locations with collecting large collections of the population. 
Approximately 50% of the population however lives within 100 km environs of 
Gaborone.645 Botswana is experiencing the challenge of dual increase in urbanisation 
and rural depopulation at the same time, with the result that roughly as much as 60% 
of its population currently lives in the cities. This is owing to the fact that economic 
development is concentrated in the cities while the hardships common to rural 
population who survive on the agricultural sector are victims to perpetual droughts.646 
Botswana’s urban population is projected to stand at 57.2% while its Human 
Development Index (HDI) is 0.683 effectively ranked at 109 out of 187 countries. The 
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life expectancy in Botswana is estimated at 47.4 years according to a 2015 report.647 
The literacy rates of those that can read and write for the Botswana population stands 
at 88.2% for adults over 15 years of age; spread between 87.2% male and 89.2% 
female for the year 2015 as estimated.648 
 
Botswana still struggles with poverty among other challenges, as well the scourge of 
the deadly HIV/AIDS disease with a total of 18.5% considered to be living with the 
disease.649 The government has many globally recognized efforts to control the 
infection of its citizens by encouraging safe sex as well as through freely distributing 
the antiretroviral pill to its citizens.650 The country’s is considered to be suffering the 
challenge of lack of vibrant civic organization, given that the government has in the 
past tended to exert a heavy-handedness in the manner it handled unionism.651 Union 
activities has often been met with brutal attacks from the government and in certain 
cases union members have lost their jobs under circumstances considered unfair.652 
Botswana has challenges with hot temperatures that have tended to affect agricultural 
production especially in terms of crops.653 
 
3.1.4 Technological factors  
 
Botswana has generally embraced the use of technology through internet connectivity 
and participation on social media. Botswana is ranked slightly below the average score 
with an overall number 74 in the world, is at 102 in terms of innovation and ranked 76th 
in terms of technological readiness in worldwide rankings.654 Technology as the know-
how for doing or accomplishing a task or something, be-it an age-old technology for 
wine making or latest cellphone high tech manufacturing know-how.655 In terms of 
telephone and internet users Botswana has 160,490 main lines in use; 3.48 million 
mobile cellular; 600,248 Internet users (2015).656 Botswana cannot be considered a 
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leader in terms of technological advancement though she has potential for becoming 
a decent technical diffuser given its growing strides as well as educational, institutional 
and economic capabilities.657 
 
3.1.5 Ecological factors  
 
Environmental sustainability is increasingly topical in the entire globe though not 
without difficulty as a concept in terms of measuring it.658 A ranking scale composed of 
22 performance indicators termed EPI659 was developed and employed to gauge the 
environmental performance of countries within a ten policy categories.660 The EPI 
indicators are: “Environmental Health Water (effects on human health); Air Pollution 
(effects on human health); Air Pollution (ecosystem effects); Water Resources 
(ecosystem effects; Biodiversity and Habitat; Forests; Fisheries; Agriculture and 
Climate Change.”661 In light of such a scale Botswana garnered an EPI of 53.74 in 
2012 which essentially ranked her at 66 of the 132 countries measured therewith and 
in the result was overall considered to be as a “modest performer”.662  
 
3.1.6 Legal factors  
 
Botswana has a dual legal system composed of common law which is essentially a 
blending of common law which comprises both Roman-Dutch law as well as common 
law of England put together as one and traditional customary law on the other.663 The 
common law tradition as a legal system was imposed on then Bechuanaland 
Protectorate (present day Botswana) through the colonial piece of legislation then 
known as General Administration Order 1891 which was essentially an extension of 
the laws that obtained in the Cape Colony on 10 June 1891 to the colony 
(Bechuanaland).664 Botswana observes constitutional supremacism as a principle, on 
the basis of which all actions of government as well as all laws it passes down are 
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subjected to constitutional scrutiny leading to the striking down of any laws that could 
be found to contravene any rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic.665 
‘Botswana’s Constitution is graced with “a Bill of Rights, modelled along that of the 
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, providing for basic 
fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to life, equality, personality, 
protection from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and freedom of 
association and conscience as well as socio-economic rights.”666 Botswana’s 
Constitution was relied upon by indigenous peoples commonly known as Basarwa to 
enforce their rights to ancestral land in the recent past.667 Dispute the Botswana 
government holding accolades in respect to upholding decisions of courts it is on 
record that the decision of the high court regarding the famous indigenous peoples the 
CKGR matter, was not fully complied with.668 Botswana has a functional legislature 
and effective court system which is graced with a Court of Appeal at its zenith.669 
Botswana commands a high record of good governance by all standards in Africa. 
This may be attributed to high quality public institutions, an independent legal system, 
and low levels of corruption in government, all of which the country has been able to 
develop and preserve over time.670 
 
3.2 Labour Dispute Settlement between 1885 and 1966 
 
This section discusses labour dispute settlement in Botswana from the pre-
independence period, that is, 1885 to 1966. The main focus of this chapter is to 
ascertain if ADR in Botswana was efficaciously resolving labour disputes. The main 
issues that characterized the period include the following: 
 
• Botswana has an elaborate history as a pastorate community of people who 
basically survived on small-hold farming and cattle rearing on a subsistence 
basis.671 Essentially, during the pre-colonial era all the ethnic groupings were 
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essentially hunters and gatherers deriving their means of support from arable 
farming and livestock with time.672 
• The discovery of gold in the region spelt new challenges in 1867 which did not 
spare Bechuanaland, as it then was, given that the Transvaal government sought 
to seize parts of Botswana. This is despite the fact that the British inhibited 
annexation, but in the 1870s and 1880s that did not stop Boers from continued 
invasion of native lands.673 
• There were no labour disputes in Botswana until colonial rule featured in the 
country and introduced formal organizations similar to the South Africa case.674 
Botswana had British rule formally imposed on her in 1884 beginning with its 
southern part and then the northern part in the following year.675 The motive of the 
British was to prevent and curb the intended expansion of the Germans and Boers 
from the west and south fronts respectively.676 
• The period from 1930 to 1966 was characterized by the enactment of several laws 
regulating labour in the Bechuanaland protectorate, as it then was, now 
Botswana.677  
• In 1934, for instance, the Works and Machinery Proclamation Act678 was enacted 
to provide for the processes associated with production, manufacturing, mining and 
issues of safety, health and inspection.679 Save for safeguarding the interests of the 
settlers or capital, this law did not have any bearing on industrial democracy in 
general and fair systems of labour dispute settlement or ADR specifically.  
• In 1936 the Women and Boys Underground Work Proclamation Act680 was enacted 
which as its main object forbade the employment of females and boys below 16-
year-old to work in underground mines.681 In the same year the Workmen’s 
Compensation Proclamation Act682 was enacted in 1936 and its main objectives 
were to protect employees in case they died or were injured in the line of duty. The 
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Act defined a workman as a worker under contract of service or an apprentice.683 
The Wages Act684 called for the formation of a Wages Board (Cap 161) and 
minimum wages were prescribed for some sectors.685  
• In 1941 the African Labour Proclamation Act686 was enacted for purposes of 
regulating and controlling the recruitment of African labour. Wage advances for 
Africans were restricted to four pounds and desertion from work was penalised by 
two months imprisonment or ten pounds fine.687 In the same year the Shop Hours 
Proclamation Act688 was enacted which prescribed strict business hours for 
shops.689  
• Clearly, from the onset, the employment environment in pre-independent 
Botswana was marred by segregation and discrimination. Laws were specifically 
installed to control African labour and impose punishments such as imprisonment 
for any slight offense like absenteeism. There is no indication that such employees 
were afforded the right to be heard, as the principles of natural justice690 would 
provide. In such an atmosphere, there can be no scope for efficacious dispute 
resolution. 
• The year 1942 marked the first attempts in pre-colonial period to provide for labour 
dispute settlement in Botswana (Bechuanaland Protectorate as it then was).691 With 
the enactment of the first legislation “Trade Union and Trade Dispute Proclamation 
of 1942” essentially legalising the formation and operation of trade unions.692 
• Finally, to consolidate and regulate conditions of work the then Legislative Council 
of Bechuanaland Protectorate devised the Employment Law Act693 prior to 
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independence which in essence repealed all the proclamations that had been 
made before it.694 
• In 1963, only ten years later, another piece of legislation named the Employment 
Law695 was enacted which, understandably so, provided for a wide spectrum of 
issues with respect to labour relations but albeit criticized for its regrettable neglect 
of labour disputes settlement.696 
 
3.3 Labour dispute resolution between 1966 to 2002 
 
From 1966 onwards the Botswana government was tasked to determine the legislative 
framework of the country in general and labour dispute settlement mechanism 
specifically. That did not happen immediately. The following activities were noted: 
 
• Labour laws which had been passed during the colonial era such as the Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation of 1942 and the Employment Law697 
remained in force.698  
• Only in 1969, was the Botswana government able to pass its first pieces of 
legislation which sought to improve employment sector engagements. These 
initiatives were particularly motivated by a series of protests especially the 1968 
strike.699 These included the Trade Unions and Trade Dispute Proclamation and 
the Employment Law,700 which were subsequently replaced by the Trade Unions 
Act,701 the Trade Dispute Act702 and the Regulation of Wages and Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1969.703 The Botswana government only enacted a 
comprehensive labour dispute settlement legislation in the 1980s.704  
• Dispute resolution settlement became more pronounced in 1992, once again after 
a hotly popularized strike of the industrial class employees in 1991. In 1992 the 
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Trade Dispute Act amendment is regarded as a landmark milestone because it 
created the particularly created ADR processes vis a vis mediation and arbitration 
for resolution of labour disputes. This Act was finally amended by the 2004 Trade 
Dispute Act which is currently in force.  
 
3.4 Labour dispute between 2003 to the present  
 
It is also important for this study to take a look at legislation particularly the Trade 
Disputes Act705 which was enacted in 2003 as it provided many definitive elements of 
ADR and some measures of its efficacy as well. The year 2003 ushered in further 
reforms and changes to the dispute resolution machinery in Botswana in the form of 
the Trade Disputes Act.706 The Trade Dispute Act707 established a panel of mediators 
and arbitrators to administer ADR processes, made provision for medication and 
arbitration as labour dispute resolution in Botswana and sets out procedures to be 
followed in the event of a dispute.708 Botswana generally lacks an independent body 
to administer ADR. ADR functions, namely mediation and arbitration of labour disputes 
are administered under the auspices of the Botswana government, the department of 
labour and social security, undermining the independence and industrial democracy 
especially for public sector employees.709 The Botswana government plays both player 
and referee in disputes involving its own employees who would benefit well under an 
independent body administering ADR rather than the current system. The current 
system of administering labour dispute resolution is inundated with many unresolved 
disputes owing to a poorly resourced ADR system, poorly managed processes and 
lack of skilled manpower. Apart from a weak legislative enactment,710 the ADR 
processes in Botswana lack jurisdiction to determine disputes that resound in money, 
which has been exclusively left as the prerogative of the Industrial Court.711 There is 
not specific jurisdiction pertaining to matters the panel of mediators and arbitrators 
ought to grapple with. This is coupled with the fact that the Trade Dispute Act lacks 
clarity on minimum requirements for persons who must be appointed onto the panel 
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that should handle the ADR responsibility. Many strides are still required from 
legislative to institutional and cultural support structures, to financing and effective 
administration of case management system seized with the ADR function in labour 
dispute resolution in Botswana.  
 
3.5 Review of ADR efficacy in labour dispute settlement in Botswana 
 
The previous sections have conducted an analysis of ADR in labour disputes in 
Botswana focusing on the provisions of mediation and arbitration in legislative 
enactments in Botswana. It is important for this study to analyse ADR processes in 
general giving regard to design elements, the planning and implementation of ADR 
processes and to specifically ascertain the efficaciousness thereof around time, cost, 
settlement and enforcement and client satisfaction.  
 
This section conducts an analysis of ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution or 
settlement in Botswana with three elements in mind. First, the background conditions 
consist of (1) adequate political and legislative support, (2) supportive institutional and 
cultural customs and norms, (3) adequate and competent manpower, (4) adequate 
funding, (5) power parity of disputants.712 Second, ADR design undertaking related to 
(1) planning and preparation713 and (2) operations and implementation.714 Third, the 
ADR measures of efficacy, utilising client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement,715 
maintaining privacy, maintaining relationships, involving constituencies, linking issues, 
getting neutral opinion, and setting precedent,716 as the focus. 
 
3.5.1 ADR Background Conditions 
 
This section discusses Botswana’s ability to provide adequate legislative and political 
support, institutional support, financial and human resource support, building popular 
support and acceptance as well as dealing with resistance. 
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3.5.1.1 Adequate Political and Legislative Support 
 
It is important for an ADR system, at design stage and continuously, to obtain 
adequate political and legislative support. Legislative and political support will ensure 
that ADR system is properly scoped; defining its role, jurisdiction, and powers as well 
as relationship it shares with the court system, among other things. Securing adequate 
political and legislative support is primarily important in order to establish legitimacy, 
jurisdiction and authority; securing bureaucratic safeguard against the potential 
onslaught of resource starvation; securing funding; generating widespread 
acceptance and use and garnering conquest over opposition from quarters with 
entrenched interests, among others.717 This essentially directs that the Botswana ADR 
system, as far as labour dispute settlement ought to engender the following 
characteristics: informal, flexible, voluntary, consensual, interest based, relational and 
future oriented to generate efficaciousness among other things.718 There is therefore a 
need for an ADR system to generate support from national government as well as 
ensuring that it gains widespread legislative and political support.719 It is important to 
underscore that the Botswana government, at the attainment of independence in 1966 
did not immediately transform labour laws in the country, let alone, dispute settlement 
laws.720  
 
Consequently, employment laws passed during colonial times such as the “Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation of 1942” and the “Employment Law”721 
remained in force.722 However, the government continually strangled the role of unions 
as representatives of the workers’ rights through intimidation, arrest and dismissals a 
case in point being the 1968, 1978, 1991 and 2011 strikes which saw all dissent 
quashed.723 
 
Only in 1982 did the Botswana Government show some measure of commitment to 
labour dispute resolution by providing for dispute settlement through section 27 of the 
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Employment Act,724 which could be actioned through the Industrial Court or Labour 
Officers in the DoLSS. Such Labour Officers were afforded un-feted powers at the 
level of Magistrate to investigate and enforce their decisions against employers who 
supposedly flouted the Act.725 This reflects on the government’s effort to provide for 
dispute resolution though it did not go full throttle.726  
 
The same year (1982), a constituent element of ADR – arbitration, was infused into 
the TDA through institutionalisation of the permanent arbitrator’s office – whose role 
was to arbitrate on labour disputes. Such office had its wings clipped and unable to fly 
for lack of resources to dispense with labour disputes adequately.727 This casts doubt 
on the government’s commitment to adequately provide political support for ADR 
programs specially that the office of Permanent Arbitrator was crippled by lack of 
funding to dispense with its duties. Without adequate funding ADR is fruitless an 
endeavor.728  
 
From a legislative point of view the current Trade Disputes Act729 clearly provides for 
ADR processes, let alone, mediation and arbitration. Courts have continually endorsed 
the role of mediation and arbitration in Botswana by refusing to hear matters that had 
not had first resort at these platforms.730 In the Modise v The Attorney General, herein 
(“Modise matter”)731 the court ruled that the matter had not been properly before it 
because it had not had first resort at mediation and /or arbitration. Such an approach 
by the judiciary has the effect of affording the ADR processes required endorsement 
and giving ADR the required legitimacy among users. That is important for purposes 
of enhancing ADR efficaciousness owing to support it receives from the judiciary arm 
of government in Botswana. However, as indicated in foregoing discussions ADR 
processes have their own set of challenges negatively impacting on its efficacy. The 
primary challenge is the lack of provision for an independent body to administer ADR 
processes. Currently, ADR is administered under the auspices of the Department of 
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Labour, as directed by the Minister and Commissioner of Labour.732 As already pointed 
out earlier, this makes the executive government both player and referee in the dispute 
resolution playing field. Employees of the executive government have to undergo 
dispute resolution processes administered by executive government in the event of a 
dispute arising between them and their employer, which defies the rule against bias. 
The Act733 also clearly omitted to clarify the jurisdiction of the panel of mediators and 
arbitrators. The mediator is for instance given power to make final decisions, which 
role can only be exercised by arbitrators.734 Instead, mediators should only make 
advisory recommendations after facilitating dialogue between disputants.735 This is an 
ambiguity that makes it difficult to determine efficacy of ADR processes. Generally, 
five challenges pertaining to political and legislative misgivings can be identified in 
various cases in Botswana case law, which are discussed below in turn. 
 
First, jurisdictional limitations of ADR processes. Where disputes regarding the 
determination of the existence of an employment relationship or lack thereof, ADR in 
Botswana lacks jurisdiction to hear and dispense with them. This comprises disputes 
pertaining to whether an employment relationship existed between the parties as 
opposed to an independent contractor relationship between them as in the case of 
Joseph736 in which it was contented that applicant was not an employee of respondent. 
Another jurisdictional limitation pertains to matters resounding in money. In the Montle 
v Rigaline matter herein (the Montle matter)737 it was held that because the TDA738 did 
not directly state that the panel of mediators and arbitrators had jurisdiction to hear 
disputes that resound in money it necessarily follows they were limited from such.739 
Instead, the Industrial Court affirmed the fact that only itself was empowered to 
dispense with such awards as a matter of jurisdictional provision.740 It is tempting to 
refer to the CCMA in the case of RSA where commissioners are not limited from 
making such awards741 and the attendant problem with respect to the powers the 
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Botswana legislature conferred on its panel of mediators and arbitrators742 who were 
limited from such a provision.743 In a certain sense, the jurisdictional limitations 
negatively impact on the timeous resolution of labour disputes as preliminary issues 
have to be determined first. This means by the time the merits of the disputes are 
determined time would have been spent on preliminary issues such as questions of 
whether an employment relationship existed. This delays ADR processes which 
renders it as inefficient as court litigation, because they are coiled and strangled by 
the latter. In the case of Botswana, it is discernible that ADR efficacy is already 
curtained by lack of jurisdiction of ADR practitioners to determine employment 
relationship status issues and matters resounding in money. 
 
Second, prescription challenges in ADR processes. Prescription pertains to the period 
within which a matter ought to be lodged before a tribunal beyond which it is 
considered to be expired. A matter prescribes if the time required for its lodgment has 
expired. Where a matter prescribes before it is referred to a tribunal it tends to prohibit 
such tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the matter. In the matter of David v Impact 
Merchandising Services744 it turned out that the dispute was not timeously referred, in 
terms of the Trade Disputes Act745 and Rules of Court746 as such the matter had 
prescribed. This suggests the lack of understanding of due process by disputants, in 
particular the workers. The points in limine raised during the proceeding included the 
fact that the “Applicant took too long to file an appeal and further failed to request the 
Industrial Court for condonation on no cause shown.”747  In the result, the Industrial 
Court consequently determined that having failed to institute its matter before 
Industrial Court within reasonable time rendered its claim against respondent arising 
from his dismissal on 18 February 2008 unclaimable.748 
 
Third, lack of understanding of ADR processes by disputants. ADR processes ought 
to be widely and clearly communicated to users so that they know what they are and 
how they work. In that regard, increased awareness of ADR processes will enhance 
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effective use thereof including choice of which particular one to use in the event of a 
dispute arising. It means the department of labour, which is responsible for 
administering ADR, ought to conduct stakeholder engagement to make users of ADR 
aware of its uses and limitations to enhance efficacious use thereof. However, in the 
Lesenda v Debswana Mining Co. (Pty) Ltd749 case, herein (the “Lesenda matter”), the 
applicant applied for an order declaring that his dismissal by the respondent was 
unfair. In a special plea the respondent alleged that the applicant had accepted the 
results of mediation by the Commissioner of Labour. He had particularly accepted and 
cashed out a cheque paid by the respondent in compliance with the recommendation 
by the Commissioner of Labour’s mediator. The cheque tendered by the respondent 
was in full and final settlement of the dispute. Clearly, the Plaintiff (employee) had 
accepted a cheque as full and final settlement during the mediation phase and then 
thereafter (same employee) proceeded to the Industrial Court to challenge the 
outcome. This is reflective of poor understanding of the workings of mediation as an 
ADR process on the one hand and poor stakeholder engagement regarding the role 
and limitations of ADR processes for those that use them, on the other hand. 
Considering the time it takes to launch a court case, the involvement of experts and 
costs required, a disputant ought to be fully armed to decide which approach is best 
suited to their matter. This analysis is important to this study for the simple reason that 
it sheds light on some aspects of ADR that can reduce or minimize its efficacious use 
such as lack of understanding of the manner in which it works. 
 
In the same vein, in the Modise matter750 the applicant had challenged ‘being retired’ 
as having been unfair against him is a case in point. The appellant was retired from 
the public service under s 15(3) of the Public Service Act (Cap 26:01) and General 
Order 18.3 both of which empowers the employer to retire employees before they 
reached retirement age. He challenged the validity of that decision in the Industrial 
Court. The respondent raised the objection in limine that the Industrial Court lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the matter as no referral certificate had been issued in terms of 
either s 8(10) or s 8(11) of the TDA.751 The court upheld the objection and dismissed 
the appellant's claim. The appellant appealed against that decision. The court held 
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that the objection was correctly upheld and that the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction 
to entertain a trade dispute in the absence of a referral certificate issued in terms of 
either section 8(10) or s 8(11) of the TDA752 as it was not then properly before the court 
in terms of s 18(1) of the Trade Disputes Act. The Botswana Railways' Organisation v 
Setsogo and Others753 case applied. The Industrial Court ruled that it could only 
dispense with a matter if it had been lodged before it by way of certificate of referral 
by a  Labour Officer in terms the TDA754 as it was then not properly before the Industrial 
Court in terms of the TDA.755 Clearly, Modise lacked understanding of how ADR 
worked, especially that a matter must be mediated upon first or dealt with under ADR 
before resort can be had at the Industrial Court. The effect of people appearing and 
settling disputes through ADR and then immediately challenging ADR outcomes they 
have agreed to has the effect of wasting time that should be devoted to other matters. 
It also speaks to poor knowledge and understanding of the role of ADR by disputants 
which tends reduce efficacious administration of its processes.  
  
Fourth, arm-twisting of due process by the judiciary. The courts have also shown that 
they at will, can arm-twist due process when it is fitting for them to do so, usurping the 
role of ADR. In Kekgosi v Clover Botswana756 the court did not dispense with 
requirement of mediation and arbitration as a first step before escalating same to the 
Industrial Court. The TDA757 directs that disputes must, as they ought to, be referred 
to the commissioner for mediation or arbitration. This signifies that access to the 
Industrial Court is not direct.758 In Kekgosi case759 the court did not make it a 
requirement, as happened in other matters such as Botswana Railways' Organisation 
v Setsogo and Others760 and the Modise matter761 to have the matter go before ADR 
first before entertaining it. Instead, the court proceeded to entertain the matter despite 
the lack of a certificate of failure to settle issued in terms of s 8(10) or s 8(11) of the 
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TDA.762 The applicant failed to demonstrate urgency763 or the need for a referral by the 
minister,764 or the Commissioner of Labour765 or parties before there was need for the 
matter to be directed or committed to the Industrial Court, as required by the Act.766 
The court in that matter, instead, devoted it’s time to asserting its own powers 
especially derivable from the TDA767 which directs that the Industrial Court was duly 'a 
court of law and equity'. In that regard pursuant to such objects, the same Act768 
adorned the Industrial Court with the latitude to 'regulate its own procedure and 
proceedings as it deemed fit.' Section 19(1)769 specifically directs that:  
 
“The Court shall not be bound by the rules of evidence or procedure in civil or 
criminal proceedings and may disregard any technical irregularity which does 
not and is not likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.”  
 
This study is not certain whether the power of court as provided for by the said 
section770 supersedes the requirement of section 7771 which requires all disputes to be 
referred to the Commissioner of Labour or Labour Officer delegated with such power 
by the Commissioner of Labour. If that is not the case then a conflict of laws or legal 
provisions does exist or the court overpowered the role of ADR as directed by section 
7772 which downplays its efficaciousness in the result. This is especially so because  all 
disputes must be referred to ADR with the exception of matters brought to the 
Industrial Court on an urgent basis, which urgency requires proof to be dispensed with 
as ruled in Molelekwa v Lebang T/A Century Fresh Produce herein (“the Molelekwa 
matter”).773 As a matter of fact this issue was decided by authority, a full bench in the 
matter Botswana Railways' Organisation v Setsogo and Others774 herein (Botswana 
Railways matter) in the CoA. In the Botswana Railways matter775 the court decided on 
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the issue of legal rules that governed the lodging of matters before the Industrial Court. 
The Industrial Court through Justice Amissah JP asserted that:776  
 
“These are the only two methods now provided by the Act by which a dispute 
may come before the Industrial Court. There is no other procedure laid down for 
bringing proceedings before the Industrial Court. I am therefore constrained to 
conclude from that, that proceedings cannot be brought before the Industrial 
Court, unless they are brought by reference under the two methods specified, 
namely, by either one or all of the parties referring a dispute to it which had 
previously gone before the Commissioner of Labour, but which the 
Commissioner of Labour had notified the parties that his efforts had proved 
unsuccessful in settling. Alternatively, by the Minister referring a dispute to it 
under section 5.” I should however point out that currently urgent applications 
may come to court without first going to the Commission of Labour because of 
a 1997 amendment (Amendment Act 14 of 1997) now s 20(3) of the TDA. 
However, the claim for the P200 is not an urgent matter. 
 
This study is at pains to find reason for exclusive direct escalation of compensation 
matters to the Industrial Court in the case of Kekgosi777 or any referral by the Minister 
or Commissioner of Labour to dispense with the requirements of section 7.778 However, 
argument may also be made that the TDA779 did not specifically make it clear that the 
panel of mediators and arbitrators780 did not have jurisdiction to hear matters regarding 
compensation which jurisdiction was given exclusively to the Industrial Court in terms 
of which: 
 
‘The Court may order the payment, to any person, of money it finds to be due to 
him under the terms of his contract of employment, this Act or any other written 
law.'781  
 
The Industrial Court in the Montle matter782 explicitly affirmed that “there is 
understandably no similar provision regarding mediators and arbitrators,” directly 
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782 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
100 
 
referring to the lack of jurisdiction of the ADR officers to determine matters that 
included monetary compensation. The Learned Judge made an inference that 
because there is no direct reference to the effect that mediators and arbitrators may 
not make awards of monetary value, the TDA783 meant that they should not. However, 
section 7 was also silent as to which types of disputes may be referred to them. It 
provides that any party to a dispute may refer it to the Commissioner.784 One could 
infer that such referral would incorporate compensation disputes.’ But the court feels 
otherwise. One may be persuaded to make the inference that Kekgosi785 was afforded 
direct access to the Industrial Court for the reason that the court asserted the silence 
of the TDA786 about ADR jurisdiction over money-related disputes meant it was left for 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the Act empowered only the 
Industrial Court to hear all matters that resound in money, though the honorable 
court787 did not necessarily state it as such. 
 
From an international law perspective, Botswana has ratified all the relevant 
conventions that deal with ADR in labour dispute resolution.788 This is an important 
step as it ensures that the country has obligated itself to enforce laws that support 
international labour standards in so far ADR is concerned. It remains to be seen 
whether such ratification is coupled with efficacious implementation of ADR processes 
informed by ILO labour standards enunciated in those conventions. The Botswana 
government for instance has been accused of arm-twisting the laws such as its 
amendment of the Trade Disputes Act of 2015789 to extend the scope of essential 
services to unreasonably include prison services for instance as essential service, so 
as to curtail the right to strike was considered unfair. Botswana has therefore appeared 
before the ILO disciplinary committee to answer for its acts of labour criminality 
especially its poor compliance of the ILO labour standards as reported at the current 
Geneva June 106th session by the Committee of Experts.790 The behaviour of the 
Botswana government in respect of poor ILO compliance has negative implications in 
 
783 Act 15 of 2004 
784 Section 3m Act of 2004 
785 [2010] 3 BLR 714 IC 
786 Section 25(1) of Act 15 of 2004 
787 [2010] 3 BLR 714 IC 
788 ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103303 
Date of Use: 06 August 2019  
789 Bill No. 21 of 2015 
790 Mmegi https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=69405&dir=2017/june/09 Date of use: 28 June 2019 
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that it curtains the establishment of industrial democracy in the country and let alone 
an environment in which ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution can be achieved.   
 
3.5.1.2 Supportive Institutional Capacity and Cultural Norms 
 
This study is interested in ascertaining if the Botswana government has adequately 
provided institutions and has enabling cultural norms that support ADR processes and 
their efficacious administration. Generally, any provisions of the Act791 that support the 
use of ADR will not be effectively implemented unless there are enabling institutions 
that provide the implementation systems. This is important to this study as it 
contributes to the analysis of ADR efficacy. Enabling institutions and cultural norms 
are important for effective administration of ADR processes. This section analysis the 
status of ADR institutions and cultural norms in Botswana.  
 
In terms of institutional support, Botswana government can be accredited with effort 
to provide for dispute settlement through establishment of three major institutions 
namely: the Labour Officers, Commissioner of Labour, the Office of Permanent 
arbitrator,792 panel of mediators and arbitrators793 Labour Advisory Board794 and the 
Industrial Court.795 Essentially, these are institutional mechanisms that exist to facilitate 
workplace dispute settlement in Botswana. First, the Employment Act in Botswana 
provides for the establishment of a Labour Advisory Board.796 Such Labour Advisory 
Board exists to advise the Minister on required legislative developments as the case 
may be, review of mechanisms for dispensing with disputes both for preventing and 
resolving them as well as consulting on the appointment of mediators and arbitrators 
onto the Panel797 as required by the TDA.798 It stands to reason, therefore that, when 
the panel of mediators and arbitrators is established, consultation between the Minister 
and the Labour Advisory Board is an instructive imperative.799  
 
 
791 Act 15 of 2004 
792 Section 9 (1) Trade Disputes Act of 1982 
793 Section 3 (1) (2) Act 15 of 2004 
794 Section 148 Employment Act (Amendment) Act 2003 
795 Section 15 Act 15 of 2004 
796 Section 148 Employment Act (Amendment) Act 2003 
797 Section 3 (1) Act 15 of 2004 
798 Section 148 Employment Act (Amendment) Act 2003 
799 Ibid  
102 
 
The Trade Dispute Act800 created the Joint Industrial Councils which are essentially 
negotiating machinery for dispensing with collective bargaining tasks within various 
industrial sectors.801 The TDA802 directs unions and employers’ organizations to apply 
if they so wish to create a Joint Industrial Councils for a respective industry if it 
sufficiently is representative of workers in the given industry.803 In the event that the 
Commissioner of Labour declines the registration of a new Joint Industrial Councils, 
or in the alternative revokes an existing one, an appeal may be made to the Minister804 
or to the Industrial Court.805 While the legislature has clearly provided for the 
establishment of such institutional machinery for collective dispute resolution there 
remains a death of information as to their effective functioning or otherwise on the 
ground.  
 
Intervention by labour officers was first introduced in the Employment Act of 1982.806 
The office of Permanent Arbitrator was an important step in terms of institutionalising 
ADR though it was highly criticised for its lack of adequate funding to dispense with 
labour disputes.807 However, the institutionalisation of the Industrial Court, which was 
empowered to dispense with labour disputes through litigation and arbitration, assisted 
the overwhelmed Labour Officers.808  
 
However, it is noteworthy that, in the foregoing three institutions afore-discussed there 
appears to be no independent body of ADR for dispute settlement in Botswana.809 
Dispute settlement is administered through the Department of Labour which may refer 
matters to the Industrial Court for settlement in the event that they fail to resolve at the 
mediation or arbitration front.810 It can be concluded that its Labour and Social Security 
Department administers ADR in Botswana, under the auspices of The Labour Officers 
and the office of the Commissioner of Labour.811 This necessarily implies that it is 
 
800 Act 15 of 2004 
801 Section 34 (4) Act 15 of 2004 
802 Act 15 of 2004 
803 Section 34 (6) Act 15 of 2004 
804 Section 36 (6) Act 15 of 2004 
805 Section 34 (7) Act 15 of 2004 
806 Section 27 Employment Act of 1982 
807 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 
808 Ibid 
809 ibid   
810 Ibid  
811 Section 3(2), Act 15 of 2004 
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administered by the Executive Government and not a body or agency independent of 
government. The only other independent institution that is observable to this study is 
the Industrial Court which is not exactly ADR on the basis of the definition adopted by 
the study that ADR is any dispute settlement short of the courts.812 This is corroborated 
by Mr. Tshenolo Mabeo813 in response to a question in the legislative assembly on 
February 28 affirmed as follows:814 
 
“Currently, the Department of Labour and Social Security is charged with the 
responsibility of mediation and arbitration of trade disputes. Arbitration is a 
quasi-judicial function while the Industrial Court exercises full judicial 
functions.” 
 
The ADR functions in Botswana constitute the mediation and arbitration presently 
performed by Industrial Relations Officers and part-time mediators and arbitrators at 
the Department of Labour Social Security.815 It stands to reason that the lack of 
independent ADR institutions goes to compromise the efficaciousness thereof. This is 
so because in cases where a dispute arises against an employee of government and 
the government as employer, the fact that a government officer gets to mediate in 
matters in which they have an interest violates the principles of natural justice in 
particular nemo judex in causa sua.816 The possibility of biased mediation is inevitable 
as officers would not want to rule against their employer which impairs the ability of 
ADR achieving the objects of independence, impartiality, and natural justice per se. 
 
3.5.1.3 Adequate and Competent Manpower 
 
In terms of manpower for the administration of ADR processes, the TDA of 1992 made 
provision, first, for the Labour Officers, Commissioner of Labour and Minister of Labour 
to dispense with ADR issues vis a vis mediation.  The Commissioner of Labour is 
required to formulate a panel of mediators and arbitrators instructive of TDA.817 In terms 
 
812 Kalula et al. (2008) 14 
813 The Minister of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development, 
814 Mabeo http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=34383 Date of use: 10 April 2017 
815 Mabeo http://www.dailynews.gov.bw/news-details.php?nid=34383 Date of use: 10 April 2017 
816 O’Brien Nemo Judex in Causa Sua: Aspects of the No-Bias Rule of Constitutional Justice in Courts 
and Administrative Bodies (2013) 2 
817 Sections 3 (1)(2), Act 15 of 2004 
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of skills set, the Act makes provision for the appointment of a panel of mediators 
competent in employment law or industrial relations or other relevant areas of 
expertise.818 This is in recognition of the fact that ADR work viz mediation and 
arbitration requires a specialist set of skills to dispense with labour disputes. However, 
the Act819 does not state the minimum academic requirements within those categories 
mentioned, for example, whether a diploma or degree is required.820 The Act also does 
not mention the need to upgrade the skills of such experts with training. Given that 
skilled and competent ADR practitioners are required to enhance ADR efficacy 
Botswana may need to provide for the upskilling of them.821 The Act822 also does not 
provide a guideline on a number of mediators and arbitrators per region or provision 
for increasing them when disputes escalate instead it just states a requirement for their 
appointment.823  
 
The reliance of dispute resolution through Labour Officers as a precursor to labour 
dispute settlement by the Industrial Court is inundated with insurgence of cases 
without sufficient manpower to handle them.824 This study lacks data to prove the 
number of cases registered with the Department of Labour and Social Security. The 
few statistics available to this study shows that there were 10,137 matters lodged with 
the Industrial Court in 2008 alone, and the same number in 2009, and 13,500 in 2010 
while 12,911 were registered in 2011.825 This study is curtailed by the lack of recent 
statistics on labour dispute resolution in Botswana save for inferences from records 
cited in a study like Ntumy.826 Though these are somewhat older statistics they speak 
to the volume of cases that go through the Industrial Court in Botswana. The number 
of matters lodged with the Department of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Court 
speak to a large inflow of cases though it does not provide for the number of those 
that were effectively settled nor those that were handled by either mediation or 
arbitration first.827 Owing to the fact that there is no direct access to the Industrial Court 
 
818 Section 3 (3), Act 15 of 2004 
819 Act 15 of 2004 
820 Section 3 (3), Act 15 of 2004 
821 Giovannucci and Largent (2009) 52, see also Brown et al. (1998) 40 
822 Act 15 of 2004 
823 Section 3 (3), Act 15 of 2004 
824 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
825 Ntumy (2016) 58 
826 Ibid  
827 Ibid  
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it would suffice to say that these matters at most are cases of failed mediation and 
arbitration hence their referral thereto.828 The lack of accurate statistics makes it 
difficult to tell if these matters were effectively dispensed with or otherwise. However, 
inferences can be made from the fact that referral to the Industrial Court signified 
failure by ADR processes to dispense with them. By a stretch of imagination, this study 
would not want to suppose that the large chuck of those cases cited above either were 
before the Industrial Court for urgency or because they had monetary jurisdictional 
challenges limiting them from resolution by ADR processes.  
 
The main challenge levelled against the DoLSS is its inability to adequately provide 
competent manpower to dispense with labour issues that were registered before it, 
and also that those presently employed to do so lacked the necessary skills.829 A case 
in point is a mediator’s inability to understand that s/he did not have jurisdiction to hear 
matters that resounded in money as provided by the TDA830 as in the Montle matter831 
as afore-discussed. While there may be varied reasons why matters fail to settle at 
mediation the lack of competences by mediators and arbitrators should not be counted 
out.832 This study lacks access to full data that reports on the issues under 
consideration hence the inability to provide accurate discussions of reasons for failure 
to settle by ADR processes in Botswana hence referral of several matters to the 
Industrial Court. 
 
Further, the panel of mediators and arbitrators may not enjoy the autonomy to decide 
on matters but save at the direct supervision and control of the Commissioner of 
Labour in the discharge of their functions.833 This potentially compromises the role of 
autonomy and independence which tenet is critical for the success of ADR 
processes.834 This finding is corroborated by a study835 conducted to assess the 
 
828 Ntumy (2016) 58  
829 Ibid  
830 Section 25(1), Act 15 of 2003 
831 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
832 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
833 Section 3(4), Act 15 of 2004  
834 Ibid  
835 Centre for Employment & Labour Relations Law (2006) 7 
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initiatives of six SADC836 countries Botswana, included, the object of which was to 
consolidate and align their labour laws with ILO standards.837  
 
Basically, the project reviewed progress and bottlenecks in labour law and dispute 
resolution systems in the respective countries, Botswana included, which is of interest 
to the present study.838 In Botswana the terms of engagement of part-time mediators 
which apparently require that they are disallowed to act as advocates in mediation or 
arbitration is not without challenges.839 Under that system of engaging part-time 
mediators very little mediation has taken place. The government consequently only 
created new roles of full-time Labour Officers among whom may be seized with the 
dispute settlement task.840 Thus, the Industrial Court remains inundated and saddled 
with a larger case-load than necessary, much of which is said to be cases that could 
have been dealt with by mediation.841 The inability to secure competent mediators in 
Botswana presents a substantial impediment to its ADR sustainability,842 and attendant 
efficaciousness thereof. It is descendible from the foregoing that despite the 
indications that more officers would be appointed to handle ADR roles in 2006,843 four 
years later the case load in the Industrial Court was still at 13,500 in 2010 while 12,911 
were registered in 2011. Recently while launching the new rules of the Industrial Court, 
on 21 March 2017 Judge President Tebogo Maruping confirmed the poor handling of 
cases. He stated that “in 2011 there was a backlog of 6780 cases caused by having 
to enter data manually and the poor handling of cases. From Maun alone we 
discovered 415 unattended files which was a shock for us.”844 One of the factors the 
Judge President highlighted was shortage of manpower as the causes of backlogs of 
cases. One can infer that the Industrial Court being closely related to the mediation 
and arbitration processes administered under the Department of Labour and Social 
Security, cases flowing through it failed to be resolved under ADR system. Generally, 
 
836 SADC stands for Southern Africa Development Community. The six countries studied comprise 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland & Zambia. 
837 ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principle and Rights at Work 
838 Centre for Employment & Labour Relations Law (2006) 7 
839 Ibid  
840 Centre for Employment & Labour Relations Law (2006) 7  
841  Ibid 
842 Ibid  
843 Ibid 
844 UNDP http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/presenter/articles/2017/03/21/new-
industrial=court-rules-launched-undp-acknowledged-for-support.html Date of use: 06th January 2019  
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the system for the mediation and arbitration of labour disputes in Botswana is poorly 
managed, poorly resourced and not running efficaciously.845 
 
3.5.1.4 Adequate Financial Resources 
 
It was important for this study to consider the adequacy of financial resources to 
administer ADR as it is considered to either positively or negatively influence the cost 
of administering the processes. Given that the cost of ADR is an important element in 
decisions by disputants to use it instead of court litigation in dispute resolution, the 
government has to set aside funds to administer it. Funds would ensure that 
institutions that administer ADR have the equipment, machinery and manpower 
required to ensure effective administration thereof.  
 
There is no record as to whether ADR in Botswana is provided with sufficient financial 
resources. The TDA846 has no explicit budget allocation reserved for funding of ADR 
this study is aware of.847 The only reference there is that there is no charge imposed 
on disputants who refer matters to either the Department of Labour and Social Security 
or the Industrial Court within the TDA.848 It can only be surmised that, given that the 
panel comprising mediators and arbitrators are answerable to the Commissioner of 
labour the financing of their work rests with the DoLSS, as there is no independent 
body charged with ADR intervention in labour disputes in Botswana.849 
 
3.5.1.5 Parity Power of Disputants 
 
It is also critical to this study to consider the power party of disputants in determining 
efficacy of ADR in resolving labour disputes. Power parity engenders the extent to 
which there is industrial democracy and a party to a dispute does not abuse power 
and due process at the expense of the other. Botswana’s civic society, unions 
included, is considered relatively weak when matched against sister countries like 
 
845 UNDP http://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/presenter/articles/2017/03/21/new-
industrial=court-rules-launched-undp-acknowledged-for-support.html Date of use: 06th January 2019    
846 Act 15 of 2004 
847 Section 3, Act 15 of 2004 
848 Section 9 (11), Act 15 of2004 
849 Part II, Act 15 of 2004 
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South Africa which already implies that power tilts in favour of government is no good 
for industrial democracy.850  
 
Granted that in Botswana the President is vested with all powers to appoint judges it 
causes a weakened tripartite relationship where unions and other players basically 
play a subordinate role.851 The Constitution of Botswana provides that the President 
appoints the Chief Justice and the President of the Court of Appeal.852 This implies that 
unions do not have the power to push for the creation of an independent body for 
dispute settlement in Botswana as long as the executive government is against it.853 
The absolute power the government wields has essentially placed civic organisations 
such as unions in a position inferior to it.854 This is especially so since government is 
never an unbiased agent of “public or social interest” nor is it “a captive of class forces, 
economic forces or the capitalist mode of production” but rather enjoys a high degree 
of relative autonomy not at the disposal of the unions.855 It implies that the unions in 
Botswana are constricted to always bargain from a disadvantaged position.856 This 
possibly explains the reluctance by the legislature, executive and judiciary to institute 
an independent body for dispensing with labour disputes.857 It is seen as a potential 
threat to executive power in bargaining for labour rights and conditions where 
government would be subject to such body in cases of dispute.858 It can be concluded 
from the foregoing that Botswana lacks an ADR system administered by a body 
independent of Government because of the reluctance to share power with workers.859 
Power disparity flows from the weakened union power as well as the lack of an 
independent body.860 Such a power disparity is probably rooted in Botswana’s labour 
fraternity history and attendant development thereof.861 The emergence of trade unions 
in Botswana is traceable to the colonial area wherein few Batswana were educated 
 
850 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016, (2016) 25 
851 Mwatcha (2015) 43 
852 Sections 96(1) and 100(1), Constitution of Botswana of 1966 
853 Motshegwa & Bodilenyane Abrupt Termination of Employee Contracts in a Democratic State (2012a) 
72 
854 Motshegwa & Bodilenyane Botswana’s Executive Presidency: Implications for Democracy (2012b) 
201 
855 Motshegwa & Bodilenyane (2012a) 72  
856  Ibid 
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858 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016, (2016) 5 
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860 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016, (2016) 5  
861 Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) 119 
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sufficiently enough to understand the object of unionism.862 There and then unionism 
was triggered by political activism through individuals who were also responsible for 
political formations of parties in Botswana.863 Employers from another angle enjoyed 
absolute power by which they employed few workers who they subjected to constricted 
choices and controlled with an iron hand, such as those who lacked alternative 
sources of employment. Such power disparities have not had abrupt changes ever 
since.  
 
3.6 ADR program design considerations  
 
This study assesses design considerations for ADR in Botswana, including planning 
and preparation and operations and implementation. First, planning pertaining to 
whether there is a clear picture on determining causes within ADR jurisdiction and 
those outside and then, second, operations relate to the presence of a system of 
appointing ADR manpower.  
 
3.6.1 Planning and Preparation 
 
In this section, I look at the extent to which the Botswana ADR system is well planned 
and prepared for resolution of labour dispute settlement. This includes the nature of 
disputes that go through the system.864 The Trade Disputes Act does not define the 
jurisdiction of the mediation and arbitration process specifically except for termination 
of employment.865 The Commissioner of Labour is the one with power to determine 
which matters go through mediation and which ones go through arbitration.866 This 
study is not aware of any case management system in place in Botswana’s ADR 
system to decide on cases that go through it. This poses a possible threat to ADR 
efficiency, as there is no funnel to prevent matters that are frivolous and not within the 
ambit of the ADR system’s jurisdiction from going through the system. 
 
 
862 Motshegwa and Tshukudu (2012) 119  
863 Ibid  
864 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
865 Sections 7 and 8, Act 15 of 2004 
866 Sections 7 (1) (a)(b), Act 15 of 2004 
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3.6.2 Operations and Implementation 
 
It is important for this study to consider the manner in which ADR processes are 
operated and implemented as a determinant of ADR efficacy. This section therefore 
considers the manner in which ADR appoints its ADR experts, registers its matters 
and the processes under which matters are resolved.  
 
Botswana’s TDA867 provides for the qualifications of mediators and arbitrators though 
not specifying the levels of attainment required.868 The Minister is seized with the role 
to appoint to the panel, mediators and arbitrators with requisite expertise.869 In terms 
of the TDA870 a legal representative is only allowed to appear on behalf of a disputant 
in an arbitration intervention conditionally.871 In that light an arbitrator may sanction 
representation by legal practitioner on behalf of a disputant in arbitration proceedings 
on condition that (a) the parties are agreeable thereto; or (b) a party to the dispute 
requests same, and the arbitrator satisfies him/herself that the nature and complexity 
of the matter warrants such representation provided it does not cause prejudice to the 
other disputant.872 Such a provision however appears to be clouded by vagueness for 
its failure to define the criteria for determining ‘complexity’ and guidelines that must 
direct an arbitrator in reaching a verdict. However, in any mediation or arbitration 
intervention sessions, disputants have a choice to appear in person or through 
representation by a member or official of the organisation or a co-employee or in the 
case of juristic persons a delegated official.873 The Act874 has left much of the 
administrative role of determining jurisdiction and registry of disputes in the hands of 
the Commissioner of Labour. The lack of exact delineation of which matters are within 
the jurisdiction of mediators and arbitrators makes it difficult for implementers to weed 
out frivolous matters to reduce clutter in the ADR system. This may explain why ADR 
system in Botswana is considered inefficient and ineffective in handling labour 
disputes.  
 
867 Act 15 of 2004 
868 Section 3 (3), Act 15 of 2004 
869 Ibid  
870 Act 15 of 2004 
871 Section 10 (2), Act 15 of 2004 
872 Section 10 (2), Act 15 of 2004 
873 Section 10 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
874 Act 15 of 2004 
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3.7 The ADR measures of efficacy  
 
The previous sections have focused mostly on general background issues that matter 
to the inception of ADR in Botswana. Aspects such as legislative support for ADR, 
financial investment and manpower provision among other things. An assessment of 
how such issues have been handled when ADR was introduced in Botswana were 
considered. It is important for this study to consider the specific determinants of 
efficacy of ADR in labour dispute resolution. This study utilises measures such as 
client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, efficiency in terms of time and cost to 
assess ADR efficacy in Botswana.875 These are considered below, in turn.  
 
3.7.1 Efficiency and time saving nature of ADR 
 
This study sought to analyse the time saving nature of ADR in Botswana, given that it 
is generally regarded876 as a more efficient alternative to court litigation in dispute 
settlement. Pursuant to that objective, this section analyses ADR in labour dispute 
settlement in Botswana. The one aspect that will be important to this study is whether 
there are set time frames within which ADR processes ought to dispense with disputes 
and then whether such time frames are being adhered to.  
 
Botswana’s Trade Dispute Act877 provides for prescriptions as to time frames within 
which parties ought to lodge disputes and minimum time periods within which matters 
ought to be dispensed with by ADR system. This provides for measures on the basis 
of which cases can be dispensed with.878 A party to a matter ought to lodge it within 30 
days from the date on which it occurred.879 A mediator shall attempt to resolve a dispute 
referred to him, within 30 days of the date the dispute was received by the 
Commissioner or Labour Officer delegated in terms of section 7.880 Likewise, upon the 
conclusion of an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator shall make an award and shall, 
within 30 days of the hearing, give reasons for the award.881 Given that there is no 
 
875 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
876 Wiese (2016) 2 
877 Act 15 of 2004 
878 Sections 8 (1) and 9 (9), Act 15 of 2004 
879 Section 7(2), Act 15 of 2004 
880 Section 8 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
881 Section 9 (9), Act 15 of 2004 
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record available to this study regarding disputes resolved and the times taken to 
resolve them it is difficult to provide an exact measure of efficiency of ADR in 
Botswana. However clearly the ADR in Botswana suffers from a poorly resourced 
system in terms of both sufficient numbers of manpower to dispense with cases and 
the lack of skills of those already running the system.882 This may suggest that 
Botswana suffers a backlog of unresolved cases and delays in handling cases lodged 
with the government run ADR system. The lack of skilled ADR practitioners may 
suggest that labour cases are being poorly handled generally. The lack of an 
independent body ADR may also suggest that ADR is being subjected to the usual 
bureaucratic bottlenecks typical of government run functions. Giovannucci and 
Largent883 suggest the need for mediators to be trained on specific mediation skills to 
dispense with mediation duties.884  
 
3.7.2 Cost effectiveness of ADR 
 
Cost effectiveness of using ADR instead of litigation is a major consideration to 
disputants.885 Apparently in Botswana disputants do not pay for any mediation and 
arbitration services as there is no provision for such in the TDA.886 This is also because  
the TDA887 has provided only for the Industrial Court to handle all matters that relate to 
monetary disputes.888 According to the Act889 mediators and arbitrators may not order 
costs except in circumstances where parties are agreeable thereto or party or a person 
representing a party in the proceedings acted in a frivolous or vexatious manner890 it 
means the matter of cost does not arise except in arbitration where a party engages 
an attorney and attorneys who would ordinarily charge to so represent such party. 
There is no clear picture either in the Act891 or elsewhere where charges for ADR 
services are indicated. Furthermore, the Act892 omitted to prescribe jurisdiction of 
mediators and arbitrators over matters resounding in money. By such omission the 
 
882 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
883 Giovannucci and Largent (2009) 52 
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885 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
886 Act 15 of 2004 
887 Ibid  
888 Section 25(1), Act 15 of 2004 
889 Act 15 of 2004 
890 Section 9(11), Act 15 of 2004 
891 Act 15 of 2004 
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court interpreted and asserted in the Montle matter893 that ADR was excluded from 
jurisdiction over matters that required orders or awards resounding in money. That 
would only imply that ADR in Botswana may only preside over matters that required 
orders of performance by the losing party such as reinstatement in dismissal cases or 
other order and not orders requiring payments in money.  This would further imply that 
ADR in Botswana does not have any jurisdiction to decide on disputes whose end 
result is monetary payments by the losing party hence matters of cost of ADR remains 
blurred. The matter of cost would arise when matters appear before the Industrial 
Court.894 This makes it difficult for this study to ascertain whether it would be costly or 
otherwise to resolve labour disputes using ADR in Botswana. 
 
3.7.3 Settlement and Enforcement of ADR Outcomes  
  
This study is not aware of any study or literature that reports on settlement of disputes 
in Botswana. In a study895 that sought to rate settlement in SADC it was confirmed that 
“…caseload data is not readily available” Botswana and Zimbabwe included with a few 
exceptions in the cases of Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa.896 The information897 
that has surfaced in this study is that the DoLSS is swamped by the number of 
unresolved cases that are presented  before it.898 As to whether the department keeps 
a record of the resolved cases remains unknown to this study.899  
 
Conciliation and arbitration are administratively undertaken under the auspices of the 
commissioner of labour, under the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social 
Security.900 Ordinarily, given the provisions of the TDA901 that limited disputes are 
pertaining to monetary compensation to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court, 
 
893 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
894 Section 25(1), Act 15 of 2004  
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arbitration Date of use: 10 April 2017 
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supposing as the court held in Kekgosi902 such matters had direct access to the 
Industrial Court, it would be reasonable to conclude that such matters would be 
enforced as does any other court matter.903 In ADR it would suffice to say that the issue 
of enforcement does not arise except in instances where such a decision was been 
granted by default.904 In terms of enforcement, the decisions of the Industrial Court 
wield the same force and effect as judgments and orders of the High Court.905 The 
TDA906 directs that an order that degenerates into money may be liquidated summarily 
in the form of a civil debt.907 There are no records that are available to this study 
indicating the manner of enforcement of arbitration and conciliation outcomes in the 
ADR framework in Botswana at large. The Act908 does not provide for the enforcement 
of mediation and arbitration outcomes in labour dispute settlement. This means if a 
party renegades on an obligation to pay the wining party there is no provision for how 
such party can enforce its claim. This state of affairs was confirmed recently by a 
Botswana Industrial Court Judge, Justice Harold Ruhukya in a symposium on the 
enforcement of arbitration and mediation awards in Gaborone, Botswana’s capital 
city.909 Justice Harold Ruhukya acknowledged that the Act never anticipated situations 
in which a mediated settlement resulted in parties signing a settlement agreement and 
one renegaded hence the question ‘what enforcement mechanisms existed for such 
a situation?’ The Act does not provide for a process of enforcement of any awards 
which renders ADR in Botswana ineffectual.  
 
3.7.4 Client Satisfaction 
 
Client satisfaction measure pertains to the degree to which ADR interventions can 
meet disputants’ expectations in resolving their disputes. To do so such intervention 
ADR processes ought to exhibit qualities such as maintaining disputant’s privacy, 
maintaining relationships, involving constituencies, linking issues, affording neutral 
opinion, setting precedence among other issues. There are no studies or data this 
 
902 Kekgosi v Clover Botswana 2010 3 BLR 714 IC 
903 Section 25 (2), Act 15 of 2014 
904 Kekgosi v Clover Botswana 2010 3 BLR 714 IC 
905 Section 25 (2), Act 15 of 2014 
906 Section 28, Act 6 of 2016 
907 Ibid  
908 Act 15 of 2004 
909 Mokwape http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=78048&dir=2018/october/10 Date of use: 26 
December 2018 
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study is aware of in the Botswana’s case that assesses client satisfaction with ADR 
processes in labour dispute resolution.910 There are no provisions for these measures 
in the TDA either. The Act only directs the Minister to circulate a code of ethics that 
mediators and arbitrators are to abide by as they go about performing their functions 
after such Minister has had consultation with the Board.911 The degree of satisfaction 
that clients derive from ADR interventions in Botswana remains unknown given the 
lack of information to that effect, at least known to this study. 
 
3.8 Summary  
 
The immediately foregoing sections assessed the efficacy of ADR in Botswana on the 
basis of measures such as cost-effectiveness, time efficiency, settlement and 
enforcement and client satisfaction thereof. This study found that lack of skilled 
manpower to administer ADR has minimised the efficiency with which labour disputes 
are handled in Botswana. The Act provides timeframes within which ADR processes 
must be administered including minimum time for registry of matters with the 
commissioner of labour and the time they ought to be dispensed with. This study found 
that the department of labour and social security still struggles with a backlog of 
unresolved matters. The many cases that are appealed to the industrial court reflect 
the poor manner in which mediation and arbitration is handling them. Given that ADR 
constitutes the first forum in the line of labour dispute resolution most matters referred 
to the industrial court would have failed to be resolved at that level. The role of the 
ADR is also curtailed by the fact that the Act has not afforded it jurisdiction to determine 
equity issues resounding in money. These remain the prerogative of the industrial 
court, which is already inundated with many unresolved matters. This study could not 
ascertain with certainty, the cost of handling matters using mediation and arbitration 
in Botswana given that the Act does not clearly online cost issues. An arbitrator was 
afforded the power to award costs in cases brought frivolously before the tribunal but 
no more than that. An arbitrator cannot issue awards that relate to money. Botswana 
presently runs an inefficacious ADR system for dealing with labour disputes.  
 
910 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 68 
911 Section 12, Act 15 of 2004 
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This chapter discussed labour dispute settlement in Botswana from the pre-
independence period to the present. The main focus of this chapter was to ascertain 
if ADR in Botswana was efficaciously resolving labour disputes. Before critically 
analyzing the processes that are used to administer ADR this chapter showed that 
during the pre-independence era there were no cases reported pertaining to labour 
disputes or labour dispute resolution to contend with. This may be attributed to the fact 
that Batswana were generally pastorate people who basically lived on subsistent 
farming of livestock.912 Labour dispute settlement became an issue when Botswana 
was colonised. This is when Batswana people were required to work in mines in South 
Africa and other modernised organised life. Botswana became independent from the 
British Empire in 1966 a period which ushered in a new era of statehood. From 1966 
onwards the Botswana government was seized with the duty to determine the 
legislative framework of the country in general and labour dispute settlement 
mechanism specifically. That however did not happen immediately. Labour laws which 
had been passed during the colonial era such as the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes 
Proclamation of 1942 and the Employment Law913 remained in force. Only in 1969, was 
the Botswana government able to pass its first pieces of legislation which sought to 
improve employment sector engagements. These initiatives were particularly 
motivated by a series of protests and notably the 1968 strike which pushed the 
government to its wits to create labour laws in response.914 These included the Trade 
Unions and Trade Dispute Proclamation and the Employment Law,915 which were 
subsequently replaced by the Trade Unions Act,916 the Trade Dispute Act917 and the 
Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act of 1969.918 The Botswana 
government only enacted a comprehensive labour dispute settlement legislation in the 
1980s. Dispute resolution settlement became more pronounced in 1992, once again 
after a hotly popularized strike of the industrial class employees in 1991. In 1992 the 
Trade Dispute Act amendment is regarded as a landmark milestone because it created 
the particularly created ADR processes vis a vis mediation and arbitration for 
 
912 Bojosi (2009) 52  
913 Act 15 of 1963 
914 Friedrick Ebert Stiftung Trade Union in Botswana: Country Report July 2008 (2008) 6 
915 Act 15 of 1963 
916 Act 24 of 1969 
917 Act 28 of 1969 
918 Friedrick Ebert Stiftung (2008) 6 
117 
 
resolution of labour disputes. This Act was finally amended by the 2004 which is 
currently in force.  
 
This chapter concluded that ADR in Botswana is still far from efficacious and a number 
of factors account for such a state of affairs. Botswana generally lacks an independent 
body to administer ADR. ADR functions, namely mediation and arbitration of labour 
disputes are administered under the auspices of the Botswana government, the 
Department of Labour and Social Security specifically, undermining the independence 
and industrial democracy ADR ought to provide especially for public sector employees. 
The Botswana government plays both player and referee in disputes involving its own 
employees who would benefit well under an independent body administering ADR 
rather than the current system. The current system of administering labour dispute 
resolution is inundated with many unresolved disputes owing to a poorly resourced 
ADR system, poorly managed processes and a general lack of adequate and skilled 
manpower. Apart from a weak legislative enactment,919 the ADR processes in 
Botswana lack jurisdiction to determine disputes that resound in money, which has 
been exclusively left as the prerogative of the Industrial Court. There is not specific 
jurisdiction pertaining to matters the panel of mediators and arbitrators ought to 
grapple with. This is coupled with the fact that Botswana’s Trade Dispute Act lacks 
clarity on minimum requirements for persons who must be appointed onto the panel 
that should handle the ADR responsibility. Botswana has not fared well in terms of 
adherence to ILO labour standards, which led her to getting blacklisted for such non-
compliance, and curtailment of the right to strike through converting many services 
into essential services unnecessarily. This has negative implications on establishment 
of efficacious ADR processes given the heavy-handedness with which the government 
overpowers other players through enactment of restrictive legislation pertaining to 
same. Many strides are still required from legislative to institutional and cultural 
support structures, to financing and effective administration of case management 
system seized with the ADR function in labour dispute resolution in Botswana. The 
next chapter discusses ADR in South Africa.  
  
 
919 Act 15 of 2004 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ADR IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4 INTRODUCTION  
  
This chapter provides a discussion of ADR in South Africa (hereinafter referred to as 
(“RSA”),920 the aim of which is to ascertain its efficacy in labour dispute resolution. The 
chapter briefly traces labour dispute settlement starting from its pre-colonial period to 
the present. It is important for this study to provide a historical context of labour dispute 
settlement as it enhances understanding of its influences on present ADR practices. 
ADR processes in labour dispute settlement after 1994 are closely analysed to 
ascertain their effective and efficient administration or otherwise and factors 
responsible for it. This is important as it answers to the main aim of this study which is 
to ascertain the efficacy of ADR labour dispute resolution in selected countries. Before 
reviewing the performance of ADR in terms of its measures such as cost, time, 
settlement and enforcement, and client satisfaction, the chapter discusses other 
aspects such as legislative support, financing, institutional support, power parity of 
disputants, as well as planning and implementation of ADR processes in South Africa. 
These are background factors that help to ascertain whether ADR was implemented 
with due consideration to important levers such as endorsement by communities who 
were going to make use of it. It is important to review these aspects as they help in 
ascertaining if ADR was started on the correct pedestal rather than a practice that was 
imposed on constituencies, who had no regard for it. This analysis leads to a 
determination of whether ADR in South African labour dispute resolution can be said 
to be efficacious or otherwise. Before going into the detailed discussion of the above 
issues this chapter begins with an analysis of the context in which labour dispute 
resolution takes place in South Africa, focusing on the attendant political, economic, 
social, technological, ecological and legal issues.  
 
 
 
 
920 RSA stands for Republic of South Africa 
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4.1 Context of ADR in South Africa  
 
South Africa is a country situated at the Southern Hemisphere of the African continent 
sharing boarders with Namibia to the South West, Botswana and Zimbabwe to the 
north, Eswathini and Mozambique to the north east. Lesotho, an independent country, 
is an enclave in the eastern part of the Republic, entirely surrounded by South African 
territory. South Africa’s coastlines border the Indian Ocean to the southeast and the 
Atlantic Ocean to the southwest.921 South Africa is a large country boasting a 
population of 55.9 million people.922  
 
4.1.1 Political factors  
 
South Africa is considered a constitutional democracy conducting multiparty elections 
every five years, South Africa attained independence from apartheid repression in 
1994 when the stalwart Nelson Mandela was released from prison after 27 years.923 
The country held its first democratic election which the African National Congress won 
resoundingly under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Currently South Africa’s 
President is Cyril Ramaphosa who took over from the embattled former president 
Jacob Zuma who spent most of his term of office embroiled in corruption charges and 
accusations of mis-governance. The popularized firebrand politician Julius Malema 
who broke away from the governing African National Congress to form his splinter 
party – the Economic Freedom Fighters gave Jacob Zuma a running for his money 
through pointing out many of the shoddy dealings and corrupt practices that 
characterized the former President’s administration.924  
 
4.1.2 Economic factors  
 
Cyril Ramaphosa has a challenge under his belt to correct the perceptions of a corrupt 
country and party that he inherited from his predecessor as well as a poorly functioning 
 
921 Britannica https://www.britannica.com/place/South-Africa Date of use: 26th February 2019 
922 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI (2018) 3 
923 SA History https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-african-general-elections-1994 Date of use: 
26th February 2019 
924 Lings (2014) 13 
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economy.925 The unemployment rate in RSA fell to 26.5% in the last three months of 
2016 after reaching a 12-1/2-year high of 27.1% in the previous period,926 with a GDP 
per capita of 13046.2 USD in 2016.927 Unemployment is arguably the most central and 
vexing problem the South African economy is presently saddled with. The unemployed 
population suffer mental hardship among other challenges and unemployment 
essentially poses a serious threat to the country’s social fibre and very political 
stability.928 The net result is that there has been increased production not backed by 
complementary gains in employment – a phenomenon commonly touted as “jobless 
growth.”929 A high GDP growth rate of approximately 7 and 8% annually in real terms 
is required in South Africa. South Africa is battling 28 percent unemployment, 
especially youth unemployment which stands at over 65% of the national score.  
 
4.1.3 Socio cultural factors  
 
The country is a culturally diverse mix consisting of the following types of people 
according to race: White – 4,584,700; Colored – 4,424,600, Indian/ Asian – 1,299,900 
and blacks – 38,682,600.930 There are 11 national languages in South Africa namely 
English, Afrikaans, Sotho, Ndebele. Pedi, Venda, Tswana, Xosa, and Isizulu.931 South 
Africa has a poverty rate of 35.9%, and a life expectancy of 61.9 years.932 The Black 
herein (“native African”) population is considered the hardest hit by the scourge of 
poverty. RSA is regarded as one of the grossly unequal nations on earth and appears 
to have become even more unequal than it was when apartheid ended.933 The low life 
expectancy may be attributable to HIV/AIDS prevalence in South Africa.934 Based on 
wide ranging data published by the UNAIDS / WHO in 2015 it was estimated that there 
 
925 Xinguanet http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/16/c_136979344.htm Date of use: 26th 
February 2019 
926 Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/unemployment-rate Date of 
use: 02 April 2017 
927 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) 3 
928 Mohr, Fourie & Associates Economics for South African Students (2008) 79  
929 Ibid  
930 Smit et al. (2013) 270  
931 Statistics South Africa Documented immigrants in South Africa (2012) 4 
932 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI (2018) 3 
933 Lings (2014) 15 
934 Smit et al. (2013) 75 
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is an estimated 6.9 million persons in the age range between 15 to 49 years and 2.1 
million orphans living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa.935  
 
4.1.4 Technological factors  
 
In terms of technology use, about 53.5% (28.9 million users) of the South African 
population uses the internet.936 The use of internet is an important global development 
which creates a catalyst for research and development and the advancement of 
economic growth and development.937 Among other issues that is now commonplace 
in the South African technology environment is the emergence of whistleblowing and 
citizen journalism.  
 
4.1.5 Ecological factors  
 
South Africa is ranked at 72nd in a benchmark of 178 countries gauged on the same 
scale termed the Environmental Performance Index which basis its measure on 20 
various indicators measuring compliance with environmental policy and public health 
aims and standards.938 Unfortunately environmental and health interests appear, more 
often than not, outranked to give economic growth and job creation preference on its 
priority list.939 In 2011, the South African government launched a Green Economy 
Accord, which pays greater attention to environmental issues and gives more attention 
to cooperation with the private sector.940   
 
4.1.6 Legal factors  
 
South Africa clearly operates on the basis of a 'hybrid' or 'mixed' legal system in terms 
of which the common law system runs parallel to the indigenous legal system.941 The 
classification suggest that the two parallel systems are seen as blending both African 
tradition and modern common law.942 South Africa is popularly considered a 
 
935  KPMG South Africa Economic Snapshop H2, 2016 (2016) 1, see also Smit et al. (2013) 75 
936 KPMG (2016) 1 
937 Smit et al. (2013) 73 
938 Smit et al. (2013) 73 
939 Ibid  
940 Ibid  
941 Van Niekerk and Wildenboer, The Origins of South African Law (2009) 1 
942 Ibid   
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constitutional democracy as of the new constitutional order of 1996 which replaced 
parliamentary sovereignty with constitutional supremacy. The net result was that the 
Constitution was framed as the ultimate law of the land.943 That also means any law or 
conduct which is found to be inconsistent with the Constitution, be it procedurally or 
substantively, will be declared invalid to the extent of such inconsistency. The 1996 
Constitutional Order enshrined the Bill of Rights as a safeguard to human rights, to 
end decades of state-sanctioned repression and racism under the auspices of the 
apartheid regime. The courts were afforded wide latitude to pronounce any law or 
conduct that is found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and the Constitution to 
be invalid to the extent of its consistency.944 The Bill of Rights guarantees and 
safeguards people’s rights.945 
 
4.2 Labour dispute resolution between 1652 and 1948 
 
The period 1652 is very important to this study as it unearths the history of suppression 
as it also negatively impacted labour dispute resolution. The discovery of mineral 
deposits particularly diamonds and gold precipitated an industrial revolution peculiar 
to South Africa in the late 1860s and 1870s leading to an increased demand for mining 
and engineering-related skills946 owing to the fact that South Africa lacked a sufficiently 
skilled labour force947 to mine the mineral deposits. The following are some of the 
common issues that characterize labour dispute resolution between 1652 to 1948: 
 
• The period between 1652 and 1948 was characterized by both forced labour 
(slavery) and voluntary or free labour which have existed side by side since 
time immemorial.948  
• When slavery was finally abolished in 1834949 the first attempt at a formal 
regulation of an employment relationship came about through the enactment of 
 
943 Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 2 
944 Sections 2; 172 (1), the 1996 Constitution 
945 Section 38, the 1996 Constitution 
946 Ibid 37 
947 Budeli (2009) 58 
948 De Kock Industrial Laws of South Africa (1956) 18 
949 Nel and van Rooyen South African Industrial Relations (1993) 54 
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the 1841 Masters and Servants Act,950 which was not long-lived.951 It was 
annulled in 1856 by the Masters and Servants Act952 in terms of which servants 
were apparently subjected to a host of hostile conditions for failing to uphold 
employment rules.’953 The employment relationship that existed during these 
times was controlled by a contract of employment to suite the times given the 
rural economy that South Africa then was and most workers were employed on 
farms. 
• Clearly, the employment relationship at the time became increasingly complex 
and protection afforded employees by the individual contract of employment 
proved inadequate.  
• In 1918 the enactment of Factories Act954 and the Regulation of Wages, 
Apprentices and Improvers Act955 became instrumental to the regulation of the 
conditions of employment for the first time. 
• The first Industrial Conciliation Act956 came into operation in April 1924, though 
crippled by its glaring exclusion of blacks from its conception of the term 
“employee.’957 The birth of this Act is attributed to the 1922 Rand Revolt which 
sparked alarming controversy, unrest and protest.958 
• During 1915 – 1930 the employers and employees doubled.959 Regarded as a 
more comprehensive Industrial Conciliation Act960 came into operation in 
December 1937. 
• During 1930 – 1948 the conflicts between employers and employees were 
again doubled. The Black Labour Relations Regulation Act961 was then enacted 
and it particularly regulated black employees’ labour relations. 
• The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 was promulgated on 11 May 1956. The 
Industrial Conciliation Act 1956 completed the creation of a separatist industrial 
 
950 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 36 “…failure to commence work on an agreed date, intoxication, 
disobedience, unauthorized absence from work, substandard work performance, negligence and the 
use of abusive language,” among others was punishable by imprisonment. 
951 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 36 
952 Act 15 of 1856 
953 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 36 
954 Act of 1918 
955 Regulation of Wages Act of 1918 
956 Act of 1924 
957 Swanepoel, et al, (2008) 38 
958 Bendix Industrial Relations in South Africa (2001) 59 
959 De Kock (1956) 18 
960 Act 36 of 1937 
961 Act 48 of 1953 
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system constructed along racial lines entrenched in the racial division of 
workers, ensuring the registration of new unions for both Caucasians and 
coloureds membership was prohibited and certain work was exclusively 
reserved for “persons of specified race” reminiscent of the 1893 ‘job colour bars’ 
spearheaded by the Volksraad as well as that prevalent in the 1898.962 
• The early 1970s was characterized by an insurgence of strikes in South Africa 
orchestrated by native Africans particularly in the Durban region, fighting for 
recognition and against the exclusion policy of apartheid.963 For example, in 
1973, native African workers embarked on a protest strike action with respect 
to wage grievances bringing the industry to an almost grinding standstill. For 
the first time, native African workers demonstrated that they possessed real 
power.  
• The apartheid government speedily reacted to the 1973 strike964 by passing the 
Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act herein (“the BLRA”).965 The 
whole objective of the Act was to control working conditions for native Africans, 
preventing and settling of disputes between employers and native African 
workers and as well as drawing up procedures for setting up labour 
committees.966 
• Although the legislative regulation of labour relations increased from 1918, the 
concept of fair labour practices was not addressed until 1977.967 The 
employment relationship was predominantly regulated by the contract of 
employment and little attention was afforded to the fairness of labour practices 
between employer and employee particular for the Native African workers.968 
 
4.3 Labour dispute resolution between 1979 and 1994 
 
The period between 1979 and 1994 is quite important in the evolution of labour dispute 
resolution in South Africa as it was characterized by several changes that became a 
 
962 Tolcher (2011) 3 
963 Ibid 
964 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 41 
965 Act 70 of 1973 
966 Budeli (2009) 69 
967 De Kock (1956) 18 
968 Ibid  
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catalyst for the current framework. The following characterise the period between 1979 
to 1994: 
 
• The Wiehahn Commission for instance, made recommendations to afford 
unions the freedom to set their own rules and to render as unfair labour practice 
any practices that curtailed union membership of native Africans and succinctly 
clarify employee’s participation in union activities.969 
• The Industrial Conciliation Act 1956970 was revised in 1979 and in 1980.971 In 
1981 the Act was amended972 and renamed the Labour Relations Act herein 
(“LRA”)973 which underwent numerous amendments in the years 1982, 1983, 
1984, 1988 and 1991 respectively.974 The aim of such modifications thereof was 
to afford considerable safeguard to the freedom of association for all workers 
regardless of origin or race.975 
• In 1988, the Labour Relations Amendment Act herein (“LRAA”)976 was amended 
which considered unfair labour practice extending to include the protection of 
native Africans; any direct or indirect meddling with the freedom of association, 
or belonging to a union or otherwise among other offenses.977 The LRAA978 
afforded protection against anti-union discrimination to employees defined in 
terms of the Act. This tacitly rendered employees falling outside its scope 
unprotected.979 
 
4.4 Labour dispute resolution between 1994 to the present  
 
The early 1990s ushered a new dispensation in RSA marking an end to the years of 
political oppression under the scourge of apartheid rule. The year 1994 for instance 
saw a new democratically elected government under President Nelson Mandela 
 
969 Budeli (2007) 70 
970 Act 28 of 1956 
971 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Acts 94 of 1979 and 95 of 1980 
972 Act 57 of 1981 
973 Act 28 of 1956 
974 Act(s) 51 of 1982; 2 of 1983; 81 of 1984; 83 of 1988 and 9 of 1991. 
975 Budeli (2007) 70 
976 Act 83 of 1988 
977 Budeli (2007) 70 
978 Act 83 of 1988 
979 Budeli (2007) 70  
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formed widely regarded as a miracle.980 At the core of RSA's democratic dispensation 
is that it ushered in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 herein (“the 
1996 Constitution”)981 which comprises a Bill of Rights,982 in which a variety of 
fundamental rights are enshrined for all South Africans.983 A deep-rooted component 
of the 1996 Constitution984 was the installation of rights such as the right to fair labour 
practices, freedom of association, to collectively bargain and the right to undertake 
strike protest action,985 a marked difference from the previous era. Labour legislation 
that gives effect to these rights was developed and formalised.986 RSA rapidly enacted 
four important components of labour legislation in succession, namely: the LRA,987 the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act herein (“the BCEA”);988 the Employment Equity 
Act herein (“the EEA”)989 and the Skills Development Act herein (“the SDA”).990 These 
legislative enactments completely transformed the manner labour relationships are 
handled in RSA to date, and are collectively touted the most comprehensive labour 
legislative arrangement in the world.991  
 
In some respects, ADR in South Africa has attained notable milestones towards an 
efficient body especially when it comes to enacting legislation that supports its 
adoption and use. The enactment of a Labour Relations Act992  ushered in a new labour 
dispute settlement regime different from that during the apartheid era which did not 
recognize the rights of native Africans. South Africa installed an independent 
regulatory body – the CCMA - to dispense with ADR in labour disputes.993 South Africa 
is highly commended for its efforts in employing the services of ILO in establishing an 
independent ADR body – the CCMA - in 1996, training of its first 100 full time and 300 part-
time conciliator’s and arbitrators and over 300 support staff as well as establishing an 
electronic case management system that deals with over 100 000 cases each year.’994 
 
980 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 45 
981 Ferreira (2004) 76 
982 Act 108 of 1996 
983 Ferreira (2004) 76 
984 Act 108 of 1996 
985 Section 23 Act 108 of 1996 
986 Ferreira (2004) 76 
987 Act 66 of 1995 
988 Act 75 of 1997 
989 Act 55 of 1998 
990 Act 97 of 1998 
991 Venter, Grossett, and Hills Labour relations in South Africa (2003) 148 
992 Act 66 of 1996 (As Amended) 
993 Section 113, Act 66 of 1996 (As Amended)  
994 Steadman (2011) 43 
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Compared to the National Party which institutionalised and solidified apartheid and 
deepened its exclusion of native Africans from participation in the labour movement 
that would assert their rights, the post 1994 government achieved much in installing 
industrial democracy in South Africa.995 Considering that the Industrial Conciliation 
Act996 enactments under apartheid which introduced Industrial Councils and 
Conciliation Boards as dispute resolution instruments among other things excluded 
native Africans and public sector workers from the definition of an “employee”997 the 
LRA is an important change of direction in the dispute resolution space. Having an 
independent body that dispenses with conciliation and arbitration of disputes ushered 
a new wave of industrial democracy. This is an important milestone according to this 
study. ADR processes in South Africa are responsive and have achieved targets in 
resolving disputes through conciliation and arbitration proceedings. The LRA 
amendments for instance introduced section 143 (3) which gave the CCMA director 
power to certify arbitration awards so as to make them enforceable. This took away 
the need to always convert arbitration awards into orders of court to make before 
section 143 was enacted.998 Such a responsive enactment has added to steps that 
enhance ADR efficacy as far as enforcement of arbitration awards is concerned. It is 
however discernible from the discussions in this chapter that ADR efficacy has been 
curtailed by those that seeks to use review of arbitration awards in the Labour Court 
and prescription period as ploys to evade responsibility. The Constitutional Court 
however ruled that the Prescription Act999 did not apply to arbitration awards and could 
not be used as a delay mechanism by those that sought to evade responsibility.1000 A 
landmark ruling of Justice Zondo and Justice Jafta in the Myathaza matter”1001 settled 
the issue and made it difficult for employers to run to the use of prescription arguments 
as well as review proceedings of arbitration awards through the Labour Court to evade 
liquidating claims or reinstatements.  
 
 
995 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 40 
996 Act of 1924 
997 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 38 
998 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
999 Prescription Act 1969 
1000 Par 142, [2016] ZACC 49, [2017] 2 BLLR 213 (CC) 
1001 Ibid  
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Other aspects that negatively impacts on ADR’s ability to efficaciously dispense with 
matters in CCMA is its inability to determine whether an employment relationship 
existed between the parties in dispute before issues in dispute can be determined. It 
causes unnecessary delay. Further, the Act1002 does not specify the minimum 
qualifications required for persons who act as commissioners and in certain 
circumstances inability to have specialised knowledge among commissioners are 
matters this study believes impinges on RSA ADR ability to be efficacious. This study 
considered whether ADR in South Africa was actually achieving time efficiency 
expectations. The study established that CCMA reported 74% success rate in 
settlements in the 2015/2016 period.1003  This study concurred with a reasoned position 
by Venter & Levy1004 who observed that CCMA was not accurately reporting. CCMA 
piles arbitration settlements together with conciliations to suppose that together they 
reflected settlement success. Conciliations by their nature are a result of the effort of 
the parties. CCMA ought to have indicated success attributed to them in arbitrations 
as they have power to make decisions, which power they do not have when it comes 
to conciliations. Conciliations are settled by the parties with minimum effort of 
commissioners. When looking closely into arbitration awards, Venter & Levy1005 
observed that about 50% (12,730) of the 25,460 matters resolved by way of arbitration 
are not enforced but rather dishonored by employers. Such a state of affairs reflects 
an unfavorable situation when it comes to enforcement of awards. This study agrees 
with Savage1006 view that awards and claims must be capable of being enforced by the 
parties. Without functional enforcement mechanisms in place, the constitutional 
assurance of the right to fair labour practices and the protection of the law risks being 
significantly undermined if not made meaningless.’1007 South Africa still faces the 
challenge of enforcement of arbitration awards especially the attitude of some 
employers as they seek to evade responsibility. By the strength of the foregoing 
arguments this study finds that ADR in labour dispute resolution is still far from being 
efficacious in South Africa. There are still gaps especially in enforcement that need to 
be resolved as seen from the foregoing discussions.  
 
1002 Act 66 of 1996 (As Amended) 
1003 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 31 
1004 Venter & Levy (2013) 45 
1005 Venter & Levy (2013) 45 
1006 Savage (2013) 46 
1007 Savage (2013) 46 
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4.5 Review of the Efficacy of ADR as a Labour Dispute Settlement System in 
South Africa  
 
This section discusses the efficacy of ADR in RSA with three elements in mind. First 
the background conditions consisting of (1) adequate legislative and political support, 
(2) supportive institutional and cultural norms, (3) adequate and competent manpower, 
(4) adequate financial resources, and (5) power parity of disputants.1008 Second, ADR 
program design considerations related to (1) planning and preparation1009 and (2) 
operations and implementation.1010 Third, the ADR measures of efficacy, utilising client 
satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, efficiency and cost-saving1011 maintaining 
privacy, maintaining relationships, involving constituencies, linking the issues, getting 
neutral opinion, and setting precedent,1012 as the focus. 
 
4.5.1 ADR Background Conditions 
 
This section discusses the state of ADR in RSA in terms of legislative and political 
support for it as well as institutional and cultural support, adequate and competent 
manpower and financial resource support and parity in the power of disputants.1013  
 
4.5.1.1 Adequate Political and Legislative Support 
 
It is important for this study to consider the political and legislative support of ADR as 
this speaks to background conditions under which its processes were established from 
its inception. The legislature being responsible for creating the laws may either 
enhance or derail ADR efficacy, depending on whether such laws provide for clear 
definitions of important terms, specific scope of jurisdiction, enabling authorities, 
putting measurement criteria in place in the case of ADR to ascertain time efficiency, 
cost issues among others as well providing adequate awareness among users of the 
system. This section therefore discusses whether ADR in RSA has been afforded the 
necessary support from the legislative and political front for it to be efficacious.  
 
1008 Brown et al. (1998) 24 
1009 Ibid 33 
1010 Ibid 40 
1011 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1012 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 49-68 
1013 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
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Immediately upon attaining independence from apartheid rule in 1994 the new 
democratically elected government in South Africa took steps to transform the labour 
market space, let alone the labour dispute settlement landscape through establishing 
an independent body – the CCMA. The LRA1014 was passed to liberalise the workplace 
giving workers a voice.1015 Subsequent efforts by the government to support the CCMA 
as a dispute resolution body in labour matters is widely applauded. In terms of the Act,  
 
“The CCMA is hereby established as a juristic person.”1016 The Act, by 
providing for the establishment of CCMA as an independent dispute 
resolution entity demonstrated a commitment by government to provide a 
scheme for labour dispute settlement in RSA.1017   
 
It is more than 25 years since the CCMA/ BCs were conceived in South Africa.1018 The 
phenomenal and steady increase in the number of CCMA users, and its exponential 
growth in recent times bears testimony to user confidence therewith and support of 
ADR processes at large.1019 South Africa is to be commended, however, for training over 
100 full-time and 300 part-time conciliators and arbitrators, and over 300 support staff at the 
inception of its post 1994 ADR system establishment.1020 This may have given the country, 
especially its CCMA body a good start at ensuring competent manpower who are adequately 
trained are handling labour disputes. There is also an evident commitment to adhere to ILO 
standards by South Africa in dispute resolution shown by her reliance in the ILO body to help 
build capacity. 
 
However, it is instructive that efforts at building popular acceptance and use also aim 
at overcoming opposition of vested interests, among others.1021 There is some form of 
resistance and dissent to ADR in South Africa that cannot go unnoticed. Carr and 
 
1014 Section 7, Act 66 of 1995 
1015 Ibid  
1016 Section 112, Act 66 of 1995 
1017 Ibid  
1018 Labour Bulletin A critical and analytical assessment of the potential benefits and problems of 
Conciliation / Arbitration as forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms (2015) 8 
1019 Ibid  
1020 Steadman (2011) 43 
1021 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
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Jencks1022 argue that, amongst other disadvantages of RSA’s ADR is that it leads to a 
waning of the role of the judiciary which risks being reduced as an “after thought” by 
the Government thereby robbing it of on-going collation of judicial precedent.1023 It is 
argued further that opting for ADR increases chances of loss and reduction of 
information hidden from the public eye. The Labour Bulletin1024 aired its misgivings of 
ADR particularly that it was eroding the role of formal law provided for my court 
litigation.1025  
 
The resistance building against ADR is that it is eroding formal law and essentially 
robbing society of judicial precedence, which is a hallmark of common law in South 
Africa.1026 This is the same outcry by lawyers in India who view ADR as a threat to court 
litigation and as causing them loss of important cases and insisted that the government 
should take over the system.1027 The fact that there is discontent among legal 
practitioners as to the role of ADR renders it subject to scrutiny and facing legitimacy 
issues among people such as lawyers who ordinarily should be promoting its efficacy. 
Given that political and legislative support is regarded as one of the determinants of 
ADR efficacy, there is evidently a challenge when the legal community expresses 
sentiment suggesting that ADR is disadvantaging them instead of seeing it as a 
panacea for the inadequacies of the courts in labour dispute resolution. This may 
negatively affect the ability of ADR processes to achieve efficacy, as end users may 
be negatively disposed towards it when it appears to be failing a legitimacy test among 
lawyers who should be supporting it. South Africa has ratified all the relevant 
conventions that deal with ADR in labour disputes.1028 South Africa has essentially 
implemented all these conventions by enacting labour laws that promote ADR 
 
1022 Carr and Jencks The Privatisation of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A misguided 
Policy decision, (1999-2000) cited in Labour Bulletin (2015) 9 
1023 Labour Bulletin (2015) 9 
1024 Ibid  
1025 Labour Bulletin (2015) 9 “As noted earlier, one attractive feature of ADR is that its interventions 
remain private and confidential. However, significant chunks of information become difficult to keep 
track of and deprived the public eye. Further, to the extent that public disclosures are volunteered during 
the privatised process, they are often not tracked, memorialised and stored. There is already a scarcity 
of data information available to scholars studying private ADR and the court system. The privatisation 
of business disputes only adds an additional layer of fog making the meaningful study and analysis 
thereof all the more difficult. Moreover, if we are serious and sincere about protecting the public welfare, 
much of the information that is normally hidden by private ADR should be available to the public.” 
1026 Ibid  
1027 Brown et al. (1998) 25 
1028 ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102888 Date 
of Use: 06 August 2019 
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processes that safeguard industrial democracy in the country. This has contributed to 
the effectives of CCMA in dispensing with labour dispute resolution in the country and 
important for achieving ADR efficacy. In the next section supportive institutional 
capacity and cultural support is considered. 
 
4.5.1.2 Supportive Institutional Capacity and Cultural Norms 
 
It is particularly concerning to this study to consider the implications of having sufficient 
institutional capacity and supportive cultural norms to administer ADR processes 
effectively. Once a legislative enactment has been instituted for it to be implemented 
requires an enabling authority in the form of institutions. The state of ADR institutions 
in RSA are reviewed hereunder. 
 
The LRA1029 also provided institutional support in the form of an independent body of 
government as follows. In terms of the Act:  
 
“The CCMA exists and operates as an entity separate from the State, any 
political party, trade union, employer, employers’ organisation, federation of 
trade unions or federation of employers’ organisations”.1030  
 
This signifies an express departure from the old practice which coiled around 
government bureaucracy towards one that affords autonomy and independence to the 
CCMA in dispensing with labour disputes.1031 
 
However, according to Bendeman1032 ‘majority of role players who rely on CCMA lack 
the skill to deal with its requirements hence at pains in handling the consequences of 
the unfair dismissal regime and the shortcomings of the ADR scheme.’ It is discernible 
from this observation that users of the CCMA scheme are unaware of what CCMA 
offers them as well as skills to adequately use the ADR processes afforded them. This 
is attributed to the realities of the RSA labour market and same is obtaining in several 
 
1029 Section 113, Act 66 of 1995 
1030 Ibid  
1031 Section 112, Act 66 of 1995 
1032 Bendeman (2007) 159 
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other African countries among whose large chunks of workers come from poor 
education backgrounds; while a large proportion of employers have little skills or 
training in labour relations as well as labour law to handle ADR and also operate small 
to medium-sized businesses.1033 For example while it may be cheap to use conciliation 
proceedings for employees who cannot afford to pay lawyers to represent them should 
they use arbitration, employers generally prefer arbitration. Evidently employers 
abscond or challenge the conciliation hearings in favour of arbitrations.1034 The 
argument is that the government has not foreseen and provided for capacity building 
on internal conflict resolution processes through bodies such as the CCMA within 
society to reduce escalation of disputes which could well be minimised.1035 
Inadequacies of ADR institutions may reduce its efficacy as cases fail to be 
administered effectively due to poor management therefore. Clearly, ADR in RSA still 
lacks adequate awareness among end users. Many people lack understanding of what 
CCMA can and cannot do for them because of poor stakeholder engagement thereon. 
This means CCMA may still struggle with wrong cases being brought before it giving 
it an administrative burden to screen them, a task which engages resources which 
could be used elsewhere to resolve disputes. The next section considers manpower 
as a determinant of efficacy of ADR. 
 
4.5.1.3 Adequate and Competent Manpower  
 
Given that ADR efficacy largely depends on skilled and competent manpower who 
administer the processes, it is important for this study to consider it as far as labour 
dispute resolution in RSA is concerned. Whether the manpower will skillfully execute 
the duties in either facilitating resolution or resolving disputes will influence whether 
such matters are resolved efficaciously.  
 
The first challenge that this study would have to establish is whether the Act provides 
for the adequate and competent workforce to administer ADR processes. The Act1036 
provides for the appointment and supervision of commissioners to administer ADR 
 
1033 Ibid  
1034 Benjamin (2013) 18 
1035 ibid 
1036 Section 117 (1), Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
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processes. The Act states that “the governing body must appoint as commissioners 
as many competent persons as it considers necessary to perform the functions of 
commissioners by or in terms of this Act or any other law.”1037 The aspect of ‘competent 
persons’ is provided for in the Act which supposedly deals with the skills levels. The 
use of the phrase “as many” competent persons supposedly deals with the aspect of 
adequacy or sufficient manpower. The challenge with competent persons is that it 
does not specify the level of competence required especially in terms of minimum 
qualifications and experience. This could pose problems for the commission especially 
when it comes to handling of complex disputes often requiring the interpretation of law 
or technical areas. The lack of specific minimum skills requirements is highlighted by 
Singh1038 when analysing CCMA disadvantages who stated that the ‘lack of technical 
skills / adequate legal skills by commissioner. Given the informal nature of ADR 
proceedings and processes, it is not a requirement for arbitrators to be legally trained 
nor are they expected to possess expertise in any subject matter in dispute. This may 
limit the ability and competence of a presiding commissioner, especially in respect of 
possessing sufficient knowledge of the law, which is sometimes necessary especially 
when lawyers are used to represent parties in arbitration. This could give rise to many 
challenges by way of review applications, thus delaying the finalisation of the dispute.’ 
CCMA has had many of its rulings especially in arbitration proceedings subject to court 
review over the years.1039  There is a challenge regarding conduct of commissioners in 
CCMA in South Africa particularly their competence levels to dispense with 
disputes.1040 This could also be attributed to the fact that the LRA1041 in RSA does not 
prescribe minimum skill level requirements for commissioners who handle labour 
disputes.1042 These challenges limit the ability of ADR in South Africa to achieve the 
efficacy goal in labour dispute resolution. This next section considers the element of 
adequate funding. 
 
4.5.1.4 Adequate Funding 
 
 
1037 Section 117(1), Act 66 of 1996 (As Amended) 
1038 Singh A critical and analytical assessment of the potential benefits and problems of Conciliation / 
Arbitration as forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms (2015) 8 
1039 Singh (2015) 8 
1040 Labour Bulletin (2015) 9 
1041 Act 66 of 1995 
1042 Ibid  
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It is important to ensure that ADR is adequately funded to administer dispute resolution 
efficaciously. Without adequate funding ADR processes may be frustrated. This 
section considers the status of funding of ADR processes in South Africa and particular 
its influence on efficacy of labour dispute resolution.  
 
The CCMA as a labour dispute settlement body is funded by the State and disputants 
are not charged for lodgment of disputes thereto.1043 The CCMA was established as 
part of the system overhaul from the pre-1994 one with the chief aim of ensuring ‘(a) 
workers themselves could lodge disputes and seek relief, free of any charge; and (b) 
providing a dispute resolution forum which was quasi-judicial in its offering but at the 
same time, statutorily entrenched so that justice would not be placed beyond the reach 
of an impoverished or disadvantaged employee or party.’1044 It is readable from the 
foregoing  that ADR in South Africa is afforded disputants free of charge. This would 
suggest that ADR is least costly than court litigation in South Africa. Disputants lodging 
their grievances through the CCMA or the Labour Court may do so themselves or 
through assistance from their union or in certain instances by attorneys.1045 The aspect 
of involving lawyers has attracted dissent with others disparaging is as making ADR 
litigious which it sought to avoid by its nature and others saying disallowing lawyers is 
unnecessarily and unfair discriminating to the disfavor of members of the legal 
fraternity.1046 Arguably allowing legal representation tendentiously increases the cost 
of ADR which may not be afforded by less privileged members of the community.1047 It 
is descendible from the foregoing that ADR in South Africa is cheap and therefore 
costless compared to court litigation in terms of labour dispute resolution. From the 
aim of this study it would be observable that the fact that ADR is free of charge in RSA 
contributes positively towards efficacy thereof especially in labour dispute resolution. 
The next section discusses power parity of disputants. 
 
4.5.1.5 Power Parity of Disputants 
 
 
1043 Benjamin (2013) 6, see Singh (2015) 5 
1044 Singh (2015) 5 
1045 Benjamin (2013) 6 
1046 Okharedia (2011) 13 
1047 Bendeman (2007) 150 
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It is important for this study to consider the power balances or imbalances within the 
context of ADR processes. This addresses situations where people who are powerful 
for some reason or the other could use such power to discomfit the rights of the less 
powerful in disputes. The question is therefore more of to what extend does ADR in 
RSA afford an environment where power between those using the processes 
balanced? This may refer to use of money, gender and other sources of power to 
disadvantage others.  
 
South Africa is an unequal society spiraled from the pre-independence era of apartheid 
rule.1048 In the PESTEL analysis section under economic factors in this study it was 
indicated that RSA is regarded as one of the grossly unequal nations on earth and 
appears to have become even more unequal than it was when apartheid ended.1049 
This undermines the effectiveness of dispute mechanisms such as ADR as was noted 
by Lynch1050 experiences of CCMA commissioners.1051 It is argued that the CCMA’s 
scheme of processes are characterised by power play in that employers often prefer 
a cavalier reliance on arbitration rather than conciliation just to reaffirm their power 
obviously to the disadvantage of the workers who lack power.1052 Reliance on 
grievance procedures is often derided as it is perceived as a challenge to 
management’s power, which needs to be corrected in the subsequent processes.1053 
The likelihood of pre-dismissal procedures bearing much fruit is negligible in such 
unequal environments.1054 However, RSA has managed to fully utilize the tripartite 
alliance of the government, unions and the business community to put up a labour 
legislation that engenders industrial democracy.1055 Even though there may still be 
power imbalances between the haves and have nots approaching the ADR systems, 
the government has made an effort to put mechanisms in place to address such 
issues. The installation of an independent ADR body which is free of charge ensures 
that the common man for instance is able to access justice. As to whether the goals 
of a power-balanced society is being achieved is unknown. There may be a challenge 
 
1048 Smit et al. (2013) 75 (See Lings (2014) 15) 
1049 Lings (2014) 15 
1050 Lynch (2001) 208 
1051 Ibid  
1052 Ibid   
1053 Ibid  
1054 Bendeman (2007) 157. 
1055 Section 23, Act 108 of 1996, See also Ferreira (2004) 76 
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of the gap between principle and practice of RSA’s ADR whereby legislation and 
mechanisms thereof speak towards addressing challenges but what is happening on 
the ground is ineffective enforcement of such ethos. RSA still has to address power 
imbalances in society in general and power parity of disputants in labor dispute 
resolution specifically; as the only hope for achieving ADR efficaciousness.  
 
4.5.2 ADR Program Design Considerations  
 
This section assesses and discusses matters around ADR design efficacy in South 
Africa. Attention is given to issues of the planning and preparation as well as 
operations and implementation of ADR under the auspices of the LRA1056 and CCMA 
in South Africa. 
 
4.5.2.1 Planning and Preparation 
 
The CCMA runs a case management system whose role is to screen cases referred 
to it according to whether such disputes are within its jurisdiction or otherwise.1057 This 
is an example of a planning role of an ADR programme.1058 This is an important 
exercise to this study because screening cases frees the tribunal of unnecessary load 
of cases that do not fall within its jurisdiction so that focus may be placed on those it 
must handle. That has a tendency to enhance efficaciousness through spending time 
within the CCMA to handle.  
 
Research1059 indicates that the CCMA or ADR system has design challenges 
especially that it is an imposing system.1060 RSA’s ADR practitioners prefer use of the 
term ‘appropriate as opposed to the term ’alternative’ in the formulation of ADR as a 
scheme while theories suggest the use of alternative as the most ideal for reason 
discussed in chapter 2 of this study.1061 This, it is argued calls for an overhauling of 
approaches to dispute settlement, touching upon the very selection (the design) of a 
process to establish the one best suited to any particular dispute bearing in mind the 
 
1056 Act 66 of 1995 
1057 Jurisdiction means for the competence of a court (tribunal) to hear a matter and enforce its decisions 
1058 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 31 
1059 Bendeman (2007) 157 
1060 Ibid   
1061 Ibid  
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needs, the mean of the concept ADR and capacity of disputants in RSA at large to 
engage the processes.1062  
 
4.5.2.2 Operations and Implementation 
 
It is also important for this study to consider the manner in which ADR processes are 
administered at CCMA giving regard to processes and implementation. It is the subject 
of this section. 
 
Arguably, the problems / challenges identified within the ADR system in RSA by and 
large comprise the attitude of interested parties to the attendant processes and /or 
competence levels of commissioners who administer same.1063 As such the need to 
overhaul the existing ADR schemes is instructive and the more, furnishing sufficient 
education and training to users, who subsequently can facilitate ADR success in 
labour dispute resolution is an urgent imperative.1064  
 
The CCMA adopted a case management system with the help of ILO1065 wherewith it 
sits officers at its receptions screening disputes as they came in to determine those 
within its jurisdiction and those without.1066 This has contributed to effectiveness in 
handling those cases it is mandated to dispense with. Furthermore, since its inception, 
the CCMA has installed an electronic case management system (CMS) designed as 
a tracking and coordinating tool for all matters lodged thereto.1067 A mandatory referral 
form which captures details about the grievance and relief sought by the disputant 
referring same acts as its primary source document for processing of matters.1068 As 
matters progress through the CCMA process, further details thereon are captured into 
the CMS. The CMS makes the scheduling and tracking of progress of disputes 
workable.1069 On 1 January 2012, CCMA made the following additional information 
obtainable through CMS as a matter of requirement:  
 
1062 Labour Bulletin (2015) 9 
1063 Ibid  
1064 Ibid  
1065 Steadman (2011) 43 
1066 CCMA (2005) 8 
1067 Benjamin (2013) 9 
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• the manner of lodgment of dispute (e.g. fax, walk in, registered mail etc.);  
• details about the disputant referring the matter (gender, identity number, length 
of service, monthly earnings, age, race and whether the employee is employed 
through a labour broker/temporary employment service);  
• if the disputant is an individual, the gender must be furnished thereto;  
• if the employer is an organization, its size by staff complement;  
• whether the disputants are represented and, if so, the nature of representation 
(lawyer, trade union official, etc.);  
• the outcome of settled matters, including the awarded amount;  
• the outcome of arbitration award made, including the amount awarded.1070 
 
Table 1 indicates that the settlement rate for the past five years (2012-2016) have 
been impressive and way above the target of 70%.1071 The settlement rate went down 
in the year 2016 by 2% compared to the previous year where it was 76%.1072 This is 
explained by the addition of caseload emanating from the promulgation of new 
amendments to the Act that requires CCMA to preside over cases that emanating from 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act1073 such as those pertaining to severance 
benefits.1074 In a strong sense there is progress in ADR in South Africa given that the 
aspect of measuring settlement rate is infused within the system.1075 In terms of the 
Act,1076 disputes should be settled within the threshold of 30 days at a minimum.1077 
 
In terms of table 1 of all conciliations of all jurisdictional cases heard each year 
between the years 2011 and 2016 had a resolution of 96% on average in total. That 
is an impressive resolution rate.1078 Though some argues that the settlement rates do 
not accurately reflect success, since the trial settlement ratios are frequently as high 
well1079  there is merit in having settlement as an outcome in ADR. Reports are often 
 
1070 Benjamin (2013) 10 
1071 CCMA (2016) 31 
1072 CCMA (2016) 31 
1073 Basic Conditions of Employment Act No. 75 of 1997 
1074 CCMA (2016) 18 
1075 Section 135, Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1076 Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1077 Ibid  
1078 CCMA (2016) 31 
1079 Katz (1993) 52 
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inflated to reflect success but without some form of measure including settlement rate, 
there is no determination of efficacy of ADR. 
 
Table 1 Number of disputes referred to CCMA 2011 – 2016 
Referrals  2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 
Total referrals  161 588 168 434 170673 171854 179528 
Jurisdictional cases 126 504 131 564 134 943 137 479 145 728 
Non-Jurisdictional 35 084 36 870 35 730 34 375 33 800 
Pre-conciliations heard 16% 17% 17% 15% 17% 
Pre-conciliations finalised 8% 9% 11% 11% 11% 
Corn/Arb finalised 36% 36% 40% 38% 37% 
Conciliations heard and closed 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 
Arbitrations finalised 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 
Late Awards - by commissioner  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Late Awards - sent to parties 7% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Postponements/Adjournments 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 
Process reworks (8%) 7% 6% 5% 6% 6% 
Turnaround time - conciliation (30 days) 24 24 24 23 23 
Turnaround time - Arbitration (60 days) 59 61 68 61 61 
Settlement rate 70% 73% 75% 76% 74% 
Source: CCMA Annual Report (2016) 31-32 
 
4.5.3 The ADR measures of efficacy 
 
Generally speaking, the CCMA is considered inundated with matters while at the same 
time rush and frivolous suits being instituted by disputants abound.1080 This state of 
affairs is attributable to the flexible nature of the procedure by which an action is 
instituted through CCMA.1081 In terms of the LRA,1082 an employee needs only to prove 
that a dismissal has occurred to institute an action through CCMA1083 and thereafter 
the burden shifts to the employer who must prove that the dismissal was a fair sanction 
 
1080 Venter (2003) 522 
1081 Van Schaack with All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change 
(2004) 2305-2319. 
1082 Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1083 Section 192 (1), Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
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both procedurally and substantively.1084 The provision of section 92 of the LRA, is 
considered too simple and rather too flexible and in the result, instances of frivolous 
suits being instituted by employees abound at CCMA.1085 The argument is that the 
employee is given a simpler task to only prove that a dismissal has occurred and the 
employer bears the larger task thereafter to prove that such dismissal was a fair 
sanction both procedurally and substantively.1086 The challenge with such a provision 
is that it tentatively opens floodgates for potentially rash and frivolous charges of unfair 
dismissal to be lodged with the CCMA.1087 This anomaly in turn, “clogs and slows the 
entire system, and perhaps even leads to an overshadowing of other more serious 
allegations that warrant greater attention from being accorded such.”1088  
 
This section however evaluates specific elements of the performance of ADR in South 
Africa with respect to client satisfaction, settlement rate, efficiency (time saving) as 
well as cost saving measures.1089 
 
4.5.3.1 Efficiency and time saving nature of ADR  
 
It is important for this study to ascertain the efficacy of ADR labour dispute resolution 
in general, efficiency and time saving nature thereof. This study established that time 
efficiency is one of the important determinants of ADR efficacy and in fact among the 
reasons why it is opted for as a dispute resolution mechanism in place of court 
litigation. The court litigation process is considered time consuming and ADR is 
therefore an efficient alternative. As a result, one considers the time it takes to 
dispense with a dispute under ADR as opposed to court litigation.  
 
The Act1090 provides timeframes within which matters are lodged with the tribunal, and 
the time it should take for these matters to be resolved. A dispute must be submitted 
to CCMA for conciliation within 30 days from the date it occurred. This study is more 
 
1084 Section 192 (2), Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1085  Madhuku Constitutional Protection of the Independence of the Judiciary: A Survey of the Position 
in South Africa (2002) 242 
1086 Section 192, Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1087 Animashaun, Odeku and Nevondwe (2014) 680 (See Venter (2003) 522) 
1088 Venter (2003) cited in Animashaun, Odeku and Nevondwe (2014) 680 
1089 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1090 Sections 135 and 136 (1) (b), Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
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interested in the time it takes to resolve a dispute once it is in the hands of CCMA. 
CCMA reports that cases have been resolved efficiently, way above the target of 70% 
for the past five years (2012-2016) which is regarded as an impressive 
performance.1091 The challenge raised by Tokiso is that the 70% success claim is 
inflated as it does not reflect matters CCMA settled. It includes matters that were 
settled by conciliation which are decided by the parties and not CCMA, Tokiso feels 
that the measurement of success by CCMA should be against arbitrated matters and 
not conciliated ones. CCMA only facilitates in conciliation but not decide on the 
decision to settle the matter. Though such an argument has some merit it is important 
to note that by a large stretch the efficacy of ADR in South Africa is satisfactory. This 
study sought to ascertain whether settling a labour dispute in RSA was time efficient 
and somewhat there is satisfactory achievement in the matter in which ADR processes 
are administered in that regard. The next section considers the cost effectiveness of 
ADR in RSA. 
 
4.5.3.2 Cost effectiveness of ADR 
 
The cost effectiveness of ADR is another important factor why it is elected as a dispute 
resolution mechanism instead of the courts. The cost effectiveness of ADR is therefore 
important to this study in its attempt to ascertain the efficacy of labour dispute 
resolution in South Africa. 
 
The CCMA has reported 70% success in its effort to settle labour disputes.1092 It is 
however discernible that ADR in RSA is cost effective given that it is afforded 
disputants free of charge. Disputants do not need to pay anything to appear before 
CCMA with a dispute. Disputants may however incur costs when it comes to engaging 
lawyers especially when appearing for arbitration proceedings. There is no specific 
guideline in the Act as to how much lawyers may charge clients to appear in CCMA 
tribunal. Generally, it may be reasonable to conclude that ADR in South Africa is cost 
effective. This attribute adds to ADR efficacy in RSA labour dispute resolution 
significantly. The next section considers settlement of disputes as a measure of 
efficacy. 
 
1091 CCMA (2016) 31 
1092 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 31  
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4.5.3.3 Settlement of ADR disputes 
 
The whole objective of an ADR intervention as with court litigation is settlement of 
disputes. The previous sections dealt with the cost effectiveness and time efficient 
manner in which ADR disputes are settled as measures of efficacy and this section is 
interested in the actual settlement. It is not enough for a tribunal to entertain disputes 
if such engagement does not settle them or facilitate same. 
 
Settlement of labour disputes is a priority in RSA. The CCMA is the body saddled with 
the role and responsibility to dispense with labour disputes, measures and reports on 
its settlement and attendant enforcement.1093 Based on reports available on CCMA’s 
website from its inception in 1996 to the present, labour dispute settlement through 
ADR has both been documented and made a matter of public record.1094 Generally, 
CCMA has managed to settle disputes at a rate of 75% on average, attributable to 
continuous effort to improve in many fronts, including resources mobilization, case 
management system and capacity building of its commissioners.1095 However, the data 
regarding settlement and enforcement has not escaped the eye of scrutiny in South 
Africa. This study concurs with Venter & Levy1096 that CCMA reports have inflated 
settlement by including conciliation success figures which are not within CCMA ambit 
to decide.  
 
“We continue to hold the view that settlement of a dispute at conciliation is 
neither the responsibility nor does it lie in the hands of the dispute resolution 
institutions. It is in fact an outcome in the hands of the parties. Therefore, 
the efficiency or effectiveness of the system should not be determined by 
how high or low the settlement rate it.”1097  
 
Considering the foregoing statement, the CCMA decides on arbitration outcomes 
where it is empowered to settle and make awards. The 75% claim is therefore 
regarded as an inflating of settlement figures and success rate not reflect the reality 
 
1093 CCMA (2016) 31  
1094 Ibid  
1095 Ibid  
1096 Venter & Levy (2011) 47  
1097 Ibid   
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on the ground. In making out their argument Venter & Levy1098 asserted that CCMA 
seldom publishes its definitions, categorizations or the basis for which it calculates its 
figures. In 2009/2010 period for instance it alluded that “the actual number of cases 
settled increased by 14%; 6% more cases were withdrawn by the applicant (note that 
this figure is across all processes); 13% more were settled by the parties and the 
CCMA commissioner settled 16% more than in the previous year.”1099 This study is 
however guided by the fact that other factors considered together, including efficient 
handling of processes, cost effective nature thereof, ADR is satisfactorily efficacious 
in labour dispute settlement. Settlement, in large part is also curtailed in certain 
instances by the delays when commissioners have to dispense with jurisdictional 
battles, in either conciliation or arbitration as it is the duty of the commissioner to 
determine questions of jurisdiction first before dispensing with matters.1100 In principle, 
CCMA commissioners ought to determine the existence of jurisdiction on four areas 
in relation to: the territory or area of jurisdiction, the persons concerned, the cause of 
action or matter in the dispute, and the period of time involved.1101 There is controversy 
collecting around whether the existence of an employment relationship and a dismissal 
are jurisdictional facts in the context of a dismissal dispute. Authority for this matter is 
Bombadier Transportation (Pty) Ltd, v Mtiya NO & Others herein (“the Bombadier 
matter”).1102 The court herein1103 sought to decline that the existence or otherwise of an 
employment relationship was truly a jurisdictional issue to be determined before 
conciliation or arbitration could resume or before CCMA could be seized with 
jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The Bombadier matter1104 finally ruled that indeed 
determining an employment relationship was an important jurisdictional issue before 
the matter is heard. In the Linda matter1105 undue delay was placed on the matter 
because the respondent (employer) claimed that an employment relationship did not 
 
1098 Venter & Levy (2011) 47    
1099Ibid  
1100 Myburgh & Bosch Reviews in the Labour Courts (2016) 109 
1101 Ibid  
1102 Par 13, [2010] 8 BLLR 840 LC “The distinction to be drawn is one between facts that the Legislature 
has decided must necessarily exist for a tribunal to have the power to act (and without which the tribunal 
has no such power) and facts that the Legislature has decided must be shown to exist by a party to 
proceedings before the tribunal, the existence of which may be determined by the tribunal in the course 
of exercising its statutory powers.” 
1103 Ibid, Par 16 point 1 
1104 Paragraph 13, [2010] 8 BLLR 840 (LC) 
1105 Linda Erasmus Properties v Lucky Mhlongo, the CCMA and Janine Beytell, J 1604/04, See also 
Building Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape) vs Melmons Cabinets CC & Another (2001) 
22 ILJ 120 (LC) 
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exist between it and the other party, but only a contract of service (independent 
contractor relationship) existed. The CCMA was therefore unable to hear the matter 
until the court settled the issue of the existence or otherwise of an employment 
relationship between the parties.1106 In the matter of Fidelity Guards Holdings  (Pty) Ltd 
v Epsen NO & Others herein (the “the Fidelity Guards matter”)1107 in order for CCMA 
to have jurisdiction, among other things, CCMA ought to determine if an employment 
relationship exists or previously existed between the parties (in the case of a dismissal 
disputes.) If the reading of this is a correct one, one would assume that CCMA will 
only have jurisdiction if an employment relationship or otherwise existed between the 
parties, which issue must be determined elsewhere. It means that time will have to be 
spent determining such a matter before ADR can be dispensed with in resolving labour 
disputes in RSA. The foregoing issue renders ADR unable to be sufficiently efficient 
in dispensing with disputes. South Africa still needs to work on its legislation to deal 
with conferring the power to determine jurisdiction on CCMA commissioners to 
enhance ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution.  The next section considers the 
aspect of enforcement of ADR outcomes. 
 
4.5.3.4 Enforcement of ADR outcomes  
 
Enforcement is an important aspect of labour dispute resolution. Savage1108 asserts 
that awards and claims must be capable of being enforced by the parties. Without 
functional enforcement mechanisms in place, the constitutional assurance of the right 
to fair labour practices and the protection of the law risks being significantly 
undermined if not made meaningless.’1109  
 
In terms of the LRA,1110 an arbitration award issued by a CCMA Commissioner is final 
and binding and may be enforced as if it were an order of the LC in respect of which 
a writ has been issued, with the exception of advisory arbitration awards such as 
orders for performance, other than payment of money, for instance, reinstatement.1111 
 
1106 Ibid   
1107 Par 16, [2000] 12 BLLR 1389 (LAC) 
1108 Savage (2013) 46 
1109 Ibid  
1110 Section 143 (1), Act 66 of 1995 
1111 Ibid  
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Such a development was quite important in 2014 especially that an arbitration award 
may be certified by a CCMA Director1112 and thus it becomes unnecessary to approach 
the court to convert it into an order, in terms of the LRA.1113 
 
The court in Mlaudzi v Metro South Towing CC herein (“Mlaudzi matter”)1114 warned 
that a party who declines to comply with a certified order, will risk such order getting 
enforced without a further order by way of contempt proceedings lodged at LC.1115 This 
is also consistent with the judgement of the Labour Court in SATAWU obo Phakathi v 
Ghekko Services SA (Pty) Ltd and Others1116 herein (“the SATAWU obo Phakathi 
matter”), in which the Labour Court held that section 158(1)(c) applications were not a 
precondition for contempt proceedings.1117  
 
Nonetheless, in Mlaudzi matter, the Labour Court further held that a section 158(1)(c) 
application may not be dismissed for the mere fact that the arbitration award was 
certified. Instead, the Labour Court ruled that the employee made out a proper case 
and, in the result, made the arbitration award an order of the Labour Court.1118 Prior to 
this amendment, a party would invoke the provisions of the Act1119 which directed the 
Labour Court to convert an arbitration award into an order of court. Now the CCMA 
can enforce its own awards through its own process by certifying them through its 
Director, and not having a winning party approach the Labour Court to be issued with 
a writ of execution in order to enable enforcement.1120 Such award therefore becomes 
directly enforceable without the need for a writ to be issued by any Court or the 
CCMA.1121 The LRA1122 regulates awards sounding in money. For purposes of 
enforcement, an arbitration award is executed as if it was an order of the Magistrate 
Court.1123 The Deputy Sheriff may enforce and execute orders of the Magistrate Court 
and by virtue of this section have the power to enforce and execute a certified 
 
1112 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1113 Section 158(1)(c), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1114 [2017] ZALCJHB 37 
1115 Par 9, [2017] ZALCJHB 37 
1116 [2011] 32 ILJ 1728 (LC) 
1117 Ibid  
1118 Par 9, [2017] ZALCJHB 37  
1119 Section 158(1)(c), Act 66 of 1995 
1120 Section 143 (1), Act 66 of 1995 
1121 Ibid   
1122 Section 143 (5), Act 66 of 1995 
1123 Section 143 (1), Act 66 of 1995 
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arbitration award.1124 The Amended Section 143(1) of the LRA reads as follows: “An 
arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and it may be enforced 
as if it were an order of the Labour Court in respect of which a writ has been issued”. 
Section 143 (5) as amended further reads: “Despite subsection (1), an arbitration 
award in terms of which a party is required to pay an amount of money must be treated 
for the purpose of enforcing or executing that award as if it were an order of the 
Magistrates Court.” The implications of the amendments1125 are as follows: (a) 
Employees who have awards issued in their favour, no longer have to approach the 
Labour Court for a writ of execution in the event of non-compliance with the award; (b) 
An arbitration award that orders compensation must be enforced or executed as if it is 
an order of the Magistrates Court. The above-mentioned position was confirmed by 
the Labour Appeal Court on 28 June 2016 when it delivered judgement in CCMA v 
MBS Transport CC.1126 The Department of Labour has made funding available to the 
CCMA to assist employees who are not in a financial position to enforce awards in 
their favour.1127 The funding is aimed at employees who are too indigent to afford the 
costs of enforcement.1128 These employees are deemed to be: (a) Employees who earn 
below the earnings threshold (currently at R205 433.30 per annum) – proof of income 
will be required by the CCMA; (b) Employees who earn up to the amount as reflected 
above, irrespective of whether they are represented by a union or legal representative 
at the arbitration proceedings are afforded the benefits of such a facility. It is important 
to note that in the enforcement of the award the sheriff will be empowered to: (a) attach 
movable goods belonging to the employer; (b) take the above goods into execution; 
(c) publicly auction the goods; (d) pay over from the proceeds of the auction the 
amount due to the employee; (e) deduct his costs incurred in the course of the 
execution from the proceeds of the auction after the employee has been paid; and (f) 
recover the whole or the unpaid portion of the costs of the execution from the 
CCMA.1129 The amendments discussed above therefore makes it easier for an 
employee to enforce an award in his / her favour and the employer should therefore 
 
1124 Section 143 (1), Act 66 of 1995  
1125 Section 143 (5), and 143(1) Act 66 of 1995  
1126 [2016] J1807/15 
1127 Strydom https://ceosa.org.za/amendments-to-section-143-of-the-labour-relations-act-66-of-1995-
and-the-implications-thereof/ Date of use: 13th February 2019 
1128 Ibid 
1129 Strydom https://ceosa.org.za/amendments-to-section-143-of-the-labour-relations-act-66-of-1995-
and-the-implications-thereof/ Date of use: 13th February 2019 
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be pro-active with regards to any matter involving the CCMA to avoid non-compliance 
and the consequences thereof.1130 
 
Concerning prescription, the Constitutional Court (CC) handed down a landmark 
decision in the Myathaza v Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Services (SOC) Limited 
t/a Metrobus and Others herein (“the Myathaza matter”)1131 in which it held that 
arbitration awards issued in terms of the LRA do not prescribe.1132 In the decisions of 
Cellucity (Pty) Limited v Communication Workers’ Union obo Peters herein (“the 
Cellucity matter)1133 and Mazibuko v Concor Plant herein (“Mazibuko matter”)1134 the 
CC had to consider whether an arbitration award issued in terms of the LRA had 
prescribed on the expiry of three years1135 from the date on which the award was issued 
and the court ruled that they did not.1136 The judgment in this matter was motivated by 
the desire to bring finality to the arguments that the arbitration awards which had been 
issued in favour unfairly dismissed employees could no longer be actionable because 
they had prescribed in terms of the Prescription Act.1137 The general undertaking is that 
the matter of enforcement is not conclusive just because the commissioner has 
handed down an award, the director of CCMA has certified it, or even that the courts 
have issued judgments in favour of a particular disputant.1138 Enforcement remains a 
challenge impinging on the very possibility of efficacy of ADR or otherwise. When an 
employee is unfairly dismissed, it does not necessarily follow that compensation or 
returning to work are afforded them instantaneously.1139 When an award is issued 
against an employer, such employer may wait to see if the other party will have the 
audacity to enforce it through the other institutions available to them.1140 The losing 
party may lodge an objection to Labour Court to have such award reviewed which is 
virtually a delay tactic.1141 CCMA Commissioners are taken on judicial review by the 
 
1130 Strydom https://ceosa.org.za/amendments-to-section-143-of-the-labour-relations-act-66-of-1995-
and-the-implications-thereof/ Date of use: 13th February 2019 
1131 [2016] ZACC 49, [2017] 2 BLLR 213 (CC) 
1132 Ibid  
1133 CA 3/14 
1134 LAC JA 39/14 
1135 Section 11(d), Prescription Act, 1969 
1136 Par 145, [2016] ZACC 49  
1137 Prescription Act, 1969 
1138 Benjamin Conciliation, Arbitration and Enforcement: The CCMA’s Achievements and Challenges 
(2009) 40 
1139 Benjamin (2009) 40   
1140 Ibid    
1141 Ibid  
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Labour Court.1142 During the period awaiting review, the award was rendered sterile by 
reason of prescription.1143 Both the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court had ruled 
in the favour of the debtors, that indeed the matters had expired due to prescription. 
The awards in that light were treated as debts which expired after three years from the 
day they were issued. In terms of the Prescription Act the arbitral award was an 
ordinary debt which expired after three years if it was not claimed or interrupted. It was 
not necessarily a judgement debt which prescribed after 30 years from the time it is 
issued. In the Myathaza matter”1144 Judge Zondo ruled that the Prescription Act1145 did 
not apply to arbitration awards given that they LRA had its own provision of 
prescriptions and that the arbitration award was not a court order.1146  This study 
concurs with judgments like the Myathaza matter.”1147 Such rulings have the effect of 
contributing towards ADR efficacy especially enhancing enforcement of awards by 
removing the cavalier or arrogant manner in which debtors or losing parties would hide 
behind review or prescription to evade its obligation to pay compensation and/or to 
reinstate an unfairly dismissed employee as stated in the award. An arbitration award 
in terms of the LRA is not subject to an appeal like a judgment or order of the Labour 
Court: it is subject to review in terms of section 145.1148 An order or judgment of the 
Labour Court is not subject to review.  A court order or a judgment also does not 
require certification before it may be executed as is the case with an arbitral award in 
terms of LRA.1149 
 
Unfortunately, the Labour Court is crippled by the lack of records on the number of 
matters lodged for review therewith. Further, apart from the initial requirement in the 
LRA that reviews be instituted within six weeks of an award, there are no requirements 
in either the rules or practices of the Labour Court to expedite such reviews through 
the court and to inhibit reviews from use as delaying techniques.1150 It takes an 
 
1142 Benjamin (2009) 40 
1143 Section 11(d), Prescription Act, 1969 
1144 Par 142, [2016] ZACC 49, [2017] 2 BLLR 213 (CC) 
1145 Prescription Act, 1969 
1146 Par 142, [2016] ZACC 49 Justice Zondo stated “It [arbitral award] is also not a judgment debt 
because an arbitration award is not a court judgment. Section 15(2), (3), (4) and (5) [of the Prescription 
Act, 1969] contemplate that the process contemplated in section 15(1) is a process that leads to a 
judgment.” 
1147 Par 142, [2016] ZACC 49, [2017] 2 BLLR 213 (CC) 
1148 Act 66 of 1995 
1149 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1150 Par 33, [2016] ZACC 49 
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estimated 23 months from the date of the arbitration award for the Labour Court to 
hear a review application and a further three months for judgment to be handed 
down.1151 This negatively impacts as much on enforcement of awards specifically as it 
does the efficacy of ADR in general.1152 There is need for more institutional reforms to 
prevent reviews being abused through cavalier tactics to frustrate the enforcement of 
awards.1153 
 
First, that arbitral awards ought to be certified by the director of CCMA is a hurdle.1154 
Second, the possibility of delays when challenged on review with its own concomitant 
delays often lasting 23 months from the date of issuance of such arbitration award for 
the application to be entertained by the Labour Court and a further three months for 
judgment to be handed down cripples the system.1155 Thirdly and finally, the winning 
party, if it be an employee ought to pay a security deposit to the sheriff to attach and 
if need be sell the employer’s assets to liquidate the owed amount (save for those 
indigent, assisted through the Department of Labour grant) are among cumbersome 
processes that renders ADR far from completely efficacious.1156  However, even on the 
CCMA side there are still glaring challenges with enforcement of arbitration awards 
rendering ADR inefficacious. CCMA reports that 44,667 arbitrations were conducted 
in the 2011/12 period for instance, and 43% arbitrations were settled, implying that 
25,460 awards were issued.1157 It is surmised that if 50% of the awards are in favour of 
employees (including default arbitrations) therefore 12,730 were issued in favour of 
employees, it means about half of the awards issued in employees favour are not 
honored by employers in the first instance.1158 This excludes the high levels of non-
compliance at bargaining councils in particular with arbitration awards in favour of the 
councils in the enforcement of collective agreements.1159 Based on the foregoing, it can 
be concluded that ADR in RSA is not completely efficacious given the challenges 
surrounding enforcement of arbitration awards as afore-discussed.  
 
1151 Par 33, [2016] ZACC 49  
1152 Kwakwala A critical evaluation of the dispute resolution function of the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) (2010) 29 
1153 Benjamin (2009) 42 
1154 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1155 Benjamin (2009) 44 
1156 Ibid   
1157 Venter & Levy The disputes referred to the CCMA, Bargaining Councils and Tokiso (2013) 45 
1158 Venter & Levy (2013) 45   
1159 Ibid     
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4.5.3.5 Client Satisfaction 
 
Client satisfaction with ADR processes is important to this study as an important 
determinant of efficacy in labour dispute resolution. This is because clients who use 
the system have to endorse it for its usefulness and benefits. If end users are unhappy 
with ADR processes, they will not use them and that will render them ineffectual. It is 
therefore important in this study to ascertain if ADR processes lead to efficacious 
outcomes that satisfy clients’ expectations and needs in labour dispute resolution. This 
study is not aware of any other research outputs conducted in RSA that seek to 
measure client satisfaction as a determinant of ADR efficacy in labour dispute 
settlement. Other considerations under client satisfaction are governed by ADR’s 
ability at maintaining privacy, maintaining relationships, involving constituencies, 
linking issues, getting neutral opinion and setting precedent.1160 Clearly, ADR issues 
that go through CCMA are never made public given that CCMA is not a tribunal of 
record operating with strict guidelines on breach of confidentiality during its awards.1161 
This satisfies one of the tenets of South Africa’s ADR as a private and confidential 
dispute settlement procedure.1162 Matters of maintaining relationships have been 
seriously contested as atypical of what transpires in CCMA administration of 
disputes.1163 The CCMA has not registered a good record of accomplishment of 
employee reinstatement after dismissal. ADR interventions through private entities is 
rather costly, rendering it not affordable to majority of the ordinary workers.1164 This 
implies that the ADR system in South Africa does not focus on restorative relationships 
beyond the dispute settlement.1165 Other elements such as setting precedence are not 
within the mandate of CCMA and therefore cannot be expected from CCMA given that 
it is a private and confidential body in the manner that it conducts its business.1166 The 
LRA1167 directs1168 the CCMA to make orders for costs according to the requirements of 
law and fairness in accordance with its rules and so on.1169 The foregoing speaks to 
 
1160 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 68 
1161 Section 16, Act 66 of 1995 
1162 Ibid  
1163 Bendeman (2007) 142 
1164 Ibid   
1165 Ibid   
1166 Section 16, Act 66 of 1995 
1167 Act 66 of 1995 
1168 Section 115 (2A) (j), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended) 
1169 Section 138 (10), Act 66 of 1995 
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the requirement of CCMA to observe fair procedure within the confines of the law 
guaranteeing the involvement of parties, linking issues and giving neutral opinion1170 
and that all its decisions reviewable at the Labour Court and appealable at the Labour 
Appeal Court.1171 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter was to ascertain the efficacy of ADR in South Africa’s labour 
dispute system in general and CCMA specifically. The chapter discussed the efficacy 
of ADR in labour disputes in South Africa. Various elements that determine efficacy 
were considered, including, among others, cost effectiveness, time efficiency, 
settlement and enforcement of matters and client satisfaction. A discussion of the 
performance of RSA’s labour dispute settlement has been considered around each of 
the previously mentioned determinants. The study noted that South Africa has made 
commendable steps towards making labour dispute resolution to all employed persons 
in the country. Prior to independence labour dispute resolution was nonexistent until 
1977. Previously the rights of the parties to the employment relationship was 
government by a contract that existed between them. More so, the coming in of the 
apartheid form of government led to the enactment and enforcement of laws that gave 
no legal rights to the native Africa. After 1994 the labour dispute settlement regime 
took a totally different turn. The study found that in some respects ADR in South Africa 
has attained some milestones towards an efficient body especially when it comes to 
enacting legislation that supports its adoption and use. The enactment of a Labour 
Relations Act ushered in a new labour dispute settlement regime different from that 
during the apartheid era which did not recognize the rights of native Africans. South 
Africa installed an independent regulatory body – the CCMA - to dispense with ADR 
in labour disputes. Compared to the National Party which institutionalized and 
solidified apartheid and deepened its exclusion of native Africans from participation in 
the about movement that would assert their rights the post 1994 government achieved 
much in installing industrial democracy in South Africa.1172 Considering that the ICA1173 
 
1170 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 49-68 
1171 Section 167, Act 66 of 1995 as amended 
1172 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 40 
1173 Act of 1924 
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enactments under apartheid which introduced Industrial Councils and Conciliation 
Boards as dispute resolution instruments among other things excluded native Africans 
and public sector workers from the definition of an “employee”1174 the LRA is an 
important change in the dispute resolution space. Having an independent body that 
dispenses with conciliation and arbitration of disputes ushered a new wave of industrial 
democracy. This is an important milestone according to this study. The study noted 
also that there are still glaring challenges with enforcement of arbitration awards. 
Given the leeway provided by the LRA for the arbitral awards issued by CCMA to be 
reviewable, many employers have used it to their own advantage leading to delays in 
liquidating these awards especially those compensation ones in favour of employees. 
Employers have also relied on prescription1175 in an effort to frustrate the liquidation of 
awards. It is thus discernible from the discussions in this chapter that ADR efficacy 
has been curtailed by those that seek to use review of arbitration awards in the Labour 
Court and prescription period as ploys to evade responsibility. ADR processes in 
South Africa are responsive and have achieved targets in resolving disputes through 
conciliation and arbitration proceedings. The LRA amendments for instance 
introduced section 143 (3) which gave the CCMA director power to certify arbitration 
awards to make them enforceable. This took away the need to always convert 
arbitration awards into orders of court to make before section 143 was enacted.1176 
Such a responsive enactment has added to steps that enhance ADR efficacy as far 
as enforcement of awards is concerned. The Constitutional ruled that Prescription Act 
did not apply to arbitration awards and could not be used a delay mechanism but those 
that sought to evade responsibility.1177 A landmark ruling of Justice Zondo and Justice 
Jafta in the Myathaza matter”1178 settled the issue and makes it difficult for employers 
to run to the use of prescription arguments as well as review of arbitration awards by 
the LC to evade liquidating claims or reinstatements. Winning parties to arbitration 
awards can no longer be bound by prescription in terms of the Prescription Act1179 to 
enforce their awards. Other aspects that negatively impacts on ADR’s ability to 
efficaciously dispense with matters in CCMA’s inability to determine whether an 
 
1174 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 38 
1175 Section 11(d), Prescription Act, 1969 
1176 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1177 Par 142, [2016] ZACC 49, [2017] 2 BLLR 213 (CC) 
1178 Ibid  
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employment relationship existed between the parties in dispute. It causes 
unnecessary delay. The Act does not specify the minimum qualifications required for 
persons who act as commissioners and in certain circumstances inability to have 
specialised knowledge among commissioners are matters this study believes 
impinges on RSA ADR ability to be efficacious. This study considered whether ADR 
in South Africa was actually achieving time efficiency expectations. The study 
established that CCMA reported 74% success rate in settlements in the 2015/2016 
period.1180  This study concurred with a reasoned position by Venter & Levy1181 who 
observed that CCMA was not accurately reporting. CCMA piles arbitration settlements 
together with conciliations to suppose that together they reflected settlement success. 
Conciliations by their nature are a result of the effort of the parties. CCMA ought to 
have indicated success attributed to them in arbitrations as they have power to make 
decisions, which power they do not have when it comes to conciliations. Conciliations 
are settled by the parties with minimum effort of commissioners. When looking closely 
into arbitration awards, Venter & Levy1182 observed that about 50% (12,730) of the 
25,460 matters resolved by way of arbitration are not enforced but rather dishonored 
by employers. Such a state of affairs reflects an unfavorable situation when it comes 
to enforcement of awards. This study agrees with Savage1183 view that awards and 
claims must be capable of being enforced by the parties. Without functional 
enforcement mechanisms in place, the constitutional assurance of the right to fair 
labour practices and the protection of the law risks being significantly undermined if 
not made meaningless.’1184 South Africa still faces the challenge of enforcement of 
arbitration awards especially the attitude of some employers to seek to evade 
responsibility. By the strength of the foregoing arguments this study finds that ADR in 
labour dispute resolution is still far from being efficacious in South Africa. There are 
still gaps especially in enforcement that need to be resolved as seen from the 
foregoing discussions. It can thus be concluded that South Africa’s ADR in dispute 
resolution is far from perfect but is satisfactory in achieving efficacy in labour dispute 
resolution.   
 
 
1180 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 31 
1181 Venter & Levy (2013) 45 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ADR IN ZIMBABWE 
 
5 INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter discussed ADR in South Africa, giving regard to whether or not 
its processes were efficacious in resolving labour disputes. This chapter looks into 
ADR in Zimbabwe. The aim is to ascertain if ADR in Zimbabwe has been able to 
achieve efficacious outcomes in labour dispute settlement. It is therefore important for 
this study to conduct a treatise of ADR before and after 1980 to the present. Zimbabwe 
attained independence from British imperialism in 1980 and before that suffered under 
a regime that did not afford native Africans industrial rights and fair access to labour 
dispute resolution. It was only in 1980 when Zimbabwe freed itself from the clutches 
and grip of British colonial rule effectively achieving its independence therefrom by 
way of a negotiated settlement at the popularized Lancaster House agreement of 
1979, after a protracted armed struggle against the minority government of Ian 
Smith.1185  
 
This study, as noted in chapter 3 and 4 above, context is important to a study of this 
nature for the simple reason that “…by its nature, influences the interpretation of 
phenomenon or issues under consideration.” According to Gadamer cited in Lessem 
& Schieffer1186 context determines meaning underscoring the notion that people have 
of a historically effected consciousness. He further argues that our consciousness is 
embedded and inclined in a particular history and culture that shaped it.1187 The context 
to this study will therefore be reviewed through a pestel analysis. Before analyzing the 
status of ADR in Zimbabwe this study will look into the Zimbabwean context 
particularly the political, economic, social, technology, ecological and legislative 
(pestel analysis) within which ADR is administered. A review of the three tier system 
that constitute the State, that is, “the legislature, the executive and the judiciary” 
 
1185 Maphosa Industrial Democracy in Zimbabwe? (1991) 15 
1186 Lessem & Schieffer Integral Research: A Global Approach towards Social Science Research 
Leading to Social Innovation (2008) 226 
1187 Lessem & Schieffer (2008) 226 
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conduct towards the work of ADR is instructive to this study alongside the pestel 
analysis.1188  After the pestel analysis this chapter reviews the developments of ADR 
from 1890 to 1980 to ascertain if there were any efforts made towards making it 
efficacious in labour dispute resolution. The study then turns towards the period 
between 1980 to the present leading to a final look at the status of ADR in terms of 
background conditions such as legislative and political support for it, funding, adequate 
and competent manpower in administering it among other things. In the final analysis 
the chapter will consider whether ADR in Zimbabwe is efficacious as far as time, cost, 
settlement and enforcement of disputes as well as client satisfaction. 
 
5.1 Context of ADR in Zimbabwe  
 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked independent republic occupying an area of 390 757 km2 to 
the south fragment of the African continent thereon, bordered by Botswana to the 
southwest; Mozambique to the north and east; South Africa to the south; Zambia to 
the northwest and with Namibia sharing a border post on the western tip of 
Zimbabwe.1189 Zimbabwe occupies a geographical area of 390 757 km2 with a 
population estimated at 15.2 million people 32.5% of who live in urban areas while the 
rest live in the rural villages according to the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators 2015.1190 Zimbabwe has an estimated population growth of 2.3% per 
annum.1191  
 
5.1.1 Political factors  
 
The country is an embattled political and economic case though regarded as a 
constitutional democracy.1192 Having attained independence in 1980, after a protracted 
armed liberation struggle the country arguably inherited a sound economy from the 
former imperial government, which has since been a thing of the past.1193 The country 
now sits with unemployment above 100% and no currency of its own because its 
 
1188 Mandaza Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 (1986) 243 
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currency was hit by inflation which shot over the roof due to various factors.1194 The 
current President of Zimbabwe is Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa who took over 
from the nonagrian leader Robert Gabriel Mugabe who had been in power since 1980 
until he was overthrown in a military cue style in November 2017.1195 The current 
President is as much struggling for legitimacy as the former president having come 
under spotlight for allegedly rigging elections and failing to restore economic and 
political stability. The President, like his predecessor has been accused of using 
military force that has led to deaths of several civilians in the aftermath of the July 2018 
election.1196 This has caused the West to withhold aid and debt from Zimbabwe and in 
fact extended the economic sanctions which were inherited from the former President. 
The current president was under travel and economic sanctions even while he was in 
Robert Mugabe’s government for participating in a government that did not uphold the 
rule of law, engaged in human rights abuses against its own people and particularly 
facilitated the killing of Ndebele’s in the early 1980s in what was popularly known as 
Gukuraundi, which was essentially perceived as a tribal cleansing facade.1197 
Zimbabwe is still far from recovering having lost the formal economy and struggled 
with basic commodities such as supply of food, water, roads and public services to the 
people of Zimbabwe.1198 The country introduced a new constitution which has all the 
pronouncements of democratic government but in principle that on the ground the 
practices are of repression against its own people.1199  
 
5.1.2 Economic factors  
 
The capital city of Zimbabwe is Harare and its currency is the Zimbabwean Dollar 
(though no longer in use due to economic collapse) while its GDP sits at USD 
16289.20 million in 2016 constituting a 0.7 decline from 2015’s 1.4 GDP growth and 
Zimbabwe’s GDP per capita is $2006.00.1200  
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5.1.3 Socio-cultural factors  
 
The life expectance is 59.0 for men, and 62.3 for women, which means the average 
life expectancy is at 60.7.1201 Zimbabwe is rated at 0.516 in terms of the Human 
Development Index herein (“HDI’) which is ranked at 156 of the 187 countries 
polled.1202 The United Nations herein (“UN”) education index Zimbabwe scores 0.500. 
In terms of gender inequality index Zimbabwe is ranked at 0.516.1203 Zimbabwe’s Gini 
Index which in 2011 fell to 0.583 exhibits women experiencing more struggles handling 
the country’s slow economic recovery than men.1204 In 2015 World Health Organisation 
(WHO) revealed that women’s life expectancy was pegged at 62.3 years which could 
be attributed to better and easier access to nutrition and antiretroviral drugs for those 
infected with the HIV virus.1205   
 
5.1.4 Technological factors  
 
In terms of technology up-take, Zimbabwe has a 333,702 main line telephones in use 
and 12.8 million mobile cellular telephone lines. Zimbabwe also has 2.33 million 
internet users according to 2015 estimates. Zimbabwe’s internet domain is .zw.1206 It 
would appear to this study that there are about only 14% internet users among the 
whole population base which is quite low a number.1207 There is also a challenge of 
unreliable data on these issues given that KPMG1208 who consolidated the information 
from various sources1209 state that there are 14% internet users while Bertelsmann 
Stiftung1210 state that there are over 20% internet users in the Zimbabwean nation. The 
establishment of internet cafés in towns, suburbs, rural schools and business centers 
in rural areas has made internet access possible and this has led to highetened use 
of social media and political participation.1211 Under the former President Mugabe’s 
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regime, a popular Pastor Evan Mawarire, for instance, from April 2016 on, posted his 
protest online and thereby initiated the temporary movement #ThisFlag, which had 
thousands of followers.1212 The government has attempted to curtail use of internet and 
social media throigh enacting and invoking laws such as the 2002 Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) represents a fundamental 
curtailment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press as well as the Public Order 
and Security Act (POSA).  
 
5.1.5 Ecological factors  
 
In terms of the EPI ratings Zimbabwe 2014 among 178 was ranked 94, a score lower 
than it was in 2012. There is dearth of a robust legal framework, institutional capacity 
or political will in place to implement policies currently in place and proficiently manage 
the environment.1213  
 
5.1.6 Legal factors  
 
The Zimbabwean Constitution subscribes to the principle of trias politica which 
engenders separation of powers between the “legislative; executive and judiciary” 
arms of government. Trias politica is a principle which has proved futile in Zimbabwe 
because of a heavy-handedness with which all other arms of government such as the 
legislative and judiciary have been rendered subordinate to the operation of executive 
powers of the president.1214 The President is invested with executive authority which 
he exercises through an appointed cabinet as prescribed by the constitution.1215 
 
5.2 Labour dispute resolution between 1890 and 1979 
 
Labour dispute settlement in Zimbabwe can be discussed in terms of four phases. 
First the pre-independence era that runs between 1890 and 1965;1216 second, the 
period of Rhodesian colonial rule under the so-called Unilateral Declaration of 
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Independence (UDI) between 1965 and 1980;1217 third the post-independence period 
between 1980 and 2003; fourth and finally the period between 2003 to the present.1218  
 
Southern Rhodesia, later Rhodesia, as it then was, and now called Zimbabwe was 
colonized by British imperialism at the end of the 19th century,1219 specifically in 1890 
through the first occupation by European settlers.1220 Arguably and as alluded to earlier, 
this move signified the official investiture and ascendance to dominance of the ‘free 
enterprise scheme’ of things in the political economy,1221 all of which point to a 
deliberate ‘…process of intrusion by capital whose earliest representatives were avid 
entrepreneurs who had amassed fortunes out of diamond and gold mining in 
neighboring South Africa.’1222 A prominent imperialist and British entrepreneur Cecil 
John Rhodes and his British South Africa Company pioneer column,1223 epitomized 
the unrelenting invasion by this early capital.1224 It is the capitalist drive to maximize 
profit and minimize loss, which makes it difficult to trust labour plight in its hands.1225 
From 1890’s unlawful settler occupation of Rhodesia as it then was (present day 
Zimbabwe), successive governments fortified an economic development agenda that 
traversed capitalist and racial lines.1226  
 
In the main, Africans in the pre-colonial period, before settlers entered to colonize 
Zimbabwe in 1890, lived on subsistent farming.1227 Essentially, native+ Africans 
worked in their fields to feed their families without need of going into formal 
employment because none existed at the time. The insurgence of settlers into colonial 
Zimbabwe was the start of the labour struggle.1228 The entry of the British South Africa 
Company's pioneer column into the territory therewith emerged monetary wealth 
requiring transformation into capital.1229 The territory had its own social formations 
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whose production systems bound direct producers to the means of subsistence, 
particularly, land.1230 This however conflicted with the requirements of the incoming 
system which required the amputating of this unity leaving the class of dispossessed 
direct producers selling their labour power to capital as the last resort.1231 Essentially 
native Africans were to be dispossessed of their farming lands and freedom, to work 
in the new capitalist system. Some of the mechanisms, besides coercion, effectively 
turned peasant producers into wage labourers.1232 Some of the key issues that 
characterized labour dispute resolutions in Zimbabwe during the period under 
consideration are as follows: 
 
• The year 1894 for instance saw the arbitrary introduction of a hut tax which 
inevitably forced the indigenous population to seek work for wages to foot the new 
bill.1233 The colonial master passed agricultural policies like the Maize Control Act 
and other measures to 're-service' and push peasants into barren soils with in mind 
to throttle their agricultural production.1234 
• The first attempt at formalizing industrial dispute resolution in Zimbabwe are 
traceable to the year 1895 which marks the inception point of labour market 
regulation through the Provincial Labour Bureau herein (the “PLB”) which in 1903 
was also followed by the establishment of the Labour Board of Southern Rhodesia 
herein (the “LBSR”).1235 
• A more subtle and elaborate colonial state came into force to procure cheap African 
labour (proletarianisation of African peasants) through the use of legislative 
instruments such as the Master and Servants Act herein (“MASA”);1236 the Pass 
Law herein (“PLA”);1237 the Private Locations Ordinance herein (“PLO”);1238 the 
Industrial Conciliation Act herein (“ICA’34”);1239 the Native Registration Act herein 
(“NRA”);1240 the Sedition Act herein the (“SA’36”);1241 the Compulsory Native Labour 
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Act herein the (“CNLA”)1242  and other expropriatory pieces of Legislation such as 
the Maize Control and Land Apportionment Acts herein (“MCLA”).1243 
• In 1902 the Pass Law1244 (1902) was enacted with the chief object to facilitate labour 
procurement agencies such as PLB of 1895 and LBSR of 1903.1245 The Act 
essentially controlled the movement of unskilled labour and penalised those who 
engaged in desertions1246 and much of that labour consisted of native Africans.1247  
• In 1926 the ‘native’ Juvenile Employment Act1248 herein the (“JEA”) was enacted for 
the main purpose of regulating the employment of native African youths in 1926.1249 
The whole objective has always been exploitation of labour in general by capital 
while marginalizing the natives. A more comprehensive Industrial Conciliation Act’ 
of 19341250 discussed below followed all these enactments.1251  
• In 1927, another Shamva Mine strike by 3500 workers was notably a popularized 
struggle and labour unrest in not only declaring a labour dispute attributed to 
intolerable conditions of work but alerting workers’ rights in general in the 
process.1252 The strikers consisted of desperate social organisation like those 
organisations whose core business was dance; mutual aid associations and 
religious formations such as the Watchtower Movement.1253 The strike lasted five 
days whose continuance was short-lived as the Rhodesian Army crushed it 
accusing the workers organisations of having been a springboard for labour unrest 
and facilitating the struggle.1254 
• In 1934 the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 herein the (“ICA ‘34”)1255 was enacted 
with the objective of controlling the movement of labour while impeding 
unionization and politically motivated pursuits amongst workers.1256 The ICA’341257 
was touted the most comprehensive labour legislation owing to its regulatory scope 
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in the colony1258 compared to previous enactments such as the MASA,1259 the Pass 
Law;1260 the Masters and Servants Ordinance; Juvenile Employment Act1261 among 
others. 
• In 1943 the colonial government enacted the Compulsory Native Labour Act herein 
the (“CNLA)1262 which was, arguably, formulated and administered on behalf of 
capital.1263 
• The year 1944 was significant in native African labour dispute settlement in colonial 
Zimbabwe as it saw native African labour forming its first industrial union termed 
the Rhodesia-Railway Employees Association herein the (“RREA”), and they 
employed the subtle use of “Association” instead of “Union” because the MASA1264 
had banned native African unionism.1265 
• In 1945 a Milling Employees Association herein the (“MEA”) was formed and 
operated in Bulawayo as its base.1266 Arguably, despite much agitation by native 
Africans trade unions for recognition, which emerged in the 1940s, the working 
conditions for black workers remained inferior to those of the white counterparts.1267 
Whites retained ‘white privilege’ remaining superior to blacks in the employment 
situation. 
• The year 1956 was characterized by an increase in the number of native Africans 
who engaged in wage labour starting with a total of 254 000 workers in 1926 and 
rising to as many as 377 000 in 1946 finally to a record breaking 600 000 in 1956.1268 
• Africans were subjected to a system of discrimination; victim to a spate of 
regulations and prior to the enactment of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1959 
herein (“ICA ‘59”).1269 African workers were deprived the right to determine their 
conditions of service as the ICA ‘59”1270 deliberately excluded them from being 
defined as 'employee'.1271 
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• This remained the prevailing position during the entire period of ‘transitional 
government’ that occurred between 1977 and 1979 up until Zimbabwe gained its 
independence in 1980.1272 
 
5.3 Labour dispute resolution between 1980 and 2003 
 
It is important to this study to ascertain the dispute resolution regime that existed from 
the time of independence to 2003 as it is assumed a native African government took 
over and would have acted in the best interests of native Africans. The following 
however were issues that characterized dispute resolution in Zimbabwe after 
independence: 
 
• The year 1980 marked the landmark period in which Zimbabwe achieved its 
political independence from British imperialism. This year saw the shift of power 
from the white minority rule by the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
led by Smith’s regime to black majority rule led by ZANU-PF Party’s Robert 
Mugabe as its President. Mugabe has been in power since then to present day 
Zimbabwe1273 until he was ousted from power in on 14 November 2017 by his own 
party in a military coup style.1274 
• During the 1980 – 1985 a colonial piece of legislation namely the ICA,1275 remained 
in force.1276 The focal point in dispute resolution was however the Industrial Court 
which was modelled on its counterparts in neighboring South Africa.1277 There was 
no meaningful reference to ADR in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act.1278  
• In 1985 the Zimbabwean Parliament, introduced a Labour Relations Bill1279 which 
was touted the most significant and comprehensive piece of legislation ever 
produced during the initial five years in independent Zimbabwe.1280 The Bill 
essentially regulated employment, remuneration, collective bargaining, the 
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settlement of disputes, the registration and certification of unions and employers' 
organisations.1281 
• In post-independence Zimbabwe, a labour minister lashed out at strikers using 
language reminiscent of that used by another labour minister in colonial Rhodesia 
on native Africans such as (“I will crack a whip on them, let them return to work,” 
referring to strikers), among other things.1282 He in fact unleashed the Army at 
Wankie Colliery and Hippo Valley Estates at striking protesters getting 13 miners 
detained at Wankie under the auspices of ICA.1283 Protesters were in fact shot at 
by guards at the Rio Tinto Zimbabwe mines as a result.1284 Picketers were 
dispersed by police and 400 work seekers were subsequently sacked at Swift 
Transport in Harare and 1000 staff in total axed with no reparations.1285 Only 96 
staff were rehired selectively. 
• The LRB1286 was eventually enacted into law in 1985, the first piece of labour 
legislation enacted in independent Zimbabwe. It would be very important for this 
study to ascertain how such legislation impacted on ADR in labour dispute 
resolution in Zimbabwe.  
• The Labour Relations Act of 1985 herein the (“LRA”),1287 reframed the rights to 
workers and unions and provided for fair labour standards. The Act1288 provided the 
Labour Minister with wide discretion to determine minimum wages, define unfair 
labour practices, register or deregister a union, approve or disapprove any 
dismissals and disallow industrial action, among other things, should occasion 
demanded.1289 
• In 1999 for example the government was faced with the collapse of the dialogue 
with its workers and numerous stay away demonstrations forcing it to invoke the 
Presidential Emergence Powers thereby banning all such stay away 
demonstrations.1290 These measures were taken against the backdrop of action by 
the ZCTU which broadened its demands to have the army withdrawn from the DRC 
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war1291 and an investigation into the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) 
scandal among other 10 pressing economic matters.1292  
• Arguably,1293 the post-independence period in Zimbabwe witnessed the struggles 
between labour and capital escalating to magnitude proportions. 
• In 1990 the government of Zimbabwe adopted the popularised Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme herein (“ESAP”) which essentially deregulated the labour 
market among other things. At this time, labour laws were particularly relaxed to 
align with the new economic order.1294 
• In 1992 the relaxation of labour laws came through the promulgation of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Act herein the (“LRAA’92”).1295 Furthermore, Statutory 
Instrument herein (“SI’379”)1296 and SI’4041297 were also promulgated placing much 
focus on Employment Codes of Conduct and retrenchment matters respectively.1298  
 
Essentially the period under consideration did not contribute significantly to industrial 
democracy and ADR as it was characterized by the heavy-handedness of the 
government, the use of executive powers and the military to control dissenting voices 
of workers. The enactment of the 1985 Labour Bill did not immediately happen. The 
then Minister of Labour – Kumbirai Kangai - in fact did not see the need to change the 
colonial piece of legislation saying 'it will be changed only if the need arose.'1299 The 
government of Robert Mugabe perpetuated colonial labour standards that afforded 
workers very little if no say in their plight for better working conditions.  
 
5.4 Labour dispute resolution between 2003 to the present  
 
The year 2003 is a significant period in the labour dispute resolution environment in 
Zimbabwe. Several changes to the labour legislation were made in Zimbabwe 
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including providing for conciliation/mediation, arbitration and the labour court as ADR 
avenues for settling labour disputes.1300  
 
In 2003, the Industrial Relations Act1301 was renamed the Labour Act of 2003 herein 
(“LA”).1302 The LA1303 placed a clarion call on Zimbabwe to align itself to its international 
law obligations hence a comprehensive labour relations legislative enactment became 
an urgent imperative.1304 The LA1305 affords fundamental rights to employees; 
favourable conditions of employment; curbing of unfair labour practices; procedures 
for the formation and operations of a union; employers’ organizations, approaches to 
collective bargaining, and the establishment and functions of a Labour Court herein 
(“LCZ”),1306 among other issues.1307 Several amendments of the Act1308 have been 
undertaken though at most minor, to align it with the said purposes.1309 It is important 
to consider the installation of ADR vis-à-vis that accompanied the enactment of the 
Labour Act,1310 which is in the discussion of the next section. 
 
The Labour Act1311 provides for conciliation and arbitration as labour dispute settlement 
approaches. This Act made reference to conciliation and excludes mediation as an 
ADR option in labour dispute settlement in Zimbabwe.1312 In terms of the Act1313 a 
Labour Officer or designated cadre from a NEC who had failed to dispense with a 
labour dispute through conciliation was to issue a certificate of failure to settle and 
therefore refer the matter to an Arbitrator after consulting with a Principal Officer in the 
region.1314 This Act1315 makes conciliation compulsory except where parties elect to go 
for arbitration, which signifies a departure from the previous one, which made it subject 
 
1300 Madhuku (2012) 12 
1301 Acts 16 of 1985 
1302 Kalula, Ordor and Fenwick Labour Law Reforms that Support Decent Work: The Case of Southern 
Africa (2008) 36 
1303 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1304 Ibid  
1305 Ibid  
1306 LCZ stands for Labour Court of Zimbabwe 
1307 Section 2A, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1308 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1309 Kalula et al. (2008) 36 
1310 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1311 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1312 Madhuku (2012) 10 
1313 Ibid  
1314 Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1315 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
169 
 
to the discretion of Labour Officer.1316 The persons responsible for conciliation services 
are Labour Officers operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Welfare.1317 The main misgiving levelled against the Act1318 is its inability to provide 
guidelines as to how such conciliators were required to handle a conciliation 
proceedings save to just indicate that they must attempt to settle a dispute. 
 
The Act also provides for arbitration in the settlement of labour disputes in 
Zimbabwe.1319 Arbitration generally entails the appointment of an impartial third party, 
who will use quasi-judicial process and act as the decision maker in a dispute.1320 The 
decision is formulated as an arbitration award, which, in general, is final and binding.1321 
The Act1322 provides for compulsory1323 and voluntary arbitration.1324 Whereas 
compulsory arbitration is to be used when conciliation by a Labour Officer has failed1325 
voluntary arbitration is to be considered if parties elect to avoid conciliation at all and 
choose the former.1326 The Act1327 prescribes compulsory arbitration in labour dispute 
settlement.1328 In terms of the Act1329 a Labour Officer or Designated Agent of an NEC 
whose conciliation effort was futile and consequently issued a no settlement certificate 
in the result, ought to appoint an arbitrator after consultations with the most senior 
Labour Officer in the respective jurisdiction.1330 As opposed to the situation obtaining 
in South Africa, in Zimbabwe the arbitrator is seldom part of an institution or 
independent body (CCMA, for instance) but an individual.1331 A Labour Officer may 
escalate a non-essential service matter to compulsory arbitration if disputants are 
agreeable.1332 The Labour Officer may also secure the agreement of disputants so as 
to escalate to compulsory arbitration any form of dispute of right whether within 
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essential service or a non-essential service1333 or in the alternative, use own discretion 
to refer it to compulsory arbitration.1334 However, disputes of interests within essentials 
services may be referred to compulsory arbitration without agreement of the parties.1335 
When referrals are made the Act directs the Minister of Labour to keep a list of 
arbitrators who are assigned the responsibility to arbitrate by the Labour Officer to 
whom the dispute is referred.1336 It is from the above-mentioned list of arbitrators that 
Labour Officers may pick a person who will preside over compulsory arbitration of 
labour disputes when the conciliation process has failed to dispense therewith.1337 The 
LA,1338 of necessity, signifies a departure from the LRA‘851339 regarding the power of 
the Labour Officers who are presently seized with the duty to exclusively conciliate but 
escalate matters for arbitration when such conciliation attempt has failed.1340 It is 
highly likely that the enactment of the new Act1341 was motivated by the fact that the 
old one1342 had proved rather unnecessarily laborious.1343 The LA1344 whittled down the 
political power and engrossment of the Minister in dispensing with disputes by way of 
arbitration.1345 The Act1346 also permits legal representation in arbitration, which is not 
the case in conciliations.1347 Further, the challenge with arbitration in Zimbabwe is that 
arbitration awards are not automatically enforceable.1348 As will be seen below, 
arbitration awards must still be registered with the court to be enforceable. 
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5.5 Review of the Efficacy of ADR System in Labour Dispute Settlement in 
Zimbabwe  
 
This section discusses the efficacy of ADR in Zimbabwe with three elements in mind. 
First the background conditions consist of (1) adequate legislative and political 
support; (2) supportive institutional and cultural norms; (3) adequate and competent 
manpower, (4) adequate funding; and (5) parity in the power of disputants.1349 Second, 
ADR program design considerations related to (1) planning and preparation1350 and (2) 
operations and implementation.1351 Third, the ADR measures of efficacy, utilising client 
satisfaction, settlement and enforcement,1352 upholding privacy, preserving 
relationships, involving constituencies, linking issues, getting neutral opinion, and 
setting precedent,1353 as the focus. In the next section, I deal with all these issues.  
 
5.5.1 ADR Background Conditions 
 
This section reviews the macro-level issues in terms of political support, human 
resources and financial resources in place to administer ADR in labour dispute 
settlement in Zimbabwe. 
 
5.5.1.1 Adequate Legislative and Political Support 
 
It is important for this study to consider the legislative and political support for ADR as 
a contribution towards its efficacy in labour dispute settlement. The Labour Act1354 has 
it that all disputes ought to be lodged with a LO to endeavour to settle it by way of 
conciliation or if disputants are agreeable, escalate it to arbitration if deemed 
appropriate in the circumstances.1355 The government of Zimbabwe did not take steps 
to establish an effective, independent and well-functioning ADR system post 1980.1356 
This is so because the period immediately after independence in 1980 to 1985 the 
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ICA1357 an imperial statutory legislation remained operational and in force with no 
reasonable prospect to factor in ADR in the fullest sense of the system.1358  The focal 
point in dispensing with industrial disputes was apparently the Industrial Court which 
the Rhodesian government (as it then was) modelled on its South African 
counterpart.1359 The Act1360 seldom alluded to ADR in any meaningful way.1361 The 
successive enactments of labour laws did not make any meaningful changes with 
respect to ADR except the maintenance of the same system that dominated the space 
since 1980 to the present.1362 Even when the government enacted the first LRA’851363 
in 1985, workers and unions were basically spectators with no say.1364 There was a 
general reluctance by the Zimbabwe government to introduce ADR as an independent 
labour dispute settlement mechanism.1365 Everything remained in the sole hands and 
control of the government through its Labour Minister.1366 The thinking around this state 
of affairs was reinforced by the promise of the first Labour Minister at independence 
that there would be no major changes to colonial labour law.1367 Successive attempts 
to amend labour laws in 1992 and 2003 respectively comprised only of the renaming 
of LRA1368 to the Labour Act1369 but the arrangements regarding ADR remained the 
same.1370 The government controls the dispute resolution from conciliation and 
arbitration until they are referred to the LCZ for want of settlement.1371 Arguably, it is 
asserted that:1372 
 
‘State functionaries were essentially seized with [the] duty to dispense with dispute 
resolution, by and large, were an appendage to the Minister’s political power. Conciliation 
and arbitration decisions by Labour Officers and IRBs largely mirrored the state’s vested 
interests be it political and/or economic.’ 
 
1357 Act of 1959 
1358 Madhuku (2012) 6 
1359 Ibid  
1360 Act of 1959 
1361 Madhuku (2012) 6 
1362 Madhuku (2012) 6 
1363 Act No. 16 of 1985 
1364 Sibanda (1989) 19 
1365 Ibid  
1366 Sibanda (1989) 19 
1367 Ibid  
1368 Acts No. 16 of 1985 
1369 Chapter 28:01, Labour Act of 2003 
1370 Ibid 18 
1371 Madhuku (2012) 8 
1372 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
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The fact that conciliation and arbitration is left to the government labour officers leaves 
the question of independence and fairness given that third party intermediaries are 
already imposed on disputants by the system.1373 Even though there is a view1374 that 
the current Labour Act1375 was drafted under the guidance of the International Labour 
Organisation herein (“ILO”) and was acknowledged by the MPSLSW1376 and 
PPCPSLSW,1377 it is rid of its current misgivings on ADR.1378 The lack of an independent 
body that administers ADR points to inadequate political and legislative support in the 
labour dispute settlement space in Zimbabwe.1379 Even though there may be a 
semblance of tripartism reminiscent of a good labour relations system, its effective 
functioning is undermined by the dominant force of executive government which 
renders all other actors subordinate to its whims and caprices.1380 At an international 
level, the ILO formed in 1919 as a member of the UN sets labour standards that should 
be adopted by well-run labour systems of UN member states of which Zimbabwe is a 
part.1381 Zimbabwe has not fully heed the call of the ILO to reform labour laws to install 
independent systems of ADR in labour dispute resolution. Zimbabwe has ratified all 
the relevant conventions that deal with ADR in labour dispute resolution.1382 The 
challenge this study is saddled with is whether ratification is followed suit with active 
implementation of the ratified conventions to give effect to efficacious ADR outcomes 
in labour disputes in Zimbabwe. This challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that 
Zimbabwe has not complied with some of the conventions of ILO such as the 
conventions dealing with abolition of forced labour. This placed the country on the 
spotlight as a non-compliant member State of the ILO body.1383 This also coincides 
with the general lack of commitment towards developing independent institutions 
 
1373 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138   
1374 Mawire Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, with Special Emphasis on Arbitration & Appeal 
Mechanisms (2009) 3 
1375 Chapter 28:01, Labour Act of 2003 
1376 MPSLSW stands for Ministry of Public Service Labour and Social Welfare 
1377 PPCPSLSW stands for Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Public Service, Labour and Social 
Welfare 
1378 Mawire (2009) 3 
1379 Madhuku (2012) 31 
1380 Ibid  
1381 Khabo (2008) 22 
1382 ILO https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103183 
Date of use: 06 August 2019 
1383 Ncube https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/zimbabwe-set-appear-ilo/ Date of use: 28 June 2019  
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modelled after South Africa’s CCMA that would dispense with ADR processes in 
labour disputes among other issues.  
 
Upon a review of cases referred to courts for failure by mediation or arbitration efforts 
(ADR processes) in place in Zimbabwe, that is, the Labour Department, it is clear that 
ADR in Zimbabwe has challenges. It is almost conclusive that majority of the matters 
before the courts were referred by the applicants for registration in order to enforce 
them or before the Labour Court after they had failed to be enforced directly or 
mediated or arbitrated upon by the tribunal (the Department of Labour Officers) 
responsible. This is so because the LA1384 provides that there is no direct access to the 
Labour Court regarding employment disputes.1385 Only matters that have been 
conciliated or arbitrated upon could be referred to the Labour Court for settlement.1386 
All employment disputes must be conciliated first, except if parties agreed to go 
straight to arbitration before resort is had to the labour court. 
 
This study picked specific cases in respect of their value in analyzing the issues under 
consideration regarding efficacy of ADR, let alone, mediation and arbitration in 
Zimbabwe. Very few matters went to the Labour Court are occasioned by direct 
reference thereto by the commissioner, but rather, majority are referred as a 
consequence of failed conciliation or arbitration.1387 
 
After an arbitral award is issued it is instructive that such award be registered with the 
High Court of Zimbabwe.1388 In terms of the LA1389 and Model Law1390 confined in the 
2nd Schedule to the Arbitration Act1391 directs that a submission for registration of an 
arbitral award ought to be lodged with the High Court or Magistrate Court depending 
on the jurisdictional value or quantum at issue in the given matter.1392 
 
 
1384 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1385 Section 93 (1), Labour Act [Chapter: 28:14] 
1386 Ibid  
1387 Section 86 (6), Labour Act [Chapter: 28:14] 
1388 Section 98(14), Labour Act [Chapter 28:14] 
1389 Ibid  
1390 Art 35, Model Law (UNCITRAL 1994) 
1391 [Chapter 7:15] 
1392 Section 98(14), Labour Act [Chapter 28:14] 
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This study observed at least seven challenges that could be attributed to political and 
legislative misgivings through the cases discussed. These are discussed in turn. 
 
First, jurisdictional disability of ADR tribunals. The powers of ADR practitioners have 
been curtailed by the legislature in Zimbabwe.1393 The arbitrator’s powers for instance 
are limited to issuing an arbitration award and the attendant certification of same but 
not to enforce it. Enforcement requires other steps and procedures outside of the 
arbitration process.1394 Section 98(13) read with (14) of the LA’ 031395 provides that: 
 
‘(13) At the end of arbitration, arbitrator shall furnish adequate certified copies of arbitral award 
to disputants affected thereby. 
(14) Any party to whom an arbitral award relates may submit for registration it in terms of 
subsection (13) to appropriate court of any magistrate seized with jurisdiction to make an order 
corresponding to the award had the matter been determined by it, or, if the arbitral award 
exceeds the jurisdiction of any Magistrate Court, the Hugh Court,’ (emphasis mine). 
 
In the Machote matter1396 the arbitration award was issued on an unknown date, but 
was heard at court on 19/11/2015 and subsequently on 13/01/2016. The applicant 
applied to have the arbitral award to be registered in order to be enforced. Section 
98(13) read with (14) effectively limits the jurisdictional power of ADR to certify awards 
for purposes of enforcement and retains that power with litigation. It necessarily follows 
that ADR goes as far as issuing an arbitral award and stops there. Enforcement may 
not be affected without the court, either the magistrate or High Court depending on the 
value involved.1397 The court is required for an arbitral award to be submitted for 
registration to have a writ issued so that an attachment and sale in execution of the 
property of the losing party can be effected or liquidated. ADR cannot do that outside 
the court system.1398 The Learned Judge, Justice Chitapi in the Giya matter1399 
expressed his misgivings with the whole registration of arbitral awards affair and 
asserted his view as follows: 
 
 
1393 Sections 98 (13) (14), [Chapter 28:14] 
1394 Ibid  
1395 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:14] 
1396 HC 7372/15 
1397 Section 98 (13) (14), [Chapter 28:14] 
1398 Ibid  
1399 [2016] HC 5061/14 
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‘It would appear to me that where the requirements for registration have been 
met as set out in the decided cases which I have adverted to, registration of the 
award becomes a formality. It is more of a clerical function and one hopes that 
the legislature will review s 98 (14) in a manner it sees best so that this court is 
not saddled with applications for registration of arbitral awards for purposes only 
of enforcement. Whilst the legislature’s intentions were obviously noble, the 
unfortunate result which has come to pass is that most respondents against 
whom arbitral awards have been granted default in satisfying them and there 
has been a proliferation of applications for registration to enable enforcement. 
Such applications have met with spurious defences leading to courts having to 
hear fully fledged applications unnecessarily and yet what the legislature really 
intended was to enable a party holding an arbitral award to utilise the services 
of a Deputy Sheriff or Messenger of Court who can only act upon the issuance 
of writs authorised by the court. Under the present set up, the Labour Court 
cannot issue writs of execution to enforce its judgments or orders for payment 
of money.’1400 
  
The meat that can be gleaned from the bones of the foregoing statement is that, first, 
registration of awards is purely formalistic and essentially clerical.1401 Second, it is 
designed for purposes of enforcement only.1402 Third, to have the two going, 
registration and enforcement, it is instructive that the award is afforded the issuance 
of writs to enable its holder to utilize the services of a Deputy Sheriff or Messenger of 
Court who only act based on such writ as authorized by a court.1403 Fourth, the labour 
court does not even have the power to issue writs.1404 Fifth, the courts are inundated 
with a proliferation of applications for registration to enable enforcement.1405 Six, while 
noble, the intentions of the legislature have been met with a spurious case of a clerical 
function (registration of arbitral awards) converted into fully fledged court applications 
unnecessarily, mainly because of reviews and appears lodged by the parties against 
whom such awards are issued.1406 Seventh and finally, arbitral awards have been 
reduced to a fanfare where a winning party will seek to register such award to enforce 
and liquidate it and the losing party will challenge it for either buying time or mere spite 
 
1400 [2016] HC 5061/14 
1401 Ibid   
1402 Ibid  
1403 Ibid   
1404 Ibid  
1405 [2016] HC 5061/14 
1406 Section 143 (1), Act 66 of 1995. See also Benjamin (2009) 40 
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thereof as in the Yobe Wells matter.1407 There may be genuine cases for which arbitral 
awards may be challenged but majority are fanfare to evade responsibility by losing 
parties. An arbitral award is challenged mainly because of dispute of fact, especially 
that the arbitrator failed to take note and recognize a factual dispute, hence 
misdirecting him/herself in reaching his or her decision.1408 In the Yobe Wells matter1409 
it became clear that the court attacked the respondent’s attitude in challenging the fact 
that the legal practitioner had deposed an affidavit on behalf of its client, which though 
contrary to general practice was understandable in the circumstance and therefore 
permissible,1410 then secondly that registering the arbitral award through a chamber 
application was irregular, was found by the court to be a flimsy excuse by respondent 
to defy the arbitrator’s decision and fail to honour its obligation to pay applicants their 
dues.1411 Arbitral awards are usually challenged because they were not correctly 
registered and administered.1412 The process of registering arbitral award with the High 
Court  before they can be actioned is in and of itself an additional burden or strain on 
the already burdensome arbitral process.1413 It implies that an arbitral tribunal is not an 
end in itself. It does not have the ability to action its own rulings save to issue and 
certify them.1414 It must still depend on court process to have its decisions effected and 
enforced.1415 This means the ADR element of arbitration is not purely ADR but pseudo-
litigation more like a pretrial hearing. To drive this point home, it is tempting to 
prematurely (as this is discussed in detail later in the study)1416 consider the arbitration 
process in South Africa where a matter is arbitrated, and the tribunal has the power to 
make a final award which must be actioned and enforced under its auspices. Resort 
is only sort at court when an appeal is registered by the disputants or losing part, at 
most.1417 In Zimbabwe an arbitral award is not enforced by the tribunal that tendered 
 
1407 [2015] HC 3833/15 
1408 [2016] HC 5061/14 (See HH 191/12) 
1409 [2015] HC 3833/15 
1410 Ibid (See Tian Ze Tobacco Company (Private) Limited versus Vusumuzi Muntuyedwa, [2015] HC 
10938/14) 
1411 [2015] HC 3833/15  
1412 [2016] HC 5061/14 
1413 Ibid  
1414 Section 98(13) (14), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:14] 
1415 [2016] HC 5061/14  
1416 Prematurely because this study is seized with this task in a successive chapter (Chapter 6) where 
the ADR in the three countries is subjected to comparative analysis. This view is inserted hereto only 
to make out a point. 
1417 [2016] HC 5061/14 
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the arbitral award.1418 At the start of this study it was drummed that ADR is anything 
short of litigation.1419 Justice Chitapa1420 corroborated the views of Justice Chiweshe1421 
in the Vasco Olympio &  four others  v Shomet Industrial Development herein (the 
Vasco Olympio matter)1422 in the foregoing statements, the latter who expressed the 
following sentiment: 
 
‘All that is required of this court is that it must satisfy itself that the award was 
granted by a competent arbitrator, that the award sounds in money, that award 
is still extant and has not been set aside on review or appeal and that the litigants 
are the parties, the subject of the arbitral award. There must also be furnished, 
a certificate given under the hand of arbitrator validating the arbitral award.’1423 
 
That signifies lack of independence of the ADR process from court litigation. Other 
jurisdictional elements, apart from the cumbersome requirement to register awards 
before enforcement thereof, common to the ADR is its inability to determine the 
existence or lack thereof of an employment relationship before hearing the merits of a 
dispute as in the Masango & Ors v Kenneth & Anor herein (Masango matter).1424 In the 
Masango Matter1425 a dispute arose in respect of which applicant was unlawfully 
dismissed, being an employee, while respondent contented that infect such applicant 
was only an independent contractor.1426 The court was seized with both a dispute of 
fact and law, in which a reading into the contract and fitting it into the frame of the law, 
that is, whether an employment contract or independent contractor one between 
principal and contractor existed.1427  
 
 
1418 Sections 98(13) (14), Chapter 28:14 
1419 Love (2011) 1 
1420 [2016] HC 5061/14 
1421 Ibid  
1422 [2012] HH 191/12 
1423 [2012] HH 191/12   
1424 [2015] S-41-15 
1425 Ibid  
1426 [2015] S-41-15  
1427 [2015] S-41-15. “The contract between master and servant is one of letting and hiring of services 
(locatio conductio operarum), whereas the contract between the principal and a contractor is the letting 
and hiring of some definite piece of work (locatio conductio operis). In the former case the relation 
between the two contracting parties is much more intimate than in the latter, the servant becoming 
subordinate to the master, whereas in the latter case the contractor remains on a footing of equality 
with the employer.” 
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It would appear to this study that arbitration (ADR) in the Masango matter1428 had failed 
hence resort had to be had to the court. This is a jurisdictional limitation of ADR to 
determine the status of disputants before dispensing with the issues in dispute.1429 
Some other disputes such as those to determine constructive dismissal disputes are 
also at issue especially in the Rainbow Tourism Group v Nkomo herein (Nkomo 
matter).1430 The dispute had failed to be resolved at arbitration and resort was had to 
be to the Labour Court failing which the Supreme Court was seized with the onus to 
determine whether the respondent had been constructively dismissed under the 
LA’031431 or otherwise. This matter could not escape the eye of scrutiny in this study in 
punching holes in the ADR case for its limitations as to matters it can resolve with 
finality and those it could not. Whether it is the nature of disputants to appeal matters 
to serve their own purposes even if ADR had competently handled with the matter, in 
cases where their decisions are confirmed by the court, or that ADR is a weak form of 
disputing tribunal is a matter of record in the number and nature of matters appealed 
to the courts.1432 This also punches holes into the legislative confidence with which 
legislators seek to make ADR a legitimate and acceptable scheme to end-users and 
the public at large.1433 
 
Second, the crisis of confidence in ADR. ADR in Zimbabwe clearly suffers a user 
confidence crisis attributed to the manner in which the legislature has conceived its 
parameters and mode of operations, in that predominantly, employers always appeal 
its decisions as being arbitrary clearly readable in the Celsys Ltd v Ndeleziwa herein 
the Celsys matter.1434 The employer clearly appealed decision of NEC, an ADR outfit, 
even after they had been confirmed by a Labour Court so as to challenge such a 
determination in the Supreme Court.1435 The Supreme Court would confirm the NEC 
had ruled in the favour of an employee that the decision to dismiss respondent was 
harsh and inappropriate in the circumstances.1436 The appeal vehemently supported 
the decision of NEC as had been confirmed by the Labour Court with the following 
 
1428 [2015] S-41-15  
1429 Ibid  
1430 [2015] S-47-15 
1431 Section 12B (3), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01]  
1432 [2015] Section-47-15 (See [2015] S-41-15;  
1433 Brown et al. (1998) 40. See [2016] HC 5061/14 and [2016] HC 5061/14) 
1434 [2015] Section-49-15 
1435 Ibid  
1436 Ibid  
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sentiment, “The appellant acted unreasonably in dismissing the respondent from 
employment, and therefore misdirected itself, so entitling the NEC and the Labour 
Court to interfere.” This however does not shrink the lack of confidence users have of 
ADR interventions as an arbitrator was rendered crippled by jurisdictional limits in 
determining matters of equity in the Delta Beverages (Pvt) Ltd v Murandu herein Delta-
Murandu matter.1437 Clearly, the Supreme Court brought to the surface the 
inadequacies of the arbitrator not only in law but competence in that ‘the Labour Court 
as a court of equity, not the arbitrator, was exclusively vested with authority to engage 
in the computation and conversion of Zimbabwe dollar currency amounts into US 
dollars. By converting such back pay, benefits and damages arbitrator’s award to 
respondent tumbled into a patent error.’1438 This assertion reflects the limitations of 
ADR to determine matters of equity in labour disputes in Zimbabwe.1439 Clearly, the 
legislature did not vest such power in arbitrators crippling their latitude in so doing 
seriously casting doubt in the whole ADR system or office of the arbitrator such that 
users have no choice but to not trust it.1440 
 
Third, incompetence of ADR personnel to determine matters. It is readable from 
several matters especially the Delta-Murandu matter;1441 Nkomo matter1442 and the 
Banking Employers’ Association of Zimbabwe v Zimbabwe Bank & Allied Workers’ 
Union herein the Allied Workers Union matter1443 in which arbitrators fail to understand 
their mandate as provided for by the Labour Act and arrived at decisions that reflect 
incompetence and lack of skills to resolve disputes. While this is an ailment that is 
attributed to the arbitrator’s own making, the legislature may not be completely 
absolved of the responsibility to afford such arbitrators the necessary latitude to carry 
out their full mandate, which appears not to be the case at present.1444 Arbitrators are 
not able to determine matters of equity,1445 determine status as in the existence or 
otherwise of an employment relationship between parties before issues in dispute are 
 
1437 [2015] Section-38-15  
1438 [2015] Section-38-15      
1439 [2015] Section-38-15. See [2015] Section-47-15 
1440 Ibid  
1441 [2015] Section-41-15  
1442 [2015] Section-47-15 
1443 [2015] Section-34-15 
1444 [2015] Section-38-15. See [2015] Section-47-15 and [2015] Section-34-15 
1445 [2015] Section-38-15 
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dispensed with1446 and they are not able to issue writs for enforcement of awards.1447 
This leaves arbitrators and ADR personnel generally open to doubt by those expected 
to rely on their judgment in determining decisions to disputes.1448 This also reduces 
ADR to a necessary evil parties go through before turning to court litigation where 
justice will finally be served.1449 The sentiment emanating from the learned judge of the 
Supreme Court regarding the inadequacies of the arbitrator in dispensing with equity 
issues in the Delta-Murandu matter1450 was that the arbitrator should have disabused 
himself from converting currencies. The arbitrator in the foregoing statement was not 
even mandated to determine equity, that is, matters involving money, and further he 
was not aware of that limitation and still proceeded to carry out the job, not without an 
aura of incompetence in so doing.1451 
 
Fourth, lack of definitive legislative provisions of time frames for dispensing with 
disputes contributing to inefficiency. While it is proper to assume that some 
inefficiencies in dispensing with disputes may be attributed to the arbitrator’s own 
competence or lack thereof, the inability of the legislature to impose time limits within 
which disputes ought to be resolved cannot be overlooked. A compelling view,1452 
asserted that: 
 
‘…. Zimbabwean labour legislation seldom prescribes maximum time limits 
within which a Conciliator or Arbitrator issues an award or settles a dispute. This 
constitutes a gap manifest in law which accounts for incessant delays in 
resolution of labour disputes [emphasis mine].’ 
 
However, the above view is conflicted by the fact that there is a partial provision with 
respect to conciliation only, which is afforded a 30 day time limit from the Labour 
Officer’s commencement of the intervention.1453 The challenge is only with the 
ambiguous nature with which that provision is crafted.1454 The 30 day provision is 
 
1446 [2015] Section-41-15 
1447 [2016] HC 5061/14 
1448 [2015] Section-38-15. See [2015] Section-47-15 and [2015] Section-34-15) 
1449 Ibid  
1450 [2015] Section-38-15  
1451 [2015] S-38-15   
1452 Watadza, Mahapa, and Muchadenyika Effectiveness of Conciliation and Arbitration in the 
FerroChrome Industry in Zimbabwe (2016) 341 
1453 Section 93 (3), Act of 2003 [Chapter28:01] 
1454 Ibid  
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computed not necessarily from the time of escalation of matter to a Labour Officer but 
from such time as Labour Officer resumes an attempt to settle the dispute.1455 The 
question then needful of treatise is: when does the Labour Officer begin to attempt to 
settle a dispute? Is it when such officer acknowledges receipt of the dispute or is it 
after s/he conducts the first hearing?1456 The manner in which this provision is worded 
is not without a challenge for want of a more definitive provision.1457 According to 
Watadza et al.1458 over 80% of arbitral awards tendered by ADR practitioners are 
contested and challenged as a result curtailing timeous resolution of disputes. Taking 
into account the time it takes for the courts cycle, in the event that awards are referred, 
which is at most 5 years or more in varied instances, ADR in Zimbabwe leaves a lot 
to be a desirable system of resolving disputes. As such the contentious view1459 may 
be justified that:  
 
‘Given the centrality of disputes and their negative impacts on productivity, the 
alternate dispute resolution mechanism is failing to resolve and settle disputes 
expeditiously and effectively.’ 
 
This status of affairs is attributed to, partly, the inability of the legislature to prescribe 
the maximum time between escalation of a dispute and the time an Labour Officer 
ought to commence his/her attempt to settle it.1460 The gap has been remedied by 
labour regulations, which provide for 90 days from receipt of a dispute to the time s/he 
must commence his or her attempt at settling it.1461 The implications of these 
regulations are that the Labour Officer has been afforded 90 days during which to sit 
on the matter before s/he starts doing anything about it, which is an unreasonable 
provision1462 rendering ADR inefficacious. 
 
Fifth, cavalier reliance on points in limine by losing party to evade effecting payment.1463 
Once an arbitral award is registered with either the Magistrate Court or High Court, a 
 
1455 Madhuku (2012) 11 
1456 Ibid   
1457 Ibid  
1458 Watadza et al. (2016) 341 
1459 Ibid  
1460 Ibíd   
1461 Ibid  
1462 Watadza et al. (2016) 341   
1463 [2015] Section-38-15 
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writ is issued in terms of which payment can be effected through a deputy sheriff or 
messenger of court’s actions.1464 However, it has emerged that the whole spectacle 
of registering arbitral awards has often turned into a spectacle in which losing 
disputants especially employers appeal the matter and raise points in limine to evade 
the responsibility to pay awarded dues.1465 In Delta-Murandu matter,1466 a point in limine 
was raised in respect of which the applicant contended that the matter had prescribed. 
Essentially, the appellant or employer had appealed the registration of an award. While 
awaiting the court to dispense with the appeal the award could not be liquidated. The 
appellant then finally relied on the fact that by the time the appeal was heard the matter 
had long since prescribed. The court quashed the argument by appellant and therefore 
dismissed the point in limine.1467 
 
Sixth, court perceives registration of awards as mere clerical function but still commits 
full court resources thereto instead of empowering ADR mechanisms to dispense 
therewith. On several occasions,1468 justices have lamented the whole affair of 
registering arbitral awards1469 through the courts as being clerical tasks that have been 
converted into a formal litigation procedure yet the practice is not subjected to 
legislative review so as to relieve it of the courts which are already inundated with 
unresolved matters. This would imply instead extending the jurisdiction of ADR to carry 
out such a function rather than having it performed by courts they keep the 
burdensome process alive. This casts aspersions on the legislative and political 
support afforded to ADR in Zimbabwe as well as the efficacy thereof.1470 As already 
discussed above, the continued involvement by courts with a clerical function renders 
such courts ‘clerical entities’1471 as far as arbitral awards are concerned patently 
depriving the ADR community of users more efficient services that an independent 
ADR scheme would better dispense with as in the case of CCMA in South Africa.1472 
 
 
1464 [2015] Section-38-15 (See [2012] HH 191/12; [2016] HC 5061/14) 
1465 Ibid  
1466 Ibid  
1467 [2015] Section-38-15  
1468 [2016] HC 5061/14 (see [2012] HH 191/12) 
1469 Section 98(13) (14), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1470 Brown et al. (1998) 24 
1471 [2016] HC 5061/14 (see [2012] HH 191/12) 
1472 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 613.See also chapter 4 of this study 
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Seventh, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in the Nyamande & Another v Zuva 
Petroleum (Pty) herein (the “Nyamande matter”)1473 also failed to set the correct 
precedents in a failed ADR matter in terms of which it endorsed what it termed the 
employer’s common law right to terminate employee’s contracts by giving notice. This 
was considered wrong on the basis that it flouted the right to fair labour practices 
enunciated in section 65(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe1474 apart from violating 
Convention C150 of the ILO in respect to denying terminated employees any requisite 
compensation. The workers perceived it as tantamount to the resurrection of the 
Master and Servant Ordinance of 1905 in which they were not afforded fair labour 
practices, while employers embraced it as a case that embraces labour flexibility and 
an entrance to a free market economy.1475 The significance of this case is that it sets 
precedence over how future ADR matters especially in ADR would be handled in 
Zimbabwe. Notably, the employer will have an upper hand in all disputes in which it 
opens floodgates of potential abuse with which employers would dismiss employees 
based on the basis of precedence emanating from the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the Nyamande matter.1476 This would essentially not lead to efficacious ADR 
outcomes on the strength that such a decision as that in the Nyamande matter1477 
would be relied upon by ADR practitioners in Zimbabwe to issue rulings that 
disadvantage workers.  
 
5.5.1.2 Supportive Institutional Capacity and Cultural Norms 
 
In terms of institutional capacity and support ADR in Zimbabwe is housed under the 
Labour Department through its Labour Officers and the Labour Court.1478 There exists 
no independent body or agent that administers ADR in terms of the LA.1479 This 
questions the commitment of the government to ADR principles especially the matter 
of independence and fairness in labour dispute settlement.1480 This view is 
 
1473 SC 43/15 
1474 Act No 20, 2013 
1475 Matsikidze (2017) 33 
1476 SC 43/15 
1477 SC 43/15, See also Matsikidze (2017) 33 
1478 Madhuku (2012) 31 
1479 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1480 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
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corroborated1481 by a finding that there were acute inefficiencies (delays) bedeviling the 
private security industry in dispensing with labour matters by way of arbitration.1482 A 
Labour Officer working under the auspices of government in the ordinary run of things 
is slower when arbitrating than Independent Arbitrators by virtue of voluminous flow of 
matters emanating from Government Labour Offices.1483 These are the obvious 
disadvantages of lack of an independent dispute resolution body apart from 
government for dispensing with labour disputes in Zimbabwe.1484 These views are 
corroborated by a view1485 that recommended the establishment of an independent 
arbitration body in Zimbabwe with jurisdiction to enforce its own decisions without the 
need for involvements of the courts.1486 Such a position1487 is further supported by 
another view,1488 which asserts that as long as arbitration gives sway to court litigation 
it seizes to be an ADR apparatus rendering it inefficacious.1489 There is also no 
provision in the Act for garnering community support for ADR programs so as to make 
them effective.1490 The foregoing discussion shows that Zimbabwe ADR is still 
inefficacious for the lack of certain fundamentals such as the existence of an 
independent body that administers it, and lacks of initiatives to get community buy in 
for ADR as an alternative to labour dispute resolution. The next discussion deals with 
adequate and competent manpower. 
 
5.5.1.3 Adequate and competent manpower  
 
The manpower measure comprises both recruitment of ADR officers sufficient to 
handle the flow of disputes and also the specifications in terms of job skills required to 
dispense with disputes.1491 In Zimbabwe Labour Officers are assigned the role of 
dispensing with conciliation at the failure of which they may refer them to arbitration.1492 
 
1481 Watadza et al. (2016) 340 
1482 Ibid  
1483 Watadza et al. (2016) 340  
1484 Ibid 336 
1485 Chulu http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2011/01/13/brett-chulu-labour-dispute-resolution-lessons-
from-sa/ Date of use: 20 November 2017 
1486 Ibid  
1487 Ibid  
1488 Watadza et al. (2016) 336 (See Madhuku (2012) 31) 
1489 Ibid  
1490 Madhuku (2012) 34 
1491 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1492 Madhuku (2012) 34 
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The LA’031493 did not provide for specific minimum requirements in terms of skills to be 
possessed by conciliators and arbitrators which made it susceptible to incompetent 
officers.1494 The lack of prescribed minimum credentials for principal actors seized with 
conciliation and arbitration intervention in Zimbabwe has a direct impact on resolution 
of disputes.1495 Some Scholars1496 have attributed the failure of ADR to effectively 
handle disputes to the ineptitude of the cadres presiding over matters.1497  
 
An interview conducted at the labour Ministry in Zimbabwe indicated that,1498 the 
minimum credentials for a Labour Officer was an academic degree coupled with two 
years’ experience in handling labour related matters.1499 This was considered a 
misnomer given that no such regulation had been enacted to provide for such a 
rendering.1500 Recent treatise into the matter suggests that the anomaly has been 
addressed.1501 A hailed proclamation in the Act1502 directs that an Arbitrator or a 
Designated Agent must be in possession of an academic degree at a minimum 
coupled with 2 years’ experience in human resources management or industrial 
relations field, and /or a diploma in people management.1503  
 
In terms of adequacy, it is decried that often such Labour Officers are swamped with 
caseload beyond their capacity to manage it.1504 A survey conducted in terms of 
conciliation and arbitration work under the administration of the National Employment 
Councils proved effective though buttressed by inadequate numbers of conciliators 
and arbitrators in Zimbabwe.1505 This led to referral of cases to independent arbitrators 
who charge exorbitant fees to dispense with issues. Arbitration by NECs is made 
favourable by the fact that, being salaried staff, did not charge for their service which 
lower the cost of such process.1506 Generally, labour dispute settlement in Zimbabwe 
 
1493 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1494 Ibid  
1495 Madhuku (2012) 34) 
1496 Watadza et al. (2016) 340 (See Madhuku (2012) 34) 
1497 Madhuku (2012) 34 
1498 Ibid  
1499 Ibid  
1500 Ibid  
1501 Mahapa and Christopher The dark side of arbitration and Conciliation in Zimbabwe (2015) 70 
1502 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1503 Statutory Instrument (SI) 173 of 2012, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1504 Madhuku (2012) 33 
1505 Ibid  
1506 Ibid  
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does not have sufficient manpower to address the caseload that saddles the system 
which only work to militate against the efficacy of ADR.1507 
 
5.5.1.4 Adequate Financial Resources 
 
It suffices to reason that the ADR system is financially catered for by the executive 
government under the Labour Department and NECs who dispense with labour 
dispute settlement.1508 Gleaning from a study conducted in Zimbabwe that showed lack 
of basic stationary to print awards indicates that ADR is inadequately funded. This 
undermines the effectiveness of the system.1509 This study would have been aided 
immensely by an availability of budget allocation to ADR at Ministry level.1510 
 
‘The Ministry lacks communication resources besides the telephones; no 
printing paper; photocopier; a vehicle for delivering service documents and 
no petty cash for postage purposes. The complainant is ought to produce 
its own copies of notification documents and arrange its own service on the 
other disputant,’ (emphasis mine).1511 
 
It is critical for ADR to have sufficient financial backing to be effective at dispensing 
with labour dispute settlement in Zimbabwe.1512 This is largely attributed to the collapse 
of the Zimbabwean economy that hastened after the 1997 collapse of its currency due 
to poor macro-economic policies of the governing party.1513 The fact that Labour 
Officers retain the power to assign an arbitrator is in and of itself problematic.1514 
Granted the existence of several names appearing on the panel the random choice of 
an arbitrator becomes susceptible to several influences possibly far less than 
proficient.1515 One such influence is cutting favours for buddies (a clique of arbitrators) 
to enhance their money making endeavours thereby.1516 It is not uncommon to find 
 
1507 Madhuku (2012) 33 
1508 Ibid  
1509 Brown et al. (1998) 40  
1510 Madhuku (2012) 36 
1511 Ibid  
1512 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1513 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016, (2016) 4 
1514 Madhuku (2012) 38 
1515 Ibid  
1516 Ibid  
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arbitrators on the panel paying visits to solicit work at the Ministry.1517 A study1518 
revealed that the ministry operates a roaster for allocating the next arbitrator in line for 
available matters therewith. Such selection is not completely waterproofed in terms of 
objectivity, reliability and validity the net result of which is an inefficacious system of 
arbitration.1519  
 
5.5.1.5 Parity in the Power of Disputants 
 
Zimbabwe is generally an unequal society.1520 At union level, the negative impact of 
paternalism has generated resentment by labour itself.1521 The matter of industrial 
democracy in the workplace has been regrettably a contentious issue lacking in post-
independent Zimbabwe’s labour relations framework.1522 The post-independence 
national centre - the ZCTU - declared that state protectiveness weakened the country 
and the awarded salary increments did not result from consultation with labour hence 
acrimonious.1523 The Executive arm of government has for instance placed draconian 
restrictions on labour in terms of which the right to strike has been curtailed through 
invoking Emergence Measures Powers of the President to beat them (labour) into 
shape or force them into compliance.1524 In post-independence Zimbabwe, a Labour 
Minister lashed out at strikers using language reminiscent of that used by a Labour 
Minister in colonial Rhodesia on native Africans such as (“I will crack a whip on them, 
let them return to work,” referring to strikers), among other things.1525 He in fact 
unleashed the Army at Wankie Colliery and Hippo Valley Estates at striking protesters 
getting 13 miners detained at Wankie under the auspices of Industrial Conciliation Act, 
a colonial piece of legislation still in force after independence.1526 Protesters were in 
fact shot at by guards at the Rio Tinto Zimbabwe mines as a result.1527 Picketers were 
dispersed by police and 400 work seekers were subsequently sacked at Swift 
 
1517 Madhuku (2012) 38  
1518 Ibid  
1519 Ibid  
1520 Mandaza (1986) 258 (see Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016, (2016) 15) 
1521 Ibid  
1522 Maphosa (1991) 22 
1523 Mandaza (1986) 258 
1524 Sachikonye (1985) 15 
1525 Sibanda (1989) 18 
1526 Act of 1959 
1527 Sibanda (1989) 18 
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Transport in Harare and 1000 staff in total axed with no reparations.1528 Only 96 staff 
were rehired selectively. A certain Kumbirai Kangai, the then Labour Minister 
pronounced in no uncertain terms the following: 
 
‘I will crack my whip if they do not go back to work ... They must go back 
now.’1529  
 
A trend is readable from these stances by the state that parity in labour disputes was 
non-existent and never a priority especially when it makes statements bordering on 
threats of physical violence against striking workers.1530 Clearly, the state sided more 
with capital than labour in all its enactments and actions up to the present.1531 However, 
it is clear that the government of Zimbabwe has not taken an initiative to establish an 
independent body to run a well-funded ADR system.1532 The current elements of ADR 
– conciliation and arbitration are awash with challenges, which render them far from 
efficacious.1533 Furthermore, after failed ADR efforts in the Nyamande matter1534 the 
Supreme Court did not help the labour dispute fraternity as it afforded more power to 
employers as if promoting capital over the interests of the workers. This is coupled 
with Zimbabwe’s poor standing with the ILO after being charged for allowing forced 
labour to perpetuate by failing to ratify Convention 1051535 an international statute 
which prohibits forced labour.  
 
5.5.2 ADR Program Design Considerations  
 
This section discusses the design considerations for ADR system with respect to 
planning and preparation and operations and implementation of the process.1536 
 
5.5.2.1 Planning and Preparation 
 
 
1528 Sibanda (1989) 18  
1529 Ibid 
1530 Ibid    
1531 Ibid 21  
1532 Madhuku (2012) 31 
1533 Ibid  
1534 SC 43/15 
1535 Ncube https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/zimbabwe-set-appear-ilo/ Date of use: 28 June 2019 
1536 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
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The four elements that are critical for the planning and preparation in ADR system 
design are: (1) to assess exact needs and requirements for dispute settlement and 
contextual conditions and outline program goals; (2) engage a participatory design 
process; (3) to develop the legal basis outlining jurisdiction, prescriptions, procedures, 
and enforcement, and to define ADR relationship with the formal legal system and (4) 
forge effective local partnerships.1537 Concerning the first issue, it is clear that there has 
not been sufficient treatise on establishment of ADR needs and background conditions 
in Zimbabwe in legislative enactments that surrounded IRA’85;1538 LRAA’921539; 
LA’031540 and subsequent amendments to date.1541 This step is important for 
establishing the resource and jurisdictional needs of an ADR system.1542 The existing 
practice is that ADR is administered by the executive government through its 
appointed Labour Officers.1543 They are responsible for conciliation and arbitration and 
deciding matters that ought to go to the Labour Court, at will.1544 Such a practice 
deprives ADR processes in Zimbabwe of the required independence and lack of 
biasness which are critical to its effectiveness in labour dispute resolution.  When the 
aggrieved part is an employee of government, having Labour Officers employed by 
government, it does not matter in which ministry, adjudicate the respective disputes 
rids the system of its independence. The ADR processes have a wide potential for 
abuse by ADR practitioners as are placed in a position of both referee and player, as 
in a soccer game. It is not dissimilar to an employee of executive government 
adjudicating a dispute between another member of the executive government.  
 
Regarding employing a participatory design process which involves all parties,1545 it is 
unfortunate that the Zimbabwean situation is characterised by seemingly command 
political economy that characterised Mugabe’s dictatorial 37 year old rule in which the 
central government runs the show with other players such as unions’ mere spectators 
or rather subordinate voices.1546 Initially the union movement in Zimbabwe was 
 
1537 Brown et al. (1998) 33 
1538 Act 16 of 1985 
1539 Act of 1992  
1540 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1541 Madhuku (2012) 5 
1542 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1543 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
1544 Madhuku (2012) 8 
1545 Brown et al. (1998) 33 
1546 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
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plugged by a leadership crisis and other challenges of embezzlement of funds so that 
they could not meaningfully participate in the first legislative process during the 1985 
enactment of the Industrial Relations Bill and Act respectively.1547 This situation has 
not changed to date. This has led to a crisis of expectations on the part of the 
Zimbabwe government. Nature of disputes referred through the system are 
predominantly unfair dismissals, compensation and unfair labour practice.1548 As to 
whether these are resolved efficiently and effectively cannot be answered with 
certainty for want of accurate records on the manner in which the Department of 
Labour administers its activities thereon.1549 
 
5.5.2.2 Operations and Implementation 
 
There is no case management system this study is aware of that screens disputes into 
those within the ambit of Labour Officers and those that are without so as to enhance 
ADR efficacy in Zimbabwe.1550 When a dispute arises it is reported to the Labour 
Officers who must conciliate.1551 Labour Officers may not entertain any dispute or unfair 
labour practice claim apart from those escalated to him/her; or those his/her attention 
has been drawn thereto; and within a space of two years from the referral date of such 
matter(s).1552 There is no prescription as to the manner in which the matter must be 
brought to the attention of Labour Officers and how it must come to his attention as 
contemplated by such a provision.1553 Even when reading from the provision of the 
powers of Labour Officers there is no guidance of case management procedure by 
which cases must be administered, registered and allocated to conciliators or 
arbitrators.1554 It is just stated ‘a Labour Officer seized with a dispute or unfair labour 
practice, or who has become aware of one, ought to attempt reaching settlement 
thereof by conciliating or, if agreeable to disputants, arbitration,’ ostensibly such 
Labour Officer ought to know what to do.1555 This exposes such as system to potential 
abuse. It has already been noted that such officers often allocate cases for arbitration 
 
1547 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138  
1548 Madhuku (2012) 8 
1549 Ibid  
1550 Section 94, Labour Act of 2003 
1551 Ibid  
1552 Section 94, Labour Act of 2003  
1553 Ibid   
1554 Ibid 
1555 Ibid  
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to friends who solicit such favours for money making or personal economic gain and 
not on the basis of meritocracy or a relevant logical framework.1556 
 
5.5.3 The ADR measures of efficacy 
 
It is important for this study to consider whether ADR in Zimbabwe is efficaciously 
dispensing with labour dispute resolution. That is the main aim of this study. Pursuant 
to that aim this section discusses Zimbabwe’s ADR systems in terms of measures of 
efficacy – client satisfaction with the system, settlement rate, efficiency and cost.1557 
 
5.5.3.1 Efficiency and time-saving nature of ADR 
 
The Labour Act‘1558 does not provide for prescriptions within which conciliators and 
arbitrators ought to settle or attempt to settle disputes.1559 The Zimbabwean system of 
arbitration generally does not escape the eye of scrutiny in terms of speedy resolution 
of disputes.1560 Critical to ADR goals is the time element given that it is alternative to 
courts, which are known as poor in terms of this element.1561  This refers to the duration 
taken to dispense with a dispute through an ADR intervention in comparison to 
traditional court litigation requires further ado in evaluating ADR efficacy in this 
study.1562 The time taken to conclude a matter is also referred to as time to disposition, 
measured as the total time from filing a complaint to settling the case.1563 Generally, 
the Zimbabwean system is inundated with delays and inability to enforce judgements 
from awards within reasonable time. This renders its ADR system inefficacious.1564 
While there is merit in the argument1565 that a hurried process without satisfactory 
settlement and enforcement of a grievance renders it hollow mainly because speedy 
resolution is not only a goal of ADR but may serve as a sign of competence in those 
who effectively dispense with matters to finality or the lack thereof as well.1566  
 
1556 Madhuku (2012) 38 
1557 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1558 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1559 Madhuku (2012) 36 
1560 Section 98(13) (14), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1561 Love (2011) 2, See also Wiese (2016) 2 
1562 Love (2011) 2, See also Wiese (2016) 2 
1563 Ibid  
1564 Love (2011) 2 
1565 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 151 
1566 Ibid (See Frimpong (2006) 166 
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5.5.3.2 Cost effectiveness of ADR 
 
The issue of costs of ADR administered labour dispute settlement cannot be 
ascertained with certainty in Zimbabwe. This is exacerbated by the challenge of 
information asymmetry that characterizes the country’s cost structure of ADR.1567 A 
study by Maitireyi and Duve1568 revealed a divergent view on cost of arbitration 
procedure in Zimbabwe the majority (71%) respondents in the employee category hold 
the view that it is unaffordable and prohibitive while remaining respondents in the 
employers’ category think otherwise.1569 However, given that the study by Maitireyi and 
Duve1570 is rather old, there lacks a study that provides a clear picture of the prevailing 
situation pertaining to cost of arbitration in Zimbabwe. This makes it difficult to reach 
a conclusion on this element. The study by Maitireyi and Duve1571 was limited to 
measures of arbitration and also was not corroborated by exact measures of cases 
from time of referral to settlement and this leaves it needful of further enquiry or 
treatise.1572 This study established that ADR is regarded as less costly when it comes 
to taking matters for resolution through NECs with salaried officers than through 
private arbitrators in Zimbabwe.1573 However, the use of legal representatives in the 
system of arbitration renders it inaccessible to the less privileged members of society 
who (constitute the majority) and may not afford such services.1574 This is so for the 
simple reason that ADR is inclined as its inherent nature to dispense with dispute 
settlement interventions within the labour community at no cost with no lawyers 
involved.1575 There are no records available to this study to make out an objective 
assessment as to the cost of ADR. The study by Maitireyi and Duve1576 is not 
corroborated by other evidence in Zimbabwe hence the inability to conclude whether 
ADR was cost effective or not. It may be surmised though that parties have to pay 
legal representatives in arbitration making ADR a costly exercise.  
 
 
1567 Section 98 (8) Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1568 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 151 
1569 Ibid   
1570 Ibid  
1571 Ibid  
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1573 Madhuku (2012) 33 
1574 Bendeman (2007) 140 
1575 Ibid  
1576 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 151 
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5.5.3.3 Settlement of disputes through ADR  
 
There are no available statistics this study is aware of that provide an assessment of 
number of referred disputes and those settled in Zimbabwe. This study only has 
inferences from secondary literature that presumes settlement rate to be poor in 
Zimbabwe.1577 Available data was conducted to rate arbitration and none exists that 
this study is aware of that rates conciliation and mediation services in Zimbabwe 
Labour dispute settlement performance.1578 The Zimbabwean government has not 
publicised data on the matter which makes it difficult for this study to ascertain the 
efficacy of ADR settlement and enforcement in the country.1579  
 
5.5.3.4 Enforcement of ADR outcomes  
 
The issuance of an arbitration award does not signify the end of an ADR process in 
labour dispute resolution in Zimbabwe.1580 It is common cause that enforcement is 
rested on other processes, administrative and legislative that are required for it to 
consummate.1581  
 
In Zimbabwe enforcement of an arbitral award is rested on such award getting 
registered by either a Magistrate or the High Court of Zimbabwe first, without which 
such award may not be enforceable.1582 Whether or not ADR is efficacious depends on 
several factors one of which is enforcement of an award as an end of justice.1583  
 
The main challenge relating to enforcement of arbitral awards is procedural. In 
Zimbabwe an arbitral decision ought to be lodged with the Magistrate Court or High 
Court, for registration dependent on the quantum of claims (amount) at issue, in order 
to be enforced. Except on that basis (registration) it cannot be enforced.1584 There is a 
general lack of data that subjects the whole system of registration of arbitration awards 
 
1577 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
1578 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 151, (See Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70) 
1579 Madhuku (2012) 43 
1580 Sections 98(13) (14), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1581 Findlaw http://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/arbitration-overview.html Date of use: 22 February 2018 
1582 Sections 98(13) and (14), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1583 Ibid  
1584 Ibid  
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is performing in Zimbabwe. This makes measurement of efficacy thereof or otherwise 
untenable. The other challenge to enforcement is the arbitrary use by employers of 
appeal procedures on grounds of the usual fraudulent conduct, misrepresentation, 
arbitrariness, or capriciousness1585 through the Labour Court as a delay mechanism 
making enforcement a nightmare to winners of awards.1586 
 
5.5.3.5 Client satisfaction 
 
Client satisfaction with ADR processes considers elements such as ADR’s ability to 
maintaining privacy, maintaining relationships, involving constituencies, linking issues, 
getting neutral opinion and setting precedent. There are no records in Zimbabwe this 
study is aware of that can be referred to ascertain the aspect of client satisfaction with 
ADR.1587 The matter of getting a neutral opinion relates to independence of the ADR 
process. The Zimbabwe ADR system does not provide for such independence for the 
simple reason that ADR is administered by Labour Officers.1588 This state of affairs is 
comparable to and at variance with South Africa where the body that administers ADR 
is independent of government.1589 Clearly the labour legislation in Zimbabwe does not 
provide for the independence of the ADR system particularly for its lack of autonomy 
from government.1590 ADR in Zimbabwe does not set any precedence for the fact that 
it is not operated by a tribunal of record. Instead it is administered by Labour Officers 
under the auspices of the government and not independent of it.1591 
 
5.6 Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the history of labour dispute settlement in Zimbabwe from the 
pre-independence era to the independence era stretching to the present practices. 
The early stages of independence in Zimbabwe did not immediately see a 
transformative approach to labour dispute settlement in an effort to reverse the 
 
1585 Findlaw http://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/arbitration-overview.html Date of use: 22 February 2018 
1586 [2015] S-38-15 
1587 Sander and Goldberg (1994) 49-68 
1588 Madhuku (2012) 31, See Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
1589 Ibid   
1590 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
1591 Sections 93 and 98, Labour Act of 2003  
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injustices of the past.1592 The Zimbabwe government maintained the use of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act1593 – a colonial legislative chunk for a significant period of 
time enacting the first post-colonial legislation only in 1985 after, five years of attaining 
independence from British imperial rule.1594 This study discussed the reluctance of the 
Zimbabwean government to relinquish control of dispute settlement functions to an 
independent body hence clinching to such functions as conciliation and arbitration of 
labour disputes under the auspices of the state. This renders the ADR system 
inefficacious. The study then discussed whether or not the Zimbabwe system of ADR 
is efficacious based on background conditions, such as adequate legislative and 
political support among other things, ADR design conditions and measures of efficacy 
such as client satisfaction, settlement rate, cost and efficiency.1595 This study found that 
for the lack of an independent ADR body, essentially leaving everything in the hands 
of executive government, renders ADR in Zimbabwe unable to blossom into a fully 
functional system that can gain legitimacy and support from interested parties.1596 
Granted it is run by the government, the ADR processes in Zimbabwe are subject to 
the usual bureaucratic tendentiousness and inefficiencies typical of government 
operations.1597 The Zimbabwe situation of ADR is made difficult by information 
asymmetry. There is a general lack of information on number of cases referred to the 
system for resolution and settlement and a lack of a case management system 
essentially renders the whole inquiry crippled.1598 The challenge is even exacerbated 
by the fact that arbitral awards require more than just an arbitrator to be affected. After 
the arbitrator has issued an arbitral award, litigation through either the Magistrate or 
High Court of Zimbabwe is required, without which the award may not be enforced. 
This is so because the arbitrator is limited in its ability to issue writs and other 
procedural orders to get a deputy sheriff to, for instance, execute an arbitral award. 
The judiciary, while acknowledging the registration of arbitral awards is a clerical 
function, continue to saddle themselves therewith, rendering their courts clerical. Such 
clerical function as it is deemed to be, registration of arbitral awards, would be served 
best if left in the jurisdictional ambit of ADR, had an independent body, rather than the 
 
1592 Madhuku (2012) 6 
1593 Act of 1959 
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labour ministry of, exited to dispense therewith. The question that remains unattended 
in this regard, pertaining to Zimbabwe’s ADR situation, is: is ADR in Zimbabwe working 
in the truest sense of the term, which implies resolution of disputes without involving 
the courts (yet the court is still required to enforce such awards by registering them 
first to secure a writ)? Throughout this study it became abundantly clear that before 
independence there was no commitment to enact laws that promoted industrial 
democracy and efficacious ADR. Post independent Zimbabwe legislation likewise did 
not show a commitment to form an independent tribunal such as South Africa’s CCMA 
to dispense with labour dispute resolution. This chapter noted that despite ratifying the 
relevant conventions Zimbabwe still lag behind in terms of implementation of 
efficacious ADR processes in labour dispute resolution. The country has come under 
spotlight for failing to enact laws that prohibit forced labour. The Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe also failed to set the correct precedents in a failed ADR matter in terms of 
which it endorsed what it termed the employer’s common law right to terminate 
employee’s contracts by giving notice. This was considered wrong on the basis that it 
flouted the right to fair labour practices enunciated in section 65(1) of the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe apart from violating Convention C150 of the ILO in respect to denying 
terminated employees any requisite compensation. There is an implementation gap 
which renders ADR processes in Zimbabwe unable to achieve efficacy. This study can 
therefore conclude, based on foregoing discussions in this chapter, that ADR in labour 
dispute resolution in Zimbabwe is awash with many challenges rendering it far from 
efficacious.  
  
198 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CRITICAL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADR IN BOTSWANA, SOUTH AFRICA 
& ZIMBABWE 
 
6 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter essentially provides for a critical comparative analysis of the ADR 
situation obtaining in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. The lack of a framework for 
conducting such a comparative analysis or rather measuring the efficacy of ADR which 
confronted the present study is acknowledged by several scholars including Love1599, 
Kerbeshian,1600 Brown1601 and Shin.1602 There is also a dearth of research of an empirical 
nature that comprehensively addresses the effectiveness of ADR, apart from those 
conducted in the USA.1603 For example, Bingham1604 observed that “most scholars and 
commentators are agreeable on the insufficiency of empirical research on the ADR 
efficacy comparable to reliance on the traditional court litigation scheme.”1605  
 
To circumvent the afore-discussed challenges this study relied largely on an adapted 
hypothetical model termed ADR Efficacy Model, as illustrated in figure 6.1 which 
comprises a three point of analysis structure, namely (1) ADR background conditions 
constituting adequate legislative and political support, institutional support, adequate 
and competent manpower, financial resource support and power parity of 
disputants1606 on the one hand and then (2) ADR program design considerations which 
touch upon Planning and preparation and Operations and implementation1607 then 
finally (3) ADR measures which constitute client satisfaction, settlement and 
enforcement, cost and efficiency.1608 These are not discussed in this chapter given their 
 
1599 Love (2011) 5 
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wide exposition in the previous  chapters particularly chapter 2 of this study. They are 
however used as the basis of comparison of the status of ADR in Botswana, RSA and 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Figure 2 ADR Efficacy Model 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 (Source: Adapted from Love1609, Kerbeshian1610, Brown et al.1611 and Shin1612). 
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The study picks the above illustrated elements, namely (1) ADR background 
conditions; (2) ADR program design1613 and then finally (3) ADR measures1614 
characteristics in that order to analyse the situation in each country.  
 
6.1 ADR Background Conditions in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
 
This section compares ADR performance in terms of background conditions in 
Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. This section specifically reviews, in a comparative 
fashion, the ADR background conditions in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe 
around the following elements: legislative and political support, institutional support, 
adequate and competent manpower and financial resource support as a well as power 
parity of disputants in all the three countries. 
 
6.1.1 Adequate Legislative and Political Support 
 
In terms of legislative and political support of ADR there is clearly an appreciation of 
the inevitability of out of court settlement (ADR) in all the three countries under 
investigation herein given the legislative enactments of same vis-a-vis Botswana1615 
RSA1616 and Zimbabwe.1617 These pieces of legislation afford ADR to citizens of the 
respective countries.1618 This is so given the fact that all three countries have a 
somewhat similar political history of colonialism and apartheid domination where 
Native Africans were oppressed and denied political as well as worker’s rights by 
imperial regimes therein.1619 However, it can be observed that Botswana in 19661620 and 
Zimbabwe in 19801621 similarly did not quickly transform the labour dispute settlement 
schemes upon attainment of independence. RSA on the other hand, immediately 
transformed its legislative system installing an independent body for resolving labour 
disputes at independence in 1994 redressing the injustices of the past.1622 
 
1613 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1614 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1615 Sections 3, 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2004 
1616 Section 112, Act 66 of 1995 
1617 Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1618 Sections 3, 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2004; Section 112, Act 66 of 1995 and Sections 93 and 98, Act of 
2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1619 Jefferis and Nemaorani (2014) 5 (See Tolcher (2011) 4; Maphosa (1991) 15) 
1620 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 37 
1621 Sibanda (1989) 18 
1622 Act 66 of 1995 
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The study must hasten to note that Botswana as does Zimbabwe do not have an ADR 
system which exists and operates independent of the executive government despite 
wide acknowledgment of the use of mediation and arbitration, ADR elements, as 
labour dispute settlement interventions therein.1623 As a matter of fact, ADR is 
administered by the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs under the auspices of the 
Minister and Commissioner of Labour in Botswana and the Minister and Labour 
Officers in Zimbabwe, respectively.1624 The TDA1625 directs the Minister to establish a 
panel of mediators and arbitrators whose work in labour dispute settlement is 
supervised by the Commissioner of Labour in Botswana.1626 As a matter of fact, this 
view is corroborated by the popular study of Kupe-Kalonda1627 who cast doubt on 
prospects of the establishment of successful ADR techniques in Botswana in the near 
future as appearing to be slim largely because of (1) the scarcity of 
private/independent mediation and arbitration services in Botswana and (2) the fact 
that the Botswana government is the largest employer in the country.1628 It is unlikely 
that the government will submit its labour disputes to such private mediation service 
among other reasons.1629 This signifies a lack of political will to develop an independent 
ADR system for labour dispute settlement in Botswana.1630 In Zimbabwe, likewise ADR 
runs under the portents of the Labour Department beneath the oversight of the 
attendant Minister and Labour Officers.1631 The Zimbabwe government did not take 
steps to establish an effective, independent and well-functioning ADR system post 
1980.1632 There is an observable general reluctance by the Botswana and Zimbabwean 
governments to establish an independent body for dispensing with labour disputes.1633 
This underlines the lack of independence of ADR in Botswana and Zimbabwe unlike 
effective ADR systems obtaining in the UK with its Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Services (ACAS) and RSA with its CCMA.1634 
 
1623 Sections 3, 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2004 and Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1624 Section 3 Act 15 of 2004 and Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1625 Ibid  
1626 Ibid  
1627 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1628 Ibid  
1629 Ibid  
1630 Ibid  
1631 Madhuku (2012) 5 
1632 Ibid  
1633 Ibid and Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1634 Madhuku (2012) 11 
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In RSA, the Act1635 directs the establishment of an ADR body which is independent and 
enjoy the autonomy of the state. Section 1131636 is actually titled ‘Independence of 
Commission’ and proceeds to state that: 
 
“The Commission is independent of the State, any political party, trade union 
employer, employers’ organisation, federation of trade unions or federation of 
employers’ organisations.”1637 
 
Clearly, RSA has both a legislative and political will and commitment to develop an 
efficacious ADR system demonstrated in its establishment of an independent body 
that administers ADR as a labour dispute settlement mechanism.1638 The LRA1639 in 
RSA recognised conciliation, mediation and arbitration as labour dispute settlement 
mechanisms.1640 
 
The Labour Act1641 in Zimbabwe recognises the inevitability of ADR in the form of 
conciliation/mediation and arbitration as labour dispute mechanism.1642 However, in 
the case of Botswana and in Zimbabwe there is no independent body that administers 
ADR.1643 Conciliation and arbitration of disputes are administered by the government 
through its Labour Officers or in the alternative NECs in the case of union related 
matters.1644 The element of independence and unbiased decisions are an unlikely 
possibility if there is a dispute between an organ of government and its employee for 
instance. This becomes a troublesome challenge especially when the adjudicator of 
such a dispute is also a government employee from a sister ministry who ordinarily 
would be careful not to rule against his or her employer as the saying goes ‘he has to 
remember where his bread is buttered’ or ‘not to bite the hand that feeds him’.1645 It 
sounds more like a cat being appointed a Commissioner of an enquiry into the 
 
1635 Act 66 of 1995 
1636 Ibid  
1637 Section 113, Act 66 of 1995 
1638 Ibid  
1639 Act 66 of 1995 
1640 Sections 135 and 136, Act 66 of 1995 
1641 Labour Act of 2003 
1642 Sections 93 and 98, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1643 Madhuku (2012) 31 
1644 Ibid  
1645 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
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disappearance of mice.1646 A Labour Officer may not be best placed to display 
independence when it come to a matter against executive government which also 
happens to be his or her employer.1647 The political will to establish an independent 
ADR body is a well-commended step towards ADR efficacy. This is one of  the most 
important characteristic elements that determines the effectiveness of an ADR system, 
among other things.1648 RSA has done well in this regard1649 compared to its 
neighbours, Botswana and Zimbabwe, respectively.1650 This study found that the 
Botswana legislature have denied ADR functions the jurisdiction to determine equity 
disputes.1651 In Zimbabwe, for instance, such sentiment was affirmed by the learned 
Judge of the Supreme Court regarding the inadequacies of the arbitrator in dispensing 
with equity issues in the Delta-Murandu matter.1652 A similar sentiment emerged in the 
Montle matter1653 discussed in chapter 3 of this study in which the learned Judge 
alluded that mediators and arbitrators in Botswana had not been afforded the latitude 
to determine equity matters in the TDA.1654 It was inferred that because the TDA was 
silent on whether arbitrators and mediators could hear matters that required monetary 
determination as a form of compensation then the Act1655 did not intended that they 
saddle themselves with same.1656 There is therefore a striking similarity in Botswana1657 
and Zimbabwe in legislature’s lack of commitment to afford ADR wide powers to 
determine matters of equity,1658 which are afforded compatriots in the South African 
system.1659 In RSA, an arbitrator can make an order for monetary compensation,1660 
which are matters of equity not afforded Botswana and Zimbabwe Labour Officers 
jurisdiction to handle. This is attributed to the possible lack of willpower in the 
legislature of these two countries to provide.1661 In Zimbabwe for instance the 
 
1646 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1647 Ibid  
1648 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1649 Madhuku (2012) 11 
1650 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 (See Brown et al. (1998) 40) 
1651 Section 25 (1) Act 15 of 2004 and 
1652 [2015] S-38-15 (Gift Bob David Samanyau & 38 Others v Fleximail HH 108/11; Terence Alan Blake 
& Anor v TABS Lighting (Pvt) Ltd SC 13/10) 
1653 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
1654 Section 25 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
1655 Ibid  
1656 Ibid. See also [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC and [2015] S-38-15) 
1657 Section 25 (1), Act 15 of 2004 and Section 87 (2)(b)(iii), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1658 Section 87 (2)(b)(iii), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1659 Section 193 (1) Act 66 of 1995 
1660 Ibid  
1661 Section 87 (2)(b)(iii), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] and Section 25 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
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legislature have saddled the Magistrate and High Courts with the duty to carry out a 
clerical function of registering arbitral awards1662 after arbitrators have issued same.1663 
This somewhat usurps the already curtailed powers of the arbitration scheme and 
saddles the court which is supposed to be relieved of such rather flimsy roles which 
ought to have been ordinarily left to ADR.1664 The argument for registering those 
awards with the courts is so that writs may be issued to allow for the Messenger of 
Court or the Deputy Sheriff to execute or liquidate the awards.1665 This is tantamount 
to a burden of enforcement taken back to the courts which are supposed to be relieved 
by ADR from the already congested court litigation system.1666 In RSA the legislature 
enacted an amendment to the Act1667 which now affords CCMA powers to enforce its 
own awards including the issuance of writs for enforcement purposes after the awards 
are certified by the director of CCMA.1668 
 
Botswana, South African and Zimbabwe are members of the ILO, who have 
proceeded to sign and ratify Conventions and Treaties in respect of establishing 
International Labour Standards in their respective countries. These conventions 
essentially provide the basis for fair labour practices enshrined in the respective 
constitutions of the three countries. In actual fact South Africa at its independence in 
1996 benefited greatly through the capacity building initiatives of the ILO in respect of 
which its first cohort of workers for the CCMA body were trained by ILO. The 
establishment of an independent labour dispute resolution body was motivated by ILO. 
On the contrary despite signing and ratifying ILO conventions both Botswana and 
Zimbabwe have been accused of flouting some of the standards. The Botswana 
government for instance has been accused of arm-twisting the laws such as its 
amendment of the Trade Disputes Act of 20151669 to extend the scope of essential 
services so as to curtail the right to strike was considered unfair. The prison service 
was unfairly piled under essential services against the recommendations of the ILO. 
Botswana has therefore appeared before the ILO disciplinary committee to answer for 
 
1662 Section 98 (13) (14), [Chapter 28:14] 
1663 Ibid  
1664 [2016] HC 5061/14  
1665 Section 98 (13) (14), [Chapter 28:14] 
1666 Ibid   
1667 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (as amended in 2014) 
1668 Ibid  
1669 Bill No. 21 of 2015 
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its acts of labour criminality especially its poor compliance of the ILO labour standards 
as reported at the current Geneva June 106th session by the Committee of Experts.1670 
Zimbabwe on the other hand has also been accused of failing to ratify an international 
statute which prohibits forced labour under Convention 105.1671 Further, the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe wrongfully decided in Nyamande matter1672 in affording employers 
the so called common law right to terminate employment contracts of employees by 
way of notice. This violates the Constitutional right to fair labour practices and 
Convention 1501673 dealing with the right to compensation in termination of 
employment. Botswana and Zimbabwe have not had a good record with enforcement 
of International Labour Standards despite ratifying the conventions they are accused 
of flouting. South Africa has ratified most of the conventions ratified by Botswana and 
Zimbabwe but has achieved many strides and milestones both in terms of institutional 
building and attaining industrial democracy.1674  
 
According to Steadman:1675 “The ILO1676 helped to establish the CCMA in 1996 as an 
independent institution for dispute settlement. The ILO, working with the 
representatives of government, business and labour in South Africa, convened a 
CCMA Establishment Secretariat comprising of a range of experts, and then played a 
key role in setting up the institutional structures, trained over 100 full-time and 300 
part-time conciliators and arbitrators, and over 300 support staff, and developed an 
electronic case management system that deals with over 100 000 cases each year.”1677 
There is a lot to learn for Botswana and Zimbabwe especially in letting go of the 
clenched fist when it comes to establishing independent systems for administering 
ADR processes in labour disputes and providing sufficient funding for it. That is the 
only hope of establishing efficacious ADR processes for labour dispute resolution in 
the respective countries.  
 
1670 Mmegi https://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?aid=69405&dir=2017/june/09 Date of use: 28 June 2019 
1671 Ncube https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/05/zimbabwe-set-appear-ilo/ Date of use: 28 June 2019 
1672 SC 43/15, see also Matsikidze (2017) 33 
1673 Convention (C150), ILO 
1674 Steadman (2011) 43 
1675 Ibid  
1676 ILO/Swiss Project on Regional Conflict Management and Enterprise Competitiveness 
Development in Southern Africa was implemented in the six Southern African countries under the 
aegis of tripartite task forces. The project which ended in 2006 was implemented in two phases: from 
2000 – 2002 and from 2003 – 2006, with funding from the Swiss Government 
1677 Steadman (2011) 43 
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6.1.2 Supportive Institutional Capacity and Cultural Norms 
 
Supportive institutional and cultural norms determine the ability of a system to be 
accepted as a legitimate way of resolving disputes.1678 It captures elements of 
autonomy and independence of the system.1679 Whether or not ADR will be acceptable 
is heavily dependent on involvement of stakeholders in its design and 
implementation.1680 Questions of whether ADR is professionally run and dispensing 
with disputes in a manner considered just and fair is a case in point.1681 
 
The strikes that saddled Botswana in 1992 coupled with the economic structural 
adjustment programmes that swept across SADC countries led to a rethink of labour 
legislation.1682 In Botswana the dispute resolution system is not independent as it is still 
operated within the grip of the central government’s ministries in particular the DoL 
hence the lack of an adequate institutional support for ADR.1683 This is unlike some 
countries, for example RSA, where the system has been separated from government 
and functions as an autonomous body.1684 Administration of ADR processes in labour 
disputes remains the prerogative of the Botswana executive arm of government, that 
is, through its Labour Officers and Commissioner of Labour.1685 The question of 
independence in terms of administration of ADR is not fully recognised especially in 
an environment where unions and civic organisations in general are considered as 
weak and subservient to the government.1686 While the step to institute ADR in the 
labour dispute settlement space signifies the need for legislative processes that 
advocate for establishment of an independent agent or body, this  has not been 
addressed in Botswana and Zimbabwe labour laws.1687 The ADR system is not 
completely free from impartiality and potentially arbitrary decisions especially if the 
disputants before it include the government as a disputant against an employee for 
instance.1688  
 
1678 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1679 Ibid  
1680 Ibid  
1681 Ibid  
1682 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1683 Ibid 170 
1684 Section 113, Act 66 of 1995 
1685 Section 3, Act 15 of 2003.See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1686 Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) 72 
1687 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1688 Ibid (See Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170) 
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South Africa, has reinforced strong supportive institutional and cultural norms notably, 
through the establishment of the CCMA, an independent statutory body with a 
governing board which is fully-funded by the state.1689 As such the availability of 
information on status of dispute settlement in RSA is obtainable and available.1690 The 
CCMA is always undergoing transformation to cater for the changing needs of the 
labour dispute settlement regime.1691 In Botswana however, the lack of institutional 
support has made availability of information on the status of dispute settlement an 
impossible or tenuous endeavour.1692 Accessing information regarding the number of 
disputes that go through the government scheme of dispute settlement proved a non-
starter to this study.1693 This is the reason why this study relied on case law particularly 
selected court cases, discussed in chapter 3 in the case of Botswana and chapter 5 in 
the case of Zimbabwe. These cases represent disputes that were escalated to the 
courts for review, having failed to be resolved by ADR processes (mediation and 
arbitration) in Botswana and Zimbabwe, respectively. This step was taken in this study 
as an important effort to glean for characteristic elements of the ADR efficacy status 
in Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe.1694 This is so with Zimbabwe. Information 
on the status, that is, nature, quantum of disputes that go through the government 
scheme of dispute settlement proved unattainable.1695 This study had to rely on 
reported court cases, discussed in chapter 5 at 5.5.1.1 of this study, matters which 
also failed to have resolve at ADR vis-a-viz arbitration and conciliation.1696  
 
This study analysed  relevant case law in Zimbabwe and Botswana to generate a 
profile of why such matters failed to be resolved by the respective Departments of 
Labour seized with that responsibility in the two countries and identifying the key 
themes emanating therefrom.1697 In so doing the study was able to pick issues such as 
jurisdictional limitations of ADR;1698 the misdirection of arbitrators and mediators when 
 
1689 Benjamin (2013) 4 
1690 CCMA (2016) 18 
1691 Benjamin (2013) 4 
1692 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 54 (See Benjamin (2013) 4) 
1693 Madhuku (2012) 36 
1694 [2004] (1) BLR 250 (IC); [2007] (1) BLR 307 (IC) and [2009] 1 BLR 135 C 
1695 Madhuku (2012) 36 
1696 [2015] CC-8-15 ([2015] HH-707-15; [2015] HH-714-15; [2015] S-46-15 and [2015] S-47-15) 
1697 [2015] CC-8-15 ([2015] HH-707-15; [2015] HH-714-15; [2015] S-46-15; [2015] S-47-15); [2004] (1) 
BLR 250 (IC); [2007] (1) BLR 307 (IC) and [2009] 1 BLR 135 C 
1698 Section 25 (1), Act 15 of 2004 and Section 87 (2)(b)(iii), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] (See also 
[2015] S-38-15) 
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dispensing with disputes which became a matter of record through court records of 
same;1699 lack of competences among ADR practitioners in the two respective 
countries;1700 and the cavalier reliance by employers on in limine processes by way of 
appeals at court to evade compensating winners of awards among others. The study 
also considered the courts as reluctant to let go clerical functions such as registering 
arbitral awards, which should have been left to the ADR processes to determine and 
dispense with in the case of Zimbabwe;1701 and the lack of latitude to dispense with 
disputes requiring monetary compensation in Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively, 
among other issues.1702 These pinpoint the reluctance of legislature to provide support 
to the ADR regime.1703 While both Botswana1704 and Zimbabwe1705 may be credited with 
the establishment of courts as institutions that dispense with disputes the schemes 
under government supervision are not adequate in giving ADR the full scrum status it 
should ordinarily enjoy.1706 Courts may aid ADR but may also stifle speedy resolution 
of disputes as they are already categorized as inundated with matters and unable to 
achieve efficacy.1707 Be that as it may, in the case of RSA’s CCMA the Act1708 specifically 
provides that as one of its main functions the CCMA must: 
 
“…compile and publish information and statistics about its activities.”1709 
 
This mandate1710 has been clearly executed, as this study was able to access 
information about the nature of disputes that go before the CCMA accompanied by a 
review of ADR performance in RSA, something that could not be ascertained with ease 
in the case of Botswana and Zimbabwe, respectively.1711 CCMA publishes annual 
reports detailing its ADR activities in labour dispute resolution in South Africa from the 
 
1699 [2015] S-38-15 and Ntumy (2016) 56  
1700 Section 25 (1), Act 15 of 2004 and S 87 (2)(b)(iii), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01]. See also [2015] S-
38-15)  
1701 Ibid  
1702 Ibid  
1703 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1704 Section 15 (1), Act 15 of 2003  
1705 Section 84(1), Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1706 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1707 Love (2011) 1. See also Brown et al. (1998) 1; Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5) 
1708 Section 115 (1)(d), Act 66 of 1995 
1709 Section 115 (1)(d) Act 66 of 1995 (See CCMA (2016) 54) 
1710 Section 115 (1)(d) Act 66 of 1995 
1711 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
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time it was established to the present.1712 CCMA has been accused by Venter & Levy1713 
of reporting successes which are not a correct reflection of what is transpiring on the 
ground. This is so especially that on its settlement rate it piles conciliation and 
arbitration outcomes yet conciliations are attributed to the parties to resolve and not 
necessarily in the power of CCMA to decide.1714 This implies CCMA reports should 
record its success rate as reflecting arbitration matters settled given that those are the 
matters it does resolve and not conciliations. From the foregoing discussion one can 
deduce that the contention of the meaning of settlement and settlement rate suffers 
from vagueness and uncertainty. The annual reports published by the CCMA detailing 
its successes are far from perfect and provide a blurred picture in thinking with the aim 
of this study to ascertain ADR efficacy in labour dispute resolution. One cannot but 
foresee that a large amount of technical and unnecessary battle exists as a result of 
this anomaly – primarily this is an interpretation problem. It however does not help this 
study to ascertain with certainty, the meaning of efficacy of ADR in labour disputes.  
 
In Zimbabwe, much like the Botswana cases, the ADR processes are recognised but 
curtailed by the fact that they are being administered under the auspices of the 
executive government.1715 This underlines the concept of independence that underpins 
an ADR efficacy as potentially compromised.1716 Ideally, ADR would work well outside 
the auspices of executive government and the judiciary given its conceptual 
construction as an ‘out of court settlement’ regime.1717 Clearly, Zimbabwe has not taken 
steps to develop institutions that would ensure an efficacious administration of ADR 
with such autonomy and independence as would have been desirable.1718 This is the 
same inadequacy levelled against the Botswana government, which has been 
reluctant to develop an independent institution for dispensing with labour disputes but 
rather opt to saddle this with the executive government.1719 
 
 
1712 CCMA (2016) 54 
1713 Venter & Levy (2011) 47  
1714 Ibid   
1715 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1716 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1717 Love (2011) 1. See also Brown et al. (1998) 1 and Wiese (2016) 2) 
1718 Madhuku (2012) 5 
1719 Section 3(2), Act 15 of 2004 
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6.1.3 Adequate and Competent Manpower 
 
In Botswana, the Trade Dispute Act1720 directs the Minister of Labour, Home Affairs 
and Social Security to oversee the establishment of a panel and attendant 
appointment of mediators and arbitrators to mediate on labour disputes.1721 In terms of 
the Act1722 the Minister ought to establish a panel of mediators and arbitrators 
competent in matters of labour law or labour relations or other relevant specialist areas 
of expertise.1723 However, the Act1724 does not state the minimum qualifications required 
for a person to qualify as a panel member such as short course, certificate, diploma, 
or degree which leaves it open to ambiguity.1725 The panel is to be comprised of a mix 
of full time and part time mediators and arbitrators appointed by the Minister after 
conferring with the Board.1726 The panel will discharge its statutory duties, under the 
direction or control of the Commissioner of Labour employed by the Department of 
Labour (emphasis mine).1727 The Act1728 restricts direct access to the Industrial Court 
herein (the IC”).1729 Regard must be had to the mediation and /or arbitration processes 
before resort is had to the IC.1730 However, there has been an outcry of lack of 
adequately skilled manpower to dispense with labour disputes hence the increase in 
unresolved disputes across all the regions in Botswana.1731  
 
In RSA, the LRA1732 directs the CCMA to appoint competent persons as 
Commissioners on the strength of their experience and expertise to perform the 
functions of Commissioner in labour dispute settlement.1733 The CCMA conducts 
capacity building programmes for its Commissioners who carry out the work of labour 
dispute settlement on a regular basis. For example, it has been reported that:1734 
 
1720 Act 15 of 2004 
1721 Section 3(3), Act 15 of 2004 
1722 Act 15 of 2004 
1723 Ibid  
1724 Act 15 of 2004 
1725 Section 3(3), Act 15 of 2004  
1726 Section 4, Act 15 of 2004 
1727 Section 3(4), Act 15 of 2004 
1728 Act 15 of 2004 
1729 Section 3(3), Act 15 of 2004 
1730 Section 15(1), Act 15 of 2004 
1731 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1732 Act 66 of 1995 
1733 Section 117, Act 66, of 1995 As Amended 
1734 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 54 
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‘During the period under review, sixty-three (63) training interventions 
carried were out involving, two thousand eight hundred and twelve (2,812) 
CCMA employees in capacity-building initiatives. Of that number, one 
thousand one hundred and ninety-two (1,192) were Commissioners who 
attended labour law amendments and Commissioner capacity-building 
programmes. A signiﬁcant amount of work was carried out to further 
capacitate Commissioner in specialist areas. This target was qualitatively 
and quantitatively achieved’.1735 
 
Clearly, from the foregoing, RSA has a commitment to establish a successful ADR 
system of labour dispute settlement which adequately equips its human resource base 
to equal the task.1736 This is one of the ways that enhances the effective adjudication 
of cases successfully, enhancing ADR efficacy in line with the aim of this study. 
 
In Zimbabwe conciliation was the priority of the Labour Officers to dispense with until 
the award, which could only be challenged at arbitration or Labour Court. However, 
the law only changed in 2006 when it was amended to give regard to the fact that 
Principal Officers had only a mandate to attempt to resolve disputes by facilitating 
dialogue.1737 When they fail to settle they are directed by the Labour Act1738 to refer the 
matter to arbitration.1739 The position that when Labour Officers fail to facilitate 
resolution of disputes through conciliation must escalate them to arbitration was 
corroborated by a code that was gazetted on 27th January 2006.1740 The position that 
was taken through such code was to ensure that Labour Officers did not become self-
imposing on disputants but limited their role to facilitation and referral as the case may 
be.1741 Clearly, Botswana and Zimbabwe have challenges pertaining to manpower to 
administer ADR processes while South Africa has done significantly well on the same 
issue. 
 
 
1735 Ibid  
1736 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 54 
1737 Section 8(7), Statutory Instrument 15 of 2006 
1738 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1739 Ibid  
1740 The National Employment Code of Conduct Regulations, 2005 (2006) 
1741 Section 8(7) Statutory Instrument 15 of 2006 
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6.1.4 Adequate Financial Resources 
 
In Botswana, there is no provision for funding of ADR in the Trade Disputes Act herein 
TDA.1742 It would be assumed that since most of ADR processes are administered 
under the Department of Labour, the executive government would incorporate the 
system under such Department of Labour’s budget allocation.1743 The idea earlier 
alluded to by Kupe-Kalonda1744 that the ministry could not cope with cases referred to 
it could attributed to the lack of adequate funding in the case of Botswana.1745 
 
In RSA, ADR is fully funded by the executive government though not housed under 
Department of Labour.1746  That CCMA is fully funded which makes the body able to 
achieve over 75% settlement rate of cases brought before it.1747 The body is composed 
of chief financial ofﬁcer herein the (“CFO”)’s office seized with the role of oversight 
over four (4) component roles, namely: financial management, supply chain 
management, risk management and financial information systems.1748 The office of the 
chief financial officer is responsible for financial reporting and accounting for finances 
of the institution among other things.1749 This is an important factor for this study as it 
speaks to the ability to make ADR processes affordable to the common man who 
requires labour dispute resolution and access to justice. 
 
In Zimbabwe, there is no provision for funding of ADR processes except that these 
functions are carried out under the auspices of the government budget as part of 
normal operations of the state.1750 However, the Act1751 empowers the Labour Officers 
to assist in ascertaining party costs between disputants.1752 An empirical review of the 
situation on the ground showed that there lacked basic office stationary such as bond 
paper for printing, lack of a photocopier and motor vehicles for purposes of conveying 
documents and lack of funds for postage uses save telephones in offices of Labour 
 
1742 Act 15 of 2003 
1743 Section 3, Act 15 of 2003 
1744 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1745 Ibid  
1746 Benjamin (2013) 6 
1747 Ibid  
1748 CCMA Annual Report 2015-2016 (2016) 82 
1749 Ibid  
1750 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 138 
1751 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1752 Madhuku (2012) 36 
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Officers who administered ADR roles.1753 It is discernible from the foregoing analysis 
that Zimbabwe’s ADR is not adequately resourced and funded which has negative 
implications on its efficaciousness in resolving labour disputes.  
 
6.1.5 Parity in the Power of Disputants. 
 
Botswana is considered an unequal society where the government has dealt a heavy 
hand on labour issues and those that promoted dissent such as unions.1754 Thus 
Botswana has a weak civic society and such inequalities make ADR generally skewed 
towards wielders of power especially the capitalists.1755 The unions for instance 
bargained from a constricted position given the government tendency to deal a heavy 
hand on dissent1756 and particularly the handling of all ADR functions without need to 
shed it to an independent body.1757 A case in point is that in the early 80s, 1991 and 
2011 strikes in Botswana saw many people lose their jobs and the government making 
drastic decisions on wages as well as limiting the right to strike.1758 The right to strike 
was limited by increasing the number of categories of workers who fell under what are 
termed as essential services.1759 This was viewed as exercising a heavy hand.1760 The 
reluctance to institute an independent ADR body has been viewed as the hesitance 
by government to submit itself under an independent body should it be brought before 
such tribunal by its own workers in labour disputes.1761 This has pretty been much the 
same as in Zimbabwe where a post-colonial government used colonial language on 
striking workers and promised to crack a whip on them if they did not return to work.1762 
Over the years the right to strike has been restricted by summon emergency powers 
of the President of Zimbabwe rather than resort to industrial democracy – for instance 
the Presidential ban on stay-aways in 1999 is a case in point.1763 This generally 
weakened the labour dispute settlement system in Zimbabwe rendering it 
 
1753 Ibid  
1754 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) 25 
1755 Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) 25 
1756 Motshegwa and Bodilenyane (2012) 72 
1757 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1758 Mwatcha (2015) 45 
1759 Ibid   
1760 Ibid  
1761 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1762 Sibanda (1989) 18 
1763 Sambureni and Mudyawamikwa (2007) 30 
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inefficacious.1764 The amendments of 2003 further developed the ADR elements to 
entrench mediation and arbitration.1765 However, in terms of performance of ADR 
Botswana system of dispute settlement, lacks adequate legislative and political 
support.1766 Buy-in from other actors is very weak given that they government uses a 
prescriptive approach, with a heavy hand, which tends to relegate unions to the status 
subordinates and not equal partners.1767 
 
The RSA is also regarded as an unequal society.1768 This may have an effect on the 
ability of ADR to achieve its objectives. Already it is noted by CCMA commissioners 
that internal dispute settlement schemes in the workplaces are weakened by power 
play between players therein especially that employers have a general preference for 
arbitration so as to reaffirm their dominance.1769 Reliance on grievance procedure in 
that light is perceived as a threat to management power, which perception needs 
correction.1770 This already signifies that the lack of power parity in the country 
generally has a negative bearing on the system of labour dispute settlement.1771 
Unfortunately, this study has no specific data on which to substantiate the argument 
that there may be lacking power balance in ADR systems in RSA. One can however 
surmise that affordable access to justice is an attempt taken by the government to 
ease the pressure on the common man who otherwise would not have recourse in 
dispute situations. 
 
In Zimbabwe it has already been indicated that the government plays a heavy hand 
on all systems of society often characterised by a weak labour movement (union) and 
a consequent lack of industrial democracy.1772 This undermines the levelling of the 
playing field that would make it unpalatable with the ideals of ADR.1773 Reports1774  
 
1764 Ibid (See also Sibanda (1989) 18) 
1765 Sections 8 and 9, Act 15 of 2003 
1766 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1767 Sibanda (1989) 21 (See also Madhuku (2012) 31; Maphosa (1991) 22; Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 
and Ntumy (2016) 59) 
1767 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 
1768 Lings (2014) 15 
1769 Bendeman (2007) 157 
1770 Ibid  
1771 Ibid  
1772 Maphosa (1991) 22 
1773 Ibid  
1774 Madhuku (2013) 38  
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indicate that there is favouritism in allocation of arbitrators by Labour Officers. The 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in Nyamande matter1775 gave the employers unbridled power to 
the disadvantage of employees in respect of which it stated that employers had a common 
law right to terminate employment contracts by issuance of a no-fault notice to such 
employees. This does not help in generating power parity in labour dispute resolution which 
is a prerequisite for efficacious ADR processes in labour disputes. All the three countries 
have some inadequacies in regards to power-parity though South Africa has attempted 
to shield society from abuse by the establishment of an independent body for 
dispensing with disputes,1776 Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively have lagged 
behind in this regard.1777 
 
6.2 ADR Program Design Considerations  
 
It is important for this study to ascertain how the planning and implementation of 
processes compares in the three countries in relationship to the aim of the study. This 
section therefore discusses ADR design considerations within Botswana, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe with specific focus on planning and preparation as well as operations 
and implementation.1778  
 
6.2.1 Planning and Preparation 
 
In terms of jurisdictional elements of ADR there is a clear elaboration of matters that 
must go through to mediation and arbitration in Botswana.1779 The RSA Act1780 directs 
the Commissioner of Labour to determine which matters go through mediation and 
which ones go through arbitration.1781 There is no specific definition of those matters 
that must fall within the jurisdiction and in fact, the Act1782 directs that the mediator may 
determine with questions concerning whether a dispute has been referred in terms of 
 
1775 SC 43/15, see also Matsikidze (2017) 33 
1776 Section 112, Act 66 of 1995 
1777 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 170 and Madhuku (2012) 5 
1778 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1779 Sections 7 and 8, Act 15 of 2003 
1780 Section 113 (1), Act 66 of 1995 
1781 Sections 7 (1) (a)(b), Act 15 of 2003 
1782 Act 15 of 2003 
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section 7; the date on which the disperse was referred and the mediator‘s jurisdiction 
to mediate the dispute.1783 The Act provides for both right and interest disputes.1784 
 
The RSA has adequate legislative enactments on jurisdiction of ADR bodies.1785 South 
African legislation as in Botswana’s case does not define with exactitude the cases 
that are within the jurisdiction of mediators and arbitrators.1786 The Act1787 directs that a 
Commissioner of Labour must conciliate matters referred to it in terms of the Act.1788  It 
is actually contended that the CCMA is inundated with matters outside its mandate as 
many as 20-25% of total referrals each year.1789 The most common non-jurisdictional 
matters needing referral elsewhere comprise bargaining council matters, grievances 
arising under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act herein (“BCEA”), and sector 
matters falling within the ambit of the labour inspectorate housed in the Department of 
Labour.1790 There are matters about which the employer may subsequently raise 
jurisdictional queries such as applicant was never their worker but rather an 
independent contractor, or simply that the applicant resigned and was not 
dismissed.1791 These issues take centre stage at the commencement of the arbitration 
process.1792 
 
Zimbabwe also suffers the challenge of not having a clear definition of matters that fall 
within the jurisdictional scope of conciliators/mediators.1793 The role has been left to 
Labour Officers to determine.1794 In the provision, that delineates the powers of Labour 
Officers the Act1795 states: 
 
 
1783 Section 8 (5) (a) (iii), Act 15 of 2003 
1784 Section 2, Act 15 of 2003 
1785 Section 115, Act 66 of 1995 
1786 Section 115, Act 66 of 1995 and Sections 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2003 
1787 Section 115, Act 66 of 1995 
1788 Section 115 (1) (a), Act 66 of 1995 
1789 Benjamin (2013) 14 
1790 Ibid 15 
1791 Benjamin (2013) 14  
1792 Ibid  
1793 Section 93, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1794 Ibid  
1795 Ibid  
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“A labour officer to whom a dispute or unfair labour practice has been 
referred, or to whose attention it has come, shall attempt to settle it through 
conciliation or, if agreed by the parties, by reference to arbitration.” 
 
There is no reference to specific matters defined as those that must be brought to the 
Labour Officer except for unfair labour practice which in and of itself is also laden with 
vagueness as to its exact meaning.’1796 
 
6.2.2 Operations and Implementation 
 
There is no record this study is aware of a case management system administered in 
Botswana’s Department of Labour – dispute resolution unit to whom matters are 
referred.1797 This could imply that a manual system of reporting and dispensing with 
labour cases is at play given that the Act1798 does not specify the manner of referring 
of cases and administration thereof.1799 
 
In RSA, through its CCMA body, runs a case management system which tends to 
screen cases against those that are within its jurisdiction and the non-jurisdictional 
ones.1800 This helps to expedite dispute resolution in the cases that falls within CCMA’s 
ambit.1801 The case management system is used to screen cases and further send 
short message services to disputants on case dates and place of meeting and other 
communication needs.1802  
 
In Zimbabwe, it was confirmed that disputes are recorded and dealt using a manual 
system controlled by Labour Officers given the lack of a case management system.1803 
In that case a duty officer is placed in the Ministry whose role is to listen to the stories 
and complete a complaint form.1804 The duty officer ought to collect the form and submit 
it to the Provincial Labour Officer who allocates it to the labour officer in line through a 
 
1796 Ibid  
1797 Sections 7 and 8, Act 15 of 2003 
1798 Ibid  
1799 Ibid  
1800 CCMA (2016) 11 
1801 Ibid  
1802 Ibid  
1803 Madhuku (2013) 35 and Sections 7 and 8, Act 15 of 2003 
1804 Ibid  
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roaster system for resolution.1805 The Labour Officers files notifications using Form L.R. 
6 (SI217/2003).1806  Apparently, disputants must do their own notification given the lack 
of resources such as transport and postage at the Ministry.1807 Comparatively, CCMA 
in RSA uses an electronic system where parties can be notified using email and short 
message service.1808 This is corroborated in a study conducted by Benjamin,1809 which 
states: 
 
“The development and tailoring of an electronic Case Management System 
has enabled it to enhance the efficiency of its processes, while at the same 
time being a source of key labour market information. The CCMA has 
embraced technology in a number of aspects of its operation, for instance, 
by using SMSs to notify parties of hearings.”1810 
 
Botswana and Zimbabwe have to consider using the information age to use electronic 
systems for administering and dispensing with labour disputes.1811 A lot can be learned 
from the RSA example who despite its attendant challenges have attempted to 
establish an effective scheme for effectively dispensing with labour disputes therein.1812 
 
6.3 The ADR Measures of Efficacy 
 
This section compares Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe in respect to ADR measures 
of efficacy with specific focus on client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, 
efficiency in terms of time as well as cost effectiveness.1813 
 
 
 
 
 
1805 Ibid  
1806 Ibid  
1807 Ibid  
1808 Benjamin (2013) 46 
1809 Ibid  
1810 Benjamin (2013) 46 
1811 Madhuku (2013) 35 
1812 CCMA Annual Report (2016) 11 (See Benjamin (2013) 46) 
1813 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
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6.3.1 Time Efficiency of ADR 
 
Efficiency measures timeliness of settlement of disputes.1814 The duration taken to have 
a matter dispensed via the ADR scheme relative to traditional court litigation generates 
interest in measures of ADR efficacy.1815 This is also regarded as disposition time, 
measured as the total time from lodgment to settling a matter.1816 
 
In Botswana, the matter of efficiency has not been reported given that there is no 
information, this study is aware of, regarding settlement rate.1817 This makes it difficult 
for this study to know if ADR in Botswana is efficient in its administration of ADR 
processes.  
 
In RSA efficiency is rated from time data is referred to CCMA and the time it took to 
settle. Table 2 indicates that on average between 2011 and 2016 conciliations against 
the standard of 30 days to settle have been settled on average of 24 days while 
arbitration using a standard measure of 60 days within which to settle have taken 59 
days on average in 2011, 61 days in 2012, 2014 and 2015 and 68 days in 2013.1818 
There is evidence of improvement but the CCMA has only met its standard once in 
five years.1819   
 
In Zimbabwe, there is also a challenge of information asymmetry as is the case with 
Botswana regarding efficiency of settlement.1820 The government, which is solely 
responsible for settlement of labour disputes, has not provided data on settlement, 
which is unavailable to this study.1821 The only information available to this study is 
secondary literature, which apparently focused only on arbitration ratings and not on 
other elements of ADR for instance conciliation or mediation.1822 Arguably, efficiency 
in labour dispute settlement is problematic in Zimbabwe granted that even through 
 
1814 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 (See Love (2011) 3) 
1815 Love (2011) 3 
1816 Ibid  
1817 Gumede http://www.africanlii.org/content/swazilands-benchmarcks-conciliation-mediation-and-
arbitration Date of use: 10 April 2017 
1818 CCMA (2016) 11 
1819 Ibid  
1820 Gumede http://www.africanlii.org/content/swazilands-benchmarcks-conciliation-mediation-and-
arbitration Date of use: 10 April 2017 
1821 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
1822 Ibid  
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arbitration processes were timely but did not bring finality to disputes.1823 Awards 
issued to winning parties still have to go through the cumbersome clerical process of 
registering them with the Magistrate Court or High Court to enable obtainment of writs 
of execution before enforcement and liquidation can be attained.  
 
Alternative Dispute Resolution must be conducted within reasonable time in order to 
dispense with disputes which is a far outcry of the litigation process which takes forever 
to do the same.1824 The argument that ADR saves time compared to court litigation is 
an argument widely endorsed by ADR scholars.1825 Some of the ways in which time 
saving nature of ADR can be determined is through setting prescription times by which 
matters in dispute must have been resolved.1826 Botswana1827 and RSA1828 have time 
limits within which disputes must be resolved and Zimbabwe does not have. For 
example, 30 days, that are to be taken to resolve a matter with respect to mediation 
and arbitration.1829 This study found that both in Botswana and RSA an arbitrator or 
mediator is required to resolve a matter through mediation within 30 days of its 
enrolment with him/her.1830 When s/he has failed to do so within 30 days he is obligated 
by statute to issue a certificate of failure to settle which ought to be returned to the 
commissioner for re-direction.1831 If a matter is for instance committed to mediation and 
fails to be settled at that level, it may be committed to arbitration as shown in table 
3.1832  
 
  
 
1823 Ibid  
1824 Love (2011) 5 
1825 Love (2011) 5, (See also Sander and Goldberg (1994) 68 & Wiese (2016) 2) 
1826 Ibid  
1827 Section 8(1), Act 15 of 2003 
1828 Section 135 (2), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended)  
1829 Section 8 (1), Act 15 of 2004 and Section 135 (2), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended) 
1830 Section 8 (1), Act 15 of 2004 and Section 135 (2), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended) 
1831 Section 135 (5)(a), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended) and Section 8 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
1832 Ibid  
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Table 2 Prescriptions for dispensing with ADR 
 
ADR process   
Countries Provisions 
Botswana South Africa Zimbabwe 
Mediation  30 days1833 30 days1834 None 
Arbitration  30 days1835 60 days1836 None 
 
Once a matter is committed to arbitration, it must be resolved within 30 days at the 
end of which an arbitration  award must be made.1837 However, some of the challenges 
levelled against mediators in Botswana is that they fail to differentiate between failing 
to settle a matter and failing to attempt to settle a matter.1838 In certain respects 
mediators do not even attempt to intervene in the given dispute which is a disservice 
to the ADR community.1839 They wait for the 30 day period to finish and issue a 
certificate of failure to settle and that is essential a miscarriage of the mediation 
mandate is.1840 The general undertaking is that mediation must have taken place first 
before it is rendered as having failed to resolve a dispute, not failing to even mediate 
at all.1841 Zimbabwe does not have the same prescription requirements set and directed 
towards saving time in ADR officiated disputes.1842 This study also found that RSA has 
a system that traces the performance of its ADR system from the time a case is 
referred to the time it gets settled.1843 On record RSA has a 75% settlement rate over 
the past five years.1844 Botswana and Zimbabwe both lack data, at least available at 
the time of conclusion of this study to ascertain the performance of the ADR system.  
 
 
 
 
 
1833 Section 8 (1), Act 15 of 2004 
1834 Section 135 (2), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended)  
1835 Section 9 (9), Act 15 of 2004 
1836 Section 139 (1) (a), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended)  
1837 Section 136 (1) (b), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended) and Section 9 (6), Act 15 of 2004 
1838 Frimpong (2006) 116 
1839 Frimpong (2006) 116 
1840 Ibid  
1841 Ibid  
1842 Madhuku (2012) 11 
1843 CCMA Annual Report (2016) 31 
1844 CCMA (2016) 31   
222 
 
6.3.2 Cost Effectiveness of ADR 
 
Several studies1845 have reviewed ADR efficacy especially in so far as it is assumed it 
reduces costs of dispute resolution when held in comparison to court litigation.1846 Cost 
estimates as regards savings tend to vary significantly from study to study, depending 
on the type of ADR scheme under review, nature of dispute, the intervention used, 
and the conditions at the local level in each jurisdiction.1847 
 
In Botswana, there is no cost that disputants incur to have their disputes mediated and 
arbitrated. The TDA1848 is silent on cost except only for penalties imposed on parties or 
their representatives for offences such as contempt for instance and also instances in 
which a party employs the services of an attorney in arbitration proceedings.1849 The 
Act1850 directs that the arbitrator may not dispense with order of costs in arbitral awards 
except in circumstances where disputants are agreeable thereto; or a disputant or 
representative behaved indignantly, frivolously or in a manner vexatious during 
proceedings.1851 In RSA, ADR is less costly given that there is no payment charged for 
persons who utilise the services of CCMA granted that it is fully funded by the 
government.1852 However, ADR offered by private entities costs an arm and a leg, 
which are beyond the affordability level of individual workers and small employers.1853 
 
Arbitration in Zimbabwe was inaccessible to the simple man for want of simplicity of 
the process confirmed by 60% of those surveyed especially that 71% respondents in 
the worker category opined that arbitration was unaffordable and therefore prohibitive 
to disputants due to cost.1854  
 
 
 
1845 Love (2011) 3 and Folberg and Rosenberg (1994) 1488 
1846 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 (See Rosenberg and Folberg (1994) in Shin (2011) 4 Love (2011) 3 and 
Wiese (2016) 2) 
1847 Wiese (2016) 2, See Love (2011) 1 
1848 Act 15 of 2003 
1849 Section 8 (11) (a), Act 15 of 2004 
1850 Act 15 of 2003 
1851 Section8 (11) (a), Act 15 of 2004 
1852 Benjamin (2013) 6 
1853 Bendeman (2007) 142 
1854 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
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6.3.3 Settlement and Enforcement   
 
Settlement and enforcement of disputes is regarded as an important element in ADR 
efficacy.1855 Alternative Dispute Resolution has potential to aid the justice system in a 
country running more efficiently. It could save costs and time while increasing user 
satisfaction. A study by Genn and others1856 conversed an involuntary ADR scheme, 
regarding instant escalation of matters to mediation, at play in London.1857 Of as many 
as 1,232 matters escalated to the program, about 14 percent were mediated; the rest 
returned to the courts.1858 Those successfully settled amounted to only 55 percent in 
the no-objection category while 48 percent matters had disputants persuaded to 
mediate.1859 
 
In Botswana, data number of labour disputes that go through the Ministry and those 
that are settled expeditiously is scant.1860 The only information available to this study is 
the sporadic data on number of cases that go through the system.1861 If there is 
settlement rate it would help measure the rate at which labour cases are being 
resolved. This study learnt that the Ministry which runs the ADR system in inundated 
with caseload for want of speedy settlement.1862 
 
In RSA, not only is there a system that tracks performance of ADR but rates the 
performance of CCMA including its ability to settle cases.1863 Table 2 shows that CCMA 
has achieved a settlement rate of 75% on average.1864 This signifies an effective 
system of labour dispute settlement to be emulated by other developing countries 
though it requires reframing of settlement around consensus driven approaches.1865 
Since it is not CCMA commissioners who settle conciliation disputes it should not be 
registered as CCMA settlement success. What is not in dispute is arbitration disputes 
 
1855 Kerbeshian (1994) 383. See also Love (2011) 6) 
1856 Genn, Fenn, Mason, Lane, Bechai, Gray and Vencappa “Twisting Arms: Court Referred and Court 
Linked Mediation under Judicial Pressure” (2007). See also Love (2011) 6) 
1857 Genn et al. (2007). See also Love (2011) 6)  
1858 Ibid  
1859 Genn et al. (2007). See also Love (2011) 6) 
1860 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1861 Ntumy (2016) 56 
1862 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1863 CCMA Annual Report (2016) 11 
1864 Ibid  
1865 Benjamin (2013) 45 
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where the commissioner reaches a verdict. South Africa has also, on a positive note, 
enacted section 143 to the Labour Relations Act1866 which seeks to shorten the process 
of enforcing an arbitration award. In terms of that section a winner can get the director 
of CCMA to certify the award and that will effectively convert it into an order of the 
Magistrate Court as opposed to the past approach where after receiving it, one took it 
to court to be converted into such an order. The Department of Labour in South Africa 
is also paying the cost of disputing for those employees who cannot afford to enforce 
their awards. These are positive steps South Africa has put in place as a push in the 
right direction especially in making ADR in labour disputes, efficacious. 
 
Table 3 Number of disputes referred to CCMA 20011 - 2016 
Referrals  2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 
Total referrals  161 588 168 434 170673 171854 179528 
Jurisdictional cases 126 504 131 564 134 943 137 479 145 728 
Non-Jurisdictional 35 084 36 870 35 730 34 375 33 800 
Pre-conciliations heard 16% 17% 17% 15% 17% 
Pre-conciliations finalised 8% 9% 11% 11% 11% 
Corn/Arb finalised 36% 36% 40% 38% 37% 
Conciliations heard and closed 96% 96% 96% 96% 96% 
Arbitrations finalised 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 
Late Awards - by commissioner  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Late Awards - sent to parties 7% 1% 0% 0% 0% 
Postponements/Adjournments 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 
Process reworks (8%) 7% 6% 5% 6% 6% 
Turnaround time - conciliation (30 days) 24 24 24 23 23 
Turnaround time - Arbitration (60 days) 59 61 68 61 61 
Settlement rate 70% 73% 75% 76% 74% 
Source: CCMA Annual Report (2016) 31-32 
 
In Zimbabwe as in Botswana there is no data this study is aware of that reports on 
settlement rate of cases.1867 This study only has inferences from secondary literature 
that presumes settlement rate to be poor in Zimbabwe.1868 Available data was 
 
1866 Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
1867 Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 75. See also Madhuku (2012) 17 and Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44) 
1868 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
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conducted to rate arbitration and none exists that this study is aware of that rates 
conciliation and mediation services in Zimbabwe Labour dispute settlement 
performance.1869 
 
6.3.4 Client satisfaction  
 
Elements of client satisfaction revolved around the goals of ADR namely its ability at: 
maintaining privacy, preserving relationships, involvement of constituencies, linking 
issues, getting neutral opinion, setting precedent, accessibility to disputants and 
degree of informality, among other things.1870 Among direct ADR impacts observed is 
clients’ higher satisfaction levels deriving from outcomes of use of ADR.1871 Other 
aspects might comprise served jobs instead of losing them during disputes.1872 There 
exists no data that specifically measures this element in Botswana, RSA and 
Zimbabwe though inferences in several studies1873 have been made which are here 
discussed. 
 
In Botswana there are no data this study is aware of which measures client satisfaction 
with respect to the labour dispute settlement process.1874 The only indications that 
would give a picture of the performance of the ADR are that the Ministry is inundated 
with high caseload, thus, it is unable to dispense with cases expeditiously as can be 
gleaned from Kupe-Kalonda’s study.1875 The establishment of an independent body 
has been stayed for supposed lack of funds and political will by the Botswana 
government.1876 
 
In RSA, there is an abundance of information on settlement rate but none on client 
satisfaction with the ADR this study is aware of.1877 Indications are that usually the 
CCMA body battles the challenge of non-attendance by both or either party to a 
 
1869 Ibid. See also Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70) 
1870 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
1871 Folberg and Rosenberg (1994) 1488 
1872 Love (2011) 4 
1873 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44. See also Benjamin (2013) 18; Bendeman (2007) 142 and Madhuku (2013) 
35) 
1874 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1875 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44  
1876 Ibid 170 
1877 CCMA (2016) 11. See also Benjamin (2013) 46) 
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dispute at ADR administered tribunals.1878 It remains to be established whether non-
attendance especially by employers is an indication of dissatisfaction or (rather spite 
of) with the system or lack of preference for it.1879 Although the scheme is often 
characterised as mandatory, a commissioner does not have the latitude to dismiss a 
matter due to non-attendance at the conciliation stage.1880 Many employers are in the 
habit of deliberately avoiding attendance at conciliation.1881 In the years 2010/2011 for 
instance a total 15 per cent conciliation interventions resulted in non-attendance and 
the employers were absent for 75 per cent of the time.1882 The other element that needs 
attention is that CCMA administered ADR has not promoted job retention.1883 The 
CCMA does not enjoy a good track record of reinstating dismissed workers.1884  
 
In Zimbabwe, this study only established the dissatisfaction expressed against 
arbitration proceedings and none on conciliation/mediation proceedings.1885 The main 
bone of contention is enforcement of awards which does not happen expeditiously 
except through registration with the Magistrate Court or High Court even if awards 
have been confirmed and ordered by the Labour Court.1886 In a study1887 conducted in 
Zimbabwe a total of 65% respondents surveyed in the employer category believed 
that arbitrators were almost always biased in their judgments whilst a total of 68% 
surveyed respondents in the workers categories contended that they were unprepared 
to accept any rulings by arbitrators against them.1888 
 
6.4 Summary  
 
This chapter compared the performance of ADR systems of labour dispute settlement 
in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. This study relied largely on three points of analysis, 
namely ADR background conditions constituting adequate legislative and political 
support, institutional and cultural support, adequate and competent manpower, 
 
1878 Benjamin (2013) 18 
1879 Benjamin (2013) 18  
1880 Ibid  
1881 Ibid. See also Bendeman (2007) 142) 
1882 Benjamin (2013) 18 
1883 Bendeman (2007) 142 
1884 Ibid  
1885 Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 75. See also Madhuku (2012) 17) 
1886 Madhuku (2012) 17. See Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 151) 
1887 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141 
1888 Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 152  
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adequate funding support and parity in the power of disputants1889 on the one hand 
and then ADR program design considerations which touch upon Planning and 
preparation and Operations and implementation1890 then finally ADR measures which 
constitute client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, cost and efficiency.1891 The 
study found that generally on all scales RSA has a well-established ADR system of 
labour dispute settlement compared to Botswana and Zimbabwe on all counts.1892 For 
example in terms of adequate legislative and political support Botswana and 
Zimbabwe have weak labour movements that are almost subordinate to the 
governments making them weaker partners in determining labour policy.1893 RSA on 
the other hand had strong civic movement that supported industrial democracy despite 
being regarded as an unequal society.1894  
 
Regarding ADR design, RSA relies on an electronic system for managing the dispute 
settlement scheme which affords it a basis for efficiency1895 while Botswana and 
Zimbabwe still rely on manual systems administered by Labour Officers which tends 
to stifle efficiency.1896 RSA has been able to record the number of matters that pass 
through its system since inception1897 while such records are unavailable in the case 
of Botswana and Zimbabwe.1898 RSA has therefore been able to establish the matters 
that have been dispensed with at its level and those escalated to the courts and those 
that have been weeded out of its mandate for want of jurisdiction.1899 The only 
information that is unavailable in the case of RSA is the levels of satisfaction of 
disputants going through the body to have their disputes resolved.1900 Such statistics 
have not been made available in the case of Botswana and Zimbabwe, respectively 
particularly because, in part, the Acts1901 therein do not make it a requirement, which 
is different from RSA, which makes it mandatory.1902 This chapter also noted that the 
 
1889 Brown et al. (1998) 33 
1890 Ibid 40 
1891 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1892 Madhuku (2012) 11. See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44) 
1893 Madhuku (2012) 11. See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44) 
1894 Lings (2014) 15 
1895 Benjamin (2013) 46 
1896 Madhuku (2013) 35 and Sections 7 and 8 Act 15 of 2003 
1897 CCMA (2016) 11 
1898 Madhuku (2012) 11 and Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 44 
1899 CCMA (2016) 11 
1900 Bendeman (2007) 142 
1901 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:1) and Act 15 of 2003 
1902 Section 115 (1)(d), Act 66 of 1995. See also CCMA (2016) 54)  
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three countries under consideration in this study are members of the ILO, and have 
ratified conventions and treaties that enjoins them to enforce international labour 
standards. It would appear to this study that South Africa has done well in establishing 
more efficacious ADR processes that were powered by ILO while Botswana and 
Zimbabwe have not fared well in the same regard. Botswana and Zimbabwe have 
been charged for violating international labour standards in respect to unfairly 
determining essential service categories and limiting the right to strike and at the same 
time failing to enforce statutes against forced labour respectively. Nevertheless, it can 
be concluded that RSA, despite its own inadequacies1903 has a more efficacious ADR 
system of labour dispute settlement than in Botswana and Zimbabwe.1904 
  
 
1903 Benjamin (2013) 46. See also Bendeman (2007) 142) 
1904 Madhuku (2012) 11 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7 INTRODUCTION  
 
This study was conducted to critically review, in a comparative and comprehensive 
fashion, the ADR schemes in three countries namely, Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe 
so as to establish its efficaciousness or otherwise in labour dispute settlement. This 
particular chapter concludes the study with a discussion of conclusions and 
recommendations thereto. The objectives set out in chapter 1 are put to test in this 
chapter. The chapter’s conclusions and recommendations collect around the 
objectives set out herein which sought to answer questions of this study. This chapter 
also discusses recommendations for future studies giving regard to its own limitations 
leading to a conclusion.  
 
The questions of the study this chapter seeks to provide answers to are set out at the 
start of this research, as follows: 
 
• Is there a problem with ADR in labour dispute resolution in Botswana, RSA and 
Zimbabwe? 
• What initiatives have been undertaken to make ADR mechanism efficacious in 
labour dispute resolution in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe? 
• Are there any challenges faced with the use of ADR in labour dispute resolution 
in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe? 
• Which among the various factors are pertinent to the efficacy of ADR in labour 
dispute resolution in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe? 
 
To answer these questions this study transformed the above questions into objectives 
which are relied upon to conclude this study. The following objectives were set out for 
this study to answer to the above questions: 
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• to examine the efficacy of ADR in resolving labour disputes in Botswana, RSA 
and Zimbabwe;  
• to assess the initiatives undertaken to make ADR mechanism efficacious in 
resolving labour disputes in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe;  
• to examine the challenges faced with measurement of ADR efficacy in resolving 
labour disputes in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe; and finally;  
• to establish the factors pertinent to the effectiveness of ADR in resolving labour 
disputes in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe.  
 
The study conducted a review of literature on the subject of ADR efficacy in Botswana, 
RSA and Zimbabwe in chapters 2 to 5. The objective was to set out a framework for 
conducting this study. Issues and views emanating from the experts reviewed in 
chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 were used to assess the status of ADR in the three countries 
for purposes of comparison at the end of which thereafter was used to compare the 
existing practices (secondary data) to reach conclusions. In order to address the 
above outlined questions and objectives of the study, this study relied largely on an 
adapted hypothetical model termed the ADR Efficacy Model, as illustrated in figure 4 
which comprises a three basis point of analysis, composed of (1) ADR background 
conditions constituting adequate legislative and political support, institutional support, 
adequate and competent manpower, sufficient funding support and power parity of 
disputants1905 on the one hand and then (2) ADR program design considerations which 
touch upon Planning and preparation and Operations and implementation1906 then 
finally (3) ADR measures which constitute (a) client satisfaction, (b) settlement and 
enforcement, (c) cost and (d) efficiency.1907 These are not discussed in detail in this 
chapter given their wide exposition in the preceding chapters and particularly chapter 
2 to this study. They are however used as the basis for reaching conclusions and 
recommendations pertaining the status of ADR in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe in 
this chapter. 
 
 
1905 Brown et al. (1998) 33 
1906 Ibid 40 
1907 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
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The study picked the above illustrated elements, namely (1) ADR background 
conditions; (2) ADR program design1908 and then finally (3) ADR measures1909 
characteristics, in that order to analyse the situation in each country and this chapter 
is poised to conclude on the attendant findings.  
 
Figure 3 ADR Efficacy Framework 
 
Adapted from Brown et al1910 and Kerbeshian1911 and Wiese1912 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
 
The first objective of this study was to ascertain the efficacy (effectiveness and 
efficiency) of the ADR interventions used to settle labour disputes in Botswana, RSA 
and Zimbabwe. This study was crippled by the lack of standard measures of efficacy 
of ADR as a universal problem as noted by Shin’s study.1913 The second challenge 
faced in regard to this objective was lack of data on the basis of which to make 
evaluations particularly in Botswana and Zimbabwe,1914 a challenge which is fairly not 
acute in RSA.1915 The information used was mainly based on inferences from 
secondary literature that was available to the study such as reported court cases, 
journal outputs and CCMA annual reports in the case of RSA.1916 However, in the main, 
efficacy could not be ascertained only on measurable criteria such as client 
 
1908 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1909 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1910 Brown et al. (1998) 15 
1911 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1912 Wiese (2016) 2, See also Love (2011) 5 
1913 Shin (2011) 13 (See also Love (2011) 5 and Brown et al. (1998) 40) 
1914 Madhuku (2012) 31  
1915 CCMA Annual Report (2016) 31 
1916 Ibid  
ADR 
Program 
Design
ADR Measures
ADR 
Background 
Conditions
232 
 
satisfaction, settlement and enforcement; efficiency and cost-saving but also on other 
factors termed critical success factors in this study in agreement with Kerbeshian’s1917 
findings. Critical successful factors looked at ADR conditions which revolve around the 
context in which ADR is established namely adequate legislative and political support, 
institutional and cultural capacity, adequate and competent manpower and sufficient 
funding support and power parity among disputants.1918 Another set of critical success 
factor considered is ADR design factors which collected around the planning elements 
as well as the implementation elements.1919  
 
On the basis of the review of ADR background conditions, this study found that ADR 
in RSA had gained phenomenal support given the involvement of stakeholders 
comprising a tripartite body such as the Unions, Business Community and 
Government from its inception in 1995. The CCMA is independent and governed by a 
tripartite Governing Body in charge of administering ADR processes in labour dispute 
resolution in South Africa.”1920 ADR in RSA is fully funded by the government1921 which 
works well for its effectiveness and its Commissioners are continually trained.1922 
Further, RSA has been able to develop and provide for the development of 
institutions1923 that aid the administration of ADR such as providing for the certification 
of independent ADR bodies like Tokiso who provide private ADR services.1924 A very 
important element contributing towards RSA ADR framework is its ability to rope in all 
partners in industry to the table and have them contribute towards industrial 
democracy goals.1925 The RSA also continually makes inroads in making ADR more 
efficacious by giving CCMA the same powers afforded to a court of law to issue writs 
for enforcing arbitration  awards.1926 In terms of the LRA, an arbitration award issued 
by a CCMA Commissioner is final and binding and may be enforced as if it was an 
order of the Magistrate Court in respect of which a writ has been issued, with the 
exception of advisory arbitration awards such as orders for performance, other than 
 
1917 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1918 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1919 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1920 Benjamin (2013) 6 
1921 Ibid  
1922 CCMA (2016) 31 
1923 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 613 
1924 Benjamin (2009) 42 
1925 Section 23, Act 108 of 1996 (See also Ferreira (2004) 76) 
1926 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
233 
 
payment of money, for instance, reinstatement.1927 Such a development was quite 
important in 2014 especially that an arbitration award may be certified by a CCMA 
Director1928 and thus it becomes unnecessary to approach the Magistrate Court in 
terms of the LRA.1929 The fact that an award gets certified by the CCMA director means 
that the time needed to get it certified by the courts for enforcement purposes is saved 
making ADR time efficient. These are positive steps that work in the favour of ADR 
legislative and political support towards ADR efficacy in South Africa labour dispute 
resolution.  
 
The RSA’s ADR has had scathing attacks for its own inadequacies such as inability to 
maintain relationships after CCMA administration of disputes.1930 The CCMA has not 
registered a good track record of employee reinstatement after dismissal.1931 ADR 
interventions administered by private entities or individuals other than the government 
are rather costly, rendering it not affordable to majority of the ordinary workers.1932 This 
implies that the ADR system in RSA does not focus on restorative relationships 
beyond the dispute settlement.1933 The question to this study is, do those inadequacies 
render ADR in RSA inefficacious? This study holds the view that the positive aspects 
of ADR in RSA outweigh its inadequacies particularly when looked at in comparison 
to Botswana and Zimbabwe’s respective ADR schemes.1934 In the main ADR in RSA 
has registered 75% percent success on record of settlements which is a commendable 
feat.1935  
 
On the other hand, the situation has been different in Botswana and Zimbabwe where 
the government has been accused of exerting a heavy hand influence in the labour 
dispute resolution regime and other partners are rather weak.1936 The Botswana 
government for instance has been reluctant to establish an independent body that 
 
1927 Section 143 (3), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1928 Ibid  
1929 Section 158(1)(c), Act 66 of 1995 (As amended in 2014) 
1930 Benjamin (2009) 42  
1931 Ibid  
1932 Ibid  
1933 Ibid  
1934 Brown et al. (1998) 33 (See also CCMA Annual Report (2016) 31; Swanepoel et al. (2008) 613 and 
Benjamin (2009) 44  
1935 CCMA (2016) 31 
1936 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 
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administers ADR rather preferring to rely on the arm of government to do so.1937 
Botswana for instance lacks an established culture and history of civic engagement 
when compared to countries like RSA, civil society is therefore considered relatively 
weak.1938 The government of Botswana has single handedly determined salaries, 
curbed strikes and declared many sectors of the economy essential services so as to 
inhibit dissent.1939 The administration of ADR by the Labour Officer’s has also had its 
fair share of problems including lack of skills,1940 poor coordination, using manual 
systems;1941 higher levels of caseloads which cannot be handled by existing 
capacity;1942 incessant escalation of matters to Industry Court because of mistrust of 
ADR decisions;1943 failure to attempt to mediate and escalation of matters 
unnecessarily.1944 In Botswana, problems have also flowed from the terms of 
engagement of part-time mediators, which apparently requires that they should not 
also act as advocates in mediation or arbitration.1945 As noted, the government has only 
recently created new positions for full time Labour Officers, some of whom might carry 
out this work.1946 The Industrial Court has highlighted poor judgment among ADR 
practitioners such as in the Montle matter1947 in which a mediator’s inability to 
understand  its own role especially that s/he did not have jurisdiction to hear matters 
that resounded in money as provided by Section 25 of Botswana’s Trade Dispute Act 
is a case in point.1948 These issues render Botswana’s ADR still far from being 
efficacious when comparing it to RSA’s. This study holds the view that Botswana’s 
ADR is inefficacious.1949  
 
In Zimbabwe, the dominant role of the government in labour dispute resolution 
weakens the efficacious administration of ADR processes as the government tends to 
take the position of both referee and player in disputes involving government as a party 
 
1937 Section 3, Act 15 of 2003 
1938 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 (2016) 6 
1939 Mwatcha (2015) 44 
1940 Ntumy (2016) 58 
1941 Centre for Employment & Labour Relations Law (2006) 7 
1942 Gumede http://www.africanlii.org/content/swazilands-benchmarcks-conciliation-mediation-and-
arbitration Date of use: 10 April 2017 
1943 Ntumy (2016) 58 
1944 Frimpong (2006) 116 
1945 Centre for Employment & Labour Relations Law (2006) 7 
1946 ibid   
1947 [2010] 2 BLR 120 IC 
1948 Section 25(1), Act 15 of 2004 
1949 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40; Frimpong (2006) 116; Ntumy (2016) 58 and Mwatcha (2015) 43) 
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(employer) thereto.1950 Much like the Botswana situation ADR is administered by the 
Labour Officers who are essentially members of the executive government.1951 This 
study holds the view that RSA’s ADR is far efficacious achieving 75% settlement of its 
matters1952 whereas Botswana and Zimbabwe has not made an effort to establish an 
independent entity that ensure such efficacious attainment of ADR goals is made 
possible.1953 
 
The second objective of this study was to examine the challenges of ADR program in 
Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. The study found that challenges include legislative 
and political, administrative, funding, client satisfaction, enforcement and skilled 
manpower to administer ADR effectively.1954 As already highlighted in the above 
discussion in objective 1, ADR is administered by the executive government in 
Botswana and Zimbabwe countries which potentially undermines its effectiveness as 
far as independence and autonomy is concerned.1955 The usual government 
bureaucracies are undermining the effectiveness of labour dispute resolution in 
Botswana and Zimbabwe due to inadequate manpower and skilled ADR 
practitioners.1956 This could also be attributable to limited financial resources to 
administer ADR from the coffers of the Department of Labour and Social Security1957 
and Department of Labour1958 in Botswana and Zimbabwe respectively.1959  
 
In Zimbabwe, for instance arbitrators and mediators are accused of favouritism and 
Labour Officers dishing out cases to their friends to aid their money making agenda 
rather than dispensing with disputes effectively.1960 The adjunct provision for 
registering awards with courts has derailed the enforcement of awards in 
Zimbabwe.1961 Employers have used the appeals process to allow awards to prescribe 
 
1950 Maphosa (1991) 22; Mandaza (1986) 243; and Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 (2016) 4) 
1951 Section 93, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
1952 CCMA (2016) 31 
1953 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 and Madhuku (2012) 31 
1954 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1955 Brown et al. (1998) 25 
1956 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 and Mandaza (1986) 125 
1957 Madhuku (2012) 36 
1958 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 166 
1959 Madhuku (2012) 36 and Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 166 
1960 Madhuku (2012) 38 
1961 Sections 13 and 14, Act 2003 [Chapter 28:01] 
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while being escalated for appeal, actions clearly prejudicial to workers.1962 Studies1963 
conducted in Zimbabwe have revealed that arbitration is disdained by workers for 
being inhibitive and costly. 
 
In RSA, ADR is generally widely supported by all actors in the legislative and political 
front, and also well resourced.1964 There are systems of measurement in place which 
ensures efficacy of ADR in RSA.1965 In RSA the LRA’1966 makes it mandatory for CCMA 
to: 
 
“…compile and publish information and statistics about its activities.”1967 
 
This is seldom the case in Botswana and Zimbabwe, at least based on information 
available to this study at its conclusion.1968 In  terms of institutional support of ADR RSA 
has done far much better than Botswana and Zimbabwe – especially establishing an 
independent body that administers the system of labour dispute settlement.1969 RSA 
still has to address concerns around non-attendance at ADR meetings by employers 
as well as frivolous cases and what other commentators call too prescriptive and fixed 
approaches,1970 rather parties to a dispute need to be afforded flexibility in considering 
approaches for resolving their disputes.1971 
 
The third objective of this study was to ascertain the efforts and initiatives to make 
ADR efficacious in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. RSA has continually made efforts 
to make ADR efficacious including improving case management systems for 
administration of disputes, training of commissioners for ensuring they are competent 
in handling disputes.1972 RSA has managed to continually repeal its legislation to factor 
it new developments and to ease the ADR regime. For instance, the enactment of 
 
1962 [2015] S-38-15 (See also [2012] HH 191/12; [2016] HC 5061/14) 
1963 Madhuku (2012) 38. See also Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141) 
1964 Benjamin (2013) 6 
1965 Section 115 (1)(d), Act 66 of 1995 (See also CCMA (2016) 54) 
1966 Ibid  
1967 Ibid  
1968 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 and Madhuku (2012) 31 
1969 Swanepoel et al. (2008) 613 
1970 Bendeman (2007) 141 
1971 Ibid  
1972 CCMA (2016) 31 
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Section 143 into the LRA’951973 afore-discussed in terms of which an arbitration award 
may be certified by a CCMA Director1974 and thus it becomes unnecessary to approach 
the Courts is a case in point, which is not the case in the other two jurisdictions.1975 
Botswana and Zimbabwe still need to put effort in this regard.1976 Zimbabwe has 
attempted to aid the ADR regime by requiring arbitrators to have an academic degree 
before they could act as such.1977 An interview conducted at the labour Ministry in 
Zimbabwe indicated that,1978 the minimum credentials for a Labour Officers was an 
academic degree coupled with a two years’ experience in handling labour related 
matters.1979 This was considered a misnomer given that no such regulation had been 
previously enacted to provide for such a rendering.1980 Recent treatise into the matter 
suggests that the anomaly has been addressed.1981 A hailed proclamation in the Act1982 
directs that an Arbitrator or a Designated Agent must be in possession of an academic 
degree.1983 The aforesaid initiatives are efforts undertaken to support ADR though it 
does not make the scheme shy away from the inherent bias of the clenched fist with 
which the state runs it. It would be ideal for the government to create in independent 
body such South Africa’s CCMA to administer ADR in labour dispute resolution.1984 The 
Industrial Court in Botswana for instance has endorsed ADR in Kekgosi matter1985 by 
asserting that the matter needed to go through mediation and arbitration first before 
audience for it was sought with the court. The court further asserted that there is no 
reference that the matter had been mediated upon and issued with a certificate of 
failure to settle issued or urgency1986 or the minister,1987 or the Commissioner1988 or 
parties or before being directed to the Industrial Court.1989 There are semblances of 
changes and initiatives in the ADR scheme in labour dispute settlement in Botswana 
 
1973 Section 143, Act 66 of 1995 (Amended in 2014) 
1974 Ibid  
1975 Sections 13 and 14, Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] and  
1976 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 and Madhuku (2012) 31 
1977 Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70 
1978 Ibid  
1979 Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70   
1980 Ibid  
1981 Ibid  
1982 Act of 2003 [Chapter 28:01] (See also Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70) 
1983 Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70 
1984 Ibid  
1985 [2010] 3 BLR 714 IC 
1986 Section 20(3), Act 15 of 2004 (As amended) 
1987 Section 14(1), Act 15 of 2004 (As amended) 
1988 Section 13, Act 15 of 2004 (As amended) 
1989 [2010] 3 BLR 714 IC 
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and Zimbabwe but not sufficient to generate ADR efficacy.1990 The main changes 
required relates to (1) ADR background conditions; (2) ADR program design1991 and 
(3) ADR measures1992 already discussed in detail above. The changes noted above do 
not even come close to addressing the many challenges emanating from Botswana 
and Zimbabwe ADR regimes.1993 RSA on the other hand, has achieved much in that 
space and could only continue to improve.1994 In the result, RSA’s ADR is considered 
efficacious.1995 
 
The fourth and final objective of this study was to establish and discuss the critical 
Success factors for ADR efficacy in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe. This study 
established critical success factors that ought to be seriously reviewed and factored 
into the three countries – Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe for the efficacious 
administration of ADR in labour dispute settlement. These are ADR background 
conditions constituting adequate legislative and political support, institutional and 
cultural support, adequate and competent manpower, funding and parity in the power 
of disputants1996 on the one hand and then ADR program design considerations which 
touch upon Planning and preparation and Operations and implementation1997 and then 
finally ADR measures which constitute client satisfaction, settlement and enforcement, 
cost and efficiency.1998 It can be concluded from an analysis of this objective that RSA 
far outpaced the other two in terms of this criteria.1999 This is so because South Africa 
has a legislature who firstly saw the need to establish an independent body to 
administer ADR, and continue to make amendments such as section 143 for ease of 
enforcement of arbitration awards among other things. RSA’s ADR is also free of 
charge, and information on its performance is made publicity available through annual 
reporting, which is not the case in the two counterpart countries. RSA has a far more 
 
1990 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 and Madhuku (2012) 31 
1991 Brown et al. (1998) 40 
1992 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1993 Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 40 (See also Madhuku (2012) 31; Mahapa and Watadza (2015) 70 and 
Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141) 
1994 CCMA (2016) 31 
1995 Ibid  
1996 Brown et al. (1998) 33 
1997 Ibid 40 
1998 Kerbeshian (1994) 383 
1999 CCMA (2016) 31 (See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 166; Madhuku (2012) 31; Mahapa and Watadza 
(2015) 70 and Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141) 
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efficacious ADR system for labour dispute settlement2000 which Botswana and 
Zimbabwe can emulate in developing their own to acceptable levels.2001 
 
Notably, Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe are members of the ILO and have ratified conventions 
and treaties that enjoin them to protect and promote international labour standards in their 
countries. South Africa has utilised the International Labour Standards to build strong ADR 
processes.  As already pointed out, South Africa had its first employees who worked for its 
CCMA body trained by ILO and its system is running effectively compared to other countries 
in the region. Botswana and Zimbabwe have unfortunately not fared well in enforcing ILO 
conventions including those they ratified. The two countries ought to consider following the 
example of South Africa in enforcing legislation that aligns with international labour standards 
in so far as ADR processes are concerned. This helps in developing efficacious ADR 
processes especially the creation of independent tribunal than the current practice of 
administering it through government departments, funding and capacitating its workforce to 
competently deliver on the mandate.  
 
7.2 Recommendations  
 
Based on the findings and conclusions of this study the following recommendations 
are advanced: 
 
• It is recommended that the Botswana and Zimbabwe governments consider 
establishing an independent body in their respective countries that administers 
ADR to remove the bureaucratic bottlenecks that undermine speedy resolution 
of disputes as the case may be at present.  
• Botswana; RSA and Zimbabwe labour market partners should strike to enhance 
institutional and cultural development towards a culture of civic engagement 
and consensus driven (ADR_ rather than combative (litigious)) approaches to 
resolve dispute settlement. 
• The Botswana and Zimbabwe governments ought to level the playing field and 
allow parties such as unions to exercise their roles without heavy handedness 
from statement machinery. This calls for a reduction in power disparities 
 
2000 CCMA (2016) 31 (See also Kupe-Kalonda (2001) 166; Madhuku (2012) 31; Mahapa and Watadza 
(2015) 70 and Maitireyi and Duve (2011) 141) 
2001 Ibid   
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between employers, employees, unions and management organisations and 
other key partners in the dispute settlement space. 
• It is recommended that RSA strengthens its ADR scheme to enhance job 
retention after dispute settlement. 
• It is recommended that the Botswana and Zimbabwe governments provide 
adequate financial resources for the establishment of an independent ADR 
body (if it is established as recommended a quo) to ensure that it is 
administered effectively. 
• It is recommended that a commission is established to ascertain the 
relationship between ADR and court litigation systems in RSA so as to curb 
potential resistance by the latter that ADR is usurping society of judiciary 
precedence given its nature as a private and confidential procedure. 
• Botswana and Zimbabwean governments ought to level the play field 
characterised by industrial democracy and consensus driven rather than the 
current heavy-handedness. 
• The legislature in Botswana, RSA and Zimbabwe ought to consider prescribing 
minimum skills requirements for ADR practitioners particularly conciliators, 
mediators and arbitrators within the legislative enactments to ensure that their 
dispute settlement systems are clothed with skilled cadre who can dispense 
with causes expeditiously. 
• The legislatures in Zimbabwe ought to consider prescribing minimum time 
thresholds for dispensing with conciliation and arbitration that would guide 
practitioners and disputants for the purposes of expedience. This practice is 
present in Botswana and RSA helping to advance the role of efficiency in terms 
of time-saving nature of ADR. 
• The legislatures in Botswana and Zimbabwe ought to delineate the exact roles 
of ADR practitioners so that there is clarity on matters of their exact roles in 
mediation and arbitration and what they are also not mandated to do to ward 
off confusion. 
• It is recommended that the legislatures of Botswana and Zimbabwe 
respectively develop an online case management system to ensure that ADR 
administered disputes are settled within reasonable time rather than the current 
systems that are left to the discretions of government officers. 
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• Botswana and Zimbabwe ought to consider enhancing the power of arbitrators 
to enforce awards as if they were court orders. Currently in Zimbabwe arbitral 
awards have to be enforced through registering them through the Magistrate 
and High Court depending on the jurisdictional amount involved.  
• RSA ought to consider reviewing the prescriptive nature of ADR functions to 
ensure that it produces outcomes that are acceptable to all stakeholders that 
rely on the system for labour dispute settlement.  
• Botswana and Zimbabwe ought to make data on ADR performance within easy 
reach of researchers and the public domain. 
• South Africa ought to consider reviewing the effectiveness of the Essential Services 
Committee, in determining essential services. 
• Zimbabwe ought to enjoin its judiciary to reach correct rulings in respect to termination 
of employment contracts to line up with convention (C150). 
• Botswana and Zimbabwe ought to enforce international standards in respect to 
establishing efficacious ADR processes in labour dispute resolution.  
 
7.3 Suggestions for future research   
 
Future research ought to consider collecting data on ADR practices in Botswana, RSA 
and Zimbabwe so as to capture the experiences of ADR practitioners as well as 
disputants. This may help formulate policy and contribute towards theory development 
in ADR development. Future research also could focus on development of measurable 
criteria that is used to determine with exactitude the effectiveness and efficiency in 
labour dispute settlement program. Future research ought to also consider 
development of sustainable funding models for ADR efficacy. Another area which is 
still grey is enforceability of ADR outcomes in the Botswana and Zimbabwe. In South 
Africa one might want to see the effectiveness of the section 1432002 while in the other 
two countries one needs to ascertain what informs enforcement of ADR awards as 
both the legislation and case law is somewhat silent on the matter. Future studies 
ought to consider the role of ILO in establishing efficacious ADR processes in labour 
disputes in SADC countries especially in Botswana and Zimbabwe. Further studies 
might need to consider efficacy of specialized bodies dealing about dispute settlement 
 
2002 Act 66 of 1995 (Amended) 
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like ELRC which are specific to education labour disputes  as well as private 
bodies like Tokiso and Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC). 
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